Transparent computationalism

Ronald L. Chrisley ( RONC@Cogs. Susx. Ac. Uk)
School of Cognitive & Computing Sciences
University of Sussex
Falmer BN1 9QH, UNITED KINGDOM

Abstract:

A distinction is made between two senses of the claim ``cognition is computation". One sense (the opaque reading) takes computation to be whatever is described by our current computational theory and claims that cognition is best understood in terms of that theory. The transparent reading, which has its primary allegiance to the phenomenon of computation, rather than to any particular theory of it, is the claim that the best account of cognition will be given by whatever theory turns out to be the best account of the phenomenon of computation. The distinction is clarified and defended against charges of circularity and changing the subject. Several well-known objections to computationalism are then reviewed, and for each the question of whether the transparent reading of the computationalist claim can provide a response is considered.