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D. Chalmers.
A computational foundation for the study of cognition.
Minds and Machines, 4(4), 1994.
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R. Chrisley.
Why everything doesn't realize every computation.
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A. Clark and J. Toribio.
Doing without representing?
Synthese, 101:401-431, 1994.
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J. Fodor.
Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in
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J. Fodor.
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S. Harnad.
The symbol grounding problem.
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C. Peacocke.
Content, computation and externalism.
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R. Penrose.
The Shadows of the Mind.
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H. Putnam.
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H. Putnam.
Representation and Reality.
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J. Searle.
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J. Searle.
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B. C. Smith.
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T. van Gelder.
What might cognition be, if not computation?
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T. van Gelder.
The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1998.
Ron Chrisley
1999-05-10