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Global Governance & Cosmopolitan Citizens

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Abstract

The most recent wave of globalization in markets, governance, and communications has increased interconnectedness between companies, states, and peoples worldwide. Indicators of structural changes affecting the role and autonomy of the nation-state, outlined elsewhere in this book, range from the proliferation of international NGOs and the expanding power of agencies like the European Union and United Nations, to the rise of multilateral agreements regulating trade, human rights and environmental protection. The sovereignty and autonomy of the nation-state has been eroded, a process that has perhaps gone furthest within the European Union. But how has the public responded to these developments? Many assume that the rise of global governance may have weakened traditional national identities, for good or ill, but skeptics suggest there are few grounds for this belief.

To examine the evidence underlying this debate, this chapter focuses on three issues. Has the rise of global governance transformed national identities so that more people have come to see themselves as part of their continent or world community rather than, say, Americans, Russians, or British, or, at a more local level, as Bostonians, Muscovites, or Londoners? How far do the public have confidence and trust in the institutions of global governance, including multilateral associations and international organizations such as the United Nations, European Union, the Organization of African Unity, and ASEAN? And how far do the public support economic policies leading towards greater globalization, such as approving of free trade and labor migration? These issues are important for understanding the public’s response to global governance, as well as for insights into the democratic legitimacy of the new world order.

To analyze these questions, the introduction outlines the theoretical debate in the literature and summarizes what we know from the evidence in previous studies. Part II defines how we are conceptualizing and measuring different dimensions of cosmopolitanism and maps out public opinion in seventy nations around the world, drawing on the World Values Surveys in the early to mid-1990s. Part III considers alternative explanations of the cross-national differences that emerge, comparing cosmopolitan attitudes in a wide range of advanced industrialized, post-communist, and developing societies, as well as between generational cohorts. The conclusion summarizes the major findings and considers their broader implications for the future of global governance.

Global Governance & Cosmopolitan Citizens

In recent decades, a massive wave of globalization has expanded the scale and speed of worldwide flows of capital, goods, people, and ideas across national borders. ‘Globalization’ is understood as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrating national economies, cultures, technologies, and governance, producing complex relations of mutual interdependence. There continues to be dispute about the exact periodization of the phenomenon, the distinctiveness of the most recent wave, and its impact in different spheres, but accounts point to a wide range of developments contributing towards globalization in the late-twentieth century. As others discuss in this book, communications have been transformed by the velocity and density of information flows and the extent of interconnectedness via modern technologies, notably the Internet, reaching the mass public as well as the elite¹. Economies have been transformed by the rapid expansion of financial markets, producing greater economic interdependence between states, such as the way that world exports of goods and services have almost tripled in real terms since the 1970s². Perhaps the greatest change, however, has been the growth of multilayered governance and the diffusion of political authority, with the role of the nation-state transformed by the development of regional trade blocs like the European Union, NAFTA, and ASEAN; the growing role of international bodies like the World Trade Organization, UN and NATO; the burgeoning network of transnational NGOs; and new norms and regulations of international and multilateral governance on issues ranging from trade to human rights and environmental protection³.

The impact of global governance upon national identities has raised many hopes and fears. On the one hand, theorists ranging from August Comte and John Stuart Mill to Karl Marx and Anthony Giddens have expressed optimism that humanity will eventually transcend national boundaries by moving towards a global culture and society. In this perspective, we can expect the globalization of markets, governance and communications to strengthen a *cosmopolitan* orientation, broadening identities beyond national boundaries to a world community, and increasing awareness of the benefits of transnational collaboration within regional associations

¹ Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

² United Nations. 1999. *Human Development Report*. NY: UN. P.30.

³ For a discussion, see David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

and international institutions.

Hence theorists such as Ohmae believe that we are witnessing the ‘end of the nation state’, with the modern period representing a new historical era dominated by the growth of world markets forces and the forces of Western consumerism, a tide against which national governments and economies have become increasingly powerless⁴. Anthony Giddens claims that contemporary globalization is historically unprecedented, reshaping modern societies, economies, governments, and the world order⁵. David Held argues that nation-states are drawing together by complex processes of interdependence on problems such as AIDS, migration, human rights, crime, trade, environmental pollution, and new challenges to peace, security, and economic prosperity which spill over national boundaries⁶. This process has gone furthest within the European Union, where the future of sovereignty and autonomy within nation-states has been most strongly challenged by European integration, but he argues that all of the world’s major regions are affected, producing overlapping ‘*communities of fate*’. The association of nationalism with some of the most disruptive forces in twentieth century history – from Hitler and Mussolini to recent conflict in the Balkans – has led many to applaud this development, although others deplore the loss of distinct national communities to the homogenizing cultural embrace of MacDonalds, Disney Corp, and CNN.

Yet alternatively those who adopt a more skeptical perspective doubt whether the nation-state has been seriously weakened, and whether there is any evidence of an emerging ‘cosmopolitan identity’ to replace the visceral gut appeals of nationalism. Structural developments in world economies and governance may have occurred without fundamentally eroding, indeed perhaps even strengthening, deep rooted attitudes towards nationalism and the nation-state. In Anthony Smith’s view: “We are still far from even mapping out the kind of global culture and cosmopolitan ideals that can truly supercede the world of nations.”⁷ Mann argues that, far from weakening nationalism, a reaction to globalization may have served to

⁴ K. Ohmae. 1995. *The End of the Nation State*. NY: Free Press.

⁵ Anthony Giddens. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Polity Press: Cambridge.

⁶ David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton. 1999. *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Pp.444-446.

⁷ Anthony Smith. 1995. ‘Towards a Global Culture?’ In *Global Culture* edited by Michael Featherstone. London: Sage.

strengthen national identities⁸. Along similar lines, Hirst and Thompson argue that the nation state retains its power in the modern era and the main trend has been towards the growth of regional blocs, where nation-states remain the primary actors, not the emergence of a new world order that transcends states⁹.

What is the evidence to substantiate these arguments? The most systematic empirical work has examined whether nationalism has declined within the European Union. The process of economic and political integration, with people working, living, studying and traveling in different member states, can be expected to have broken down some of the traditional cultural barriers between member states, particularly among the early joiners. Public opinion has been closely monitored in EuroBarometer surveys since the early 1970. Successive studies have found that the public's identification with Europe has fluctuated over time, often in response to specific political events like the Maastricht agreement, the 'Mad Cow' dispute, and the launch of the euro under EMU. The process of European integration has been gradually strengthening, deepening, and widening the Union, yet there is little evidence that this process has generated a growing sense of European identity and community among its citizens, even among the public in long-standing member states like Germany¹⁰. Related attitudes also display a pattern of trendless fluctuations since the early 1970s, rather than growing public affection for the European project, including approval of EU policies, satisfaction with the performance of the Union, and confidence in EU institutions like the Commission and Parliament. Persistent cross-national differences continue between states like Ireland and Belgium that are relatively positive across most indicators, and deep-seated Euro-skeptics like the British¹¹. Moreover in the 1990s, British public opinion drifted in an ever more Euro-skeptic direction, almost half the public now opt for

⁸ M. Mann. 1997. 'Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?' *Review of International Political Economy*. 4.

⁹ P. Hirst and G. Thompson. 1996. *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*. Cambridge: Polity.

¹⁰ Sophie Duchesne and André-Paul Frogner. 1995. 'Is There a European Identity?' In *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Angelika Scheuer. 1999. 'A Political Community?' In *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also B. Nelson, D. Roberts and W. Veit. (eds). *The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity*. Oxford: Berg.

¹¹ Pippa Norris. 'The Political Regime.' In *Political Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union*. Ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also Mattei Dogan. 1994. 'The Decline of Nationalism within Western Europe.' *Comparative Politics*. 281-305.

complete withdrawal¹².

If there is little evidence of growing cosmopolitan identities within the EU, what is the situation elsewhere? We generally know far less about trends in public opinion concerning other institutions of global governance, such as attitudes towards NATO, the U.N., or WTO, in large part because systematic cross-national survey evidence is sparse beyond Western Europe, and largely non-existent in most of the developing world, although polls are available within particular countries¹³. One of the most thorough studies of attitudes towards international organizations, by Evert, suggests a similar pattern to that already observed towards the EU. Evert found that support for the EU, NATO and the UN is essentially multi-dimensional, with attitudes influenced by responses to specific issues and events, rather than being arrayed on a general continuum stretching from nationalism to internationalism. Fluctuations over time in the public's approval of NATO displayed no secular trends, although there were also persistent differences in support between member states¹⁴. This pattern certainly seems to fit what we know about the public reaction towards NATO intervention in recent conflicts like Bosnia and Kosovo, with clear differences emerging between the publics within the alliance, for example between Greek doves and the more hawkish Brits.

Therefore despite plausible theories that the rise of global governance may lead towards growing cosmopolitanism, most of the available empirical studies lean towards a skeptical perspective. At least within Europe, national publics vary significantly in their support for the institutions and policies of the new world order, and the last thirty years has not seen the rise of a more internationalist orientation. Nevertheless evidence remains limited, we lack systematic comparative studies to understand trends in many countries outside of the EU, particularly in the developing world, and it remains possible that any fundamental transformation of national identities is a lagged process that will take far longer to become apparent.

¹² Geoffrey Evans. 1999. 'Europe: A New Electoral Cleavage?' In Geoffrey Evans and Pippa Norris. *Critical Elections: British Parties and Voters in Long-Term Perspective*. London: Sage. Geoffrey Evans. 1998. 'How Britain Views the EU'. In Roger Jowell et al. *British Social Attitudes: the 15th Report*. Aldershot: Dartmouth/SCPR.

¹³ Although a detailed case-study of the impact of NAFTA can be found in Ronald Inglehart, Neil Nevitte and Migual Basanez. 1996. *Cultural Change in North America? Closer Economic, Political and Cultural Ties between the United States, Canada and Mexico*. Hawthorne, NY: de Gruyter.

¹⁴ Philip Evert. 1995. 'NATO, the European Community, and the United Nations.' In *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Evidence for Cosmopolitanism

The concepts of ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘national’ identities are particularly complex. In this study, ‘national identity’ is understood to mean the existence of communities with bonds of ‘blood and belonging’ arising from sharing a common homeland, cultural myths, symbols and historical memories, economic resources, and legal-political rights and duties¹⁵. Nationalism can take ‘civic’ forms, meaning ties of soil based on citizenship within a shared territory and boundaries delineated by the nation-state, or it may take ‘ethnic’ forms, drawing on more diffuse ties of blood based on religious, linguistic, or ethnic communities¹⁶. National identities are usually implicit and inert, and may only rise to the surface in response to an ‘other’, in which (rather like Simon de Beauvoir’s *Second Sex*) we know what we are by virtue of what we are not. Hence as a minority, Scottish nationalism is currently explicit and self-assertive, while English identity remains dormant and inert, perhaps even slightly embarrassed¹⁷. In the modern world, national identities underpin the state and its institutions exercising political authority within a given territory, although there are many multinational states like the UK as well as stateless nations like the Kurds. *Nationalists* can be understood as those who identify strongly with their nation-state, who have little confidence in multilateral and international institutions, and who favor policies of national economic protectionism over the free trade of goods and services.

In contrast, *cosmopolitans* can be understood as those who identify more broadly with their continent or with the world as a whole, and who have greater faith in the institutions of global governance. The nationalism-cosmopolitan dimension can be expected to crosscut traditional ideological cleavages, although there is some overlap. If leaning rightwards, cosmopolitans can be expected to support policies designed to dismantle protectionist economic barriers, while those on the left may favor other measures like stricter global environmental regulations and greater spending on overseas aid. Cosmopolitans can be expected to be

¹⁵ There is a large literature on the concepts of nationalism and national identity. See, for example, Michael Ignatieff. 1993. *Blood and Belonging*. London: Chatto and Windus; Benedict Anderson. 1996. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso; Michael Billig. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage; Ernest Gellner. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell..

¹⁶ Anthony D. Smith. 1991. *National Identity*. London: Penguin. Chapter 7. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Pippa Norris. ‘Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems and Democratization’. In *Institutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy* ed. Andrew Reynolds. (forthcoming).

¹⁷ See Bridget Taylor and Katarina Thomson. Eds. 1999. *Scotland and Wales: Nations Again?* Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

comfortable living and working in different countries, familiar with travel well beyond their national boundaries, and fluent in languages, as well as well connected to international networks through global communications¹⁸. In previous eras this process mainly influenced the elite, like the European aristocracy finishing their education in Paris and Rome on the eighteenth century Grand Tour, but the most recent wave of globalization in communications may have encouraged a resurgence of cosmopolitanism to spread well beyond elite circles to the mass public¹⁹. If this hypothesis were correct, we would expect to find that cosmopolitan identities would supplement traditional national and ethnic allegiances, producing a broader identification with neighboring countries, citizens, and regions of the world.

What new evidence would allow us to examine claims of a growing cosmopolitan consciousness? Previous analysis of public opinion towards these issues has relied largely upon the Eurobarometer, monitoring the 15 member states, as well as the annual International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), covering 18-20 democracies²⁰. These are invaluable sources for monitoring trends over time but the most comprehensive comparative data, which includes a range of developing, post-communist and post-industrial societies, is available from the World Values Survey²¹. The 1990-91 and 1995-97 waves are combined for this analysis, allowing the comparison of seventy nations representing the majority of the world's population and ranging from societies with per capita incomes as low as \$300 per year to societies with per capita incomes as high as \$30,000 per year. The survey contains long-established democracies, consolidating regimes, and various types of authoritarian states. This study is still the only comparative survey that aims at global coverage, including 70 out of 174 independent nation-states in the world, and the majority of the world's population. All the surveys used face-to-face interviews using a multi-stage random sample and the data is weighted for analysis to compensate for obvious deviations from national populations.

¹⁸ For a more detailed discussion of this distinction see Pippa Norris. 1997. 'Towards A More Cosmopolitan Political Science?' *European Journal of Political Research* Spring 30(1).

¹⁹ See Michael Featherstone. (ed). 1995. *Global Culture*. London: Sage.

²⁰ For an earlier study based on the ISSP module on nationalism, see, for example, Pippa Norris. 1999. 'Global Communications and Cultural Identities.' *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*. 4(4):1-7. The most thorough empirical work on orientations within Europe from 1973-1990 using the Eurobarometer surveys can be found in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. 1995. *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²¹ The author is most grateful to the Principal Investigator, Ronald Inglehart, and all the collaborators on the World Values Surveys for release of this dataset.

One limitation of the survey is the first wave in 1980-83 only included Western industrialized nations, so it cannot be used to study trends over time in post-Communist and developing societies. However cohort analysis can be employed, dividing the sample by decade of birth, to examine whether successive generations have become progressively more cosmopolitan in their orientations. Of course attitudes could be interpreted as a life-cycle effect, if younger people become more deeply rooted in their local or national communities as they age and settle down. We cannot resolve this issue with the available data but it seems more plausible to understand any age-related differences primarily as cohort effects, reflecting each generation's distinctive experiences of the major developments in international affairs in the twentieth century, as different generations acquire their attitudes and identities during their formative years prior to the Great War, the interwar era, or the post-war decades.

Public opinion can be monitored at three levels, adapting the classic Eastonian typology, to distinguish between identification with the global community, confidence in the institutions of global governance, and approval of the policy mechanisms²². First, at the most diffuse level, theories suggest that the growth of global governance may have gradually eroded *national identities* and producing more cosmopolitans, understood as essentially 'citizens of the world' with a broad internationalist outlook. Equally plausibly, theories suggest that globalization may have changed public attitudes towards the *institutions* of international and multilateral governance, notably the United Nations, which has rapidly expanded its role as an active player in peace-keeping operations, as well as the new regional associations like the EU, ASEAN and NAFTA which have strengthened economic links between member states. Lastly, at the most specific level, globalization may have altered public support for the *policy mechanisms* designed to dismantle national barriers, including policies promoting free trade and open labor markets for migrant workers.

The Erosion of National Identities?

The strength of national and cosmopolitan identities is gauged by people's attachment to different territorial areas, an approach commonly used in previous studies²³. In the World Values

²² David Easton. 1965. *A Framework for Political Analysis*. Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; 1975. 'A Reassessment of the Concept of Political Support.' *British Journal of Political Science*. 5: 435-57.

²³ Ronald Inglehart. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Sophie Duchesne and Andrè-Paul Frogner. 1995. 'Is There a European

Surveys, people were asked the following:

“To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?

And the next?

- *The locality or town where you live*
- *The state or region of the country in which you live*
- *Your country [The U.S, France, etc.] as a whole**
- *The continent in which you live [North America/Europe/Asia/Latin America, etc] **
- *The world as a whole”*

*[Each specific nation and continent substituted for these labels.]

Two responses are nominated, allowing overlapping and multiple identities if, for example, people feel they belong most strongly to their local community and then with their country, or with their country and then with their continent, and so on. The replies can be collapsed into major groups for descriptive statistics then combined to provide a cosmopolitan identity scale, ranging on a continuum from the most localized identities up to the most cosmopolitan²⁴.

[Table 1 about here]

To examine this thesis, Table 1 describes the broad distribution of replies when people were asked for their primary identification (‘which geographic groups do you belong to *first of all?*’). The most striking finding to emerge is how far local and national identities remain far stronger than any cosmopolitan orientation. Overall, almost half the public (47%) see themselves as belonging primarily to their locality or region of the country, while over one third (38%) say they identify primarily with their nation. Nevertheless, a distinct minority does have a sense of a cosmopolitan identity, with one-sixth of the public (15%) feeling, at least at some diffuse level, close to their continent or ‘the world as a whole’ in their primary identity. Therefore the proportion of cosmopolitans remains small but not insignificant.

If we combine the first and second choices (in Table 2), altogether one fifth of the public can be classified as pure localists, who identified only with their local-regional community. In contrast, a mere 2% can be classified as pure cosmopolitans, who expressed only a continental-

Identity?’ In *Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance*. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

²⁴ It should be noted that because of the size of the combined dataset (with more than 147,000 cases) all the differences between groups are statistically significant by conventional tests like ANOVA. As a result tests of statistical significance are not reported in the presentation of the analysis.

world identity. The remainder had mixed multiple identities, for example seeing themselves as belong to their region and country, or to their country and continent. The overall results therefore serve to support the skeptical thesis that sees citizens as deeply rooted in their traditional communities, with strong ties of blood and soil, despite (or even because of?) all the structural changes produced by globalizing forces.

[Table 2 about here]

How do attitudes vary by type of society? Perhaps the most common explanation for differences in nationalism and cosmopolitanism regards the process of socioeconomic development as the primary driving force. Post-modernization theory certainly advances these claims. Traditional societies are facing increasing financial volatility and economic insecurities produced by opening up markets to global forces, illustrated by the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-99, throwing millions into unemployment and slowing down investments in Latin America (for a discussion, see chapter 9). Since 1980, the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, many in Latin America, and most in transition have experienced disastrous failures in growth, with setbacks in human security and growing poverty.²⁵ In a situation of growing insecurities, Inglehart predicts that traditional societies will often experience a resurgence in feelings of nationalism and identification with the nation-state. In contrast, in post-industrial societies, which experienced high levels of affluence and economic growth during recent decades, Inglehart argues that the tendency is to transfer authority from the nation-state simultaneously downwards towards more local and regional communities, as in Quebec, Scotland and Catalonia, and also upwards towards broader transnational ties.²⁶ If this account were correct, then we would expect cosmopolitanism to be most widespread in post-industrial societies like the United States, Germany, and the UK. These are among the countries that have been transformed most radically by the process of technological change, new communications, and open markets in goods and services, as well as by high levels of education and affluence produced by socioeconomic development. In contrast, we would expect that nationalism might remain stronger in less developed economies, such as those in South-East Asia and Africa, as well as in post-Communist societies struggling with the disruptive process of economic and political

²⁵ UNDP. 1999. *Human Development Report*. NY: Oxford University Press. P.99.

²⁶ Ronald Inglehart. 1997. *Modernization and Post-Modernization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pp.303-305.

transitions in Central and Eastern Europe.

To examine this thesis, Table 1 also shows how national identities vary in post-industrial, post-Communist, and developing societies.²⁷ In contrast to Inglehart's hypotheses, there are few major differences in cosmopolitan orientations between post-industrial, post-Communist and developing societies. The results also show that, contrary to popular perceptions, nationalism is weakest in post-Communist states, where local-regional identities prevail. Therefore globalization may well have had a differential impact on developed and developing countries, especially the 'winners' and 'losers' from the globalizations of markets, but it is not evident that so far this in turn has affected the public's national identities.

Alternatively if the latest wave of globalism is a historical process, then plausibly the process of *generational* change may be influencing cosmopolitan attitudes. Since the process of globalization is a gradual process, albeit one which has accelerated in the late twentieth century, we would expect that it would have most influence by weakening the national identity of the younger generation, brought up in a world of MTV, Yahoo and MacDonalds. In contrast, we would expect that the pre-war and interwar generation would retain stronger national allegiances and would be most distrustful of the new forms of regional and global governance. The theory of post-modernization developed by Ronald Inglehart presents the strongest argument that pervasive structural trends are transforming the basic values of the younger generation; with the net result that intergenerational population replacement is having a long-term impact on cultural change²⁸. If this is the case, then we should find that older citizens remain more strongly nationalistic, while younger generations, backpacking with Eurail passes, volunteering for the peace corps, or working with environmental NGOs around the world, would be more cosmopolitan in their orientation.

The results in Table 1 strongly confirm this thesis. The oldest cohort, born at the turn of the last century, display by far the strongest nationalism while the younger cohorts, the 'baby boomers' born after the Second World War, are most likely to have a sense of global identification. The generation gap means that cosmopolitans are more than three times as likely among the Baby Boomers than the pre-Great War generations. Moreover, this pattern was not

²⁷ Developing societies were classified as those with a 'medium' or 'low' Human Development Index in 1997. See the UNDP. *Human Development Report 1999*. New York: Oxford University Press. Table 1 Pp134-137.

²⁸ Ronald Inglehart. 1997. *Modernization and Post-Modernization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

just confined to post-industrial societies, as further analysis revealed that it was also equally evident among the younger cohorts in post-Communist and developing countries. If this is understood as a generational and not a life-cycle effect, and if we can extrapolate from these patterns, they provide important evidence that in the long-term secular trends will eventually reduce the balance of support for nationalism and move the public in a more cosmopolitan direction. The results suggest that the more optimistic scenarios of a global society and culture are indeed greatly exaggerated at present, but there is good evidence to believe that these hopes (and fears) may well be realized in future as younger populations gradually replace older groups.

Lastly, who are the cosmopolitans? Table 1 shows that cosmopolitans are broadly distributed by continent, although stronger in North and South America than in Europe, and weakest in Eastern Europe and Africa. Previous studies have emphasized that high cognitive mobilization is strongly associated with a sense of belonging to the European Union²⁹. The comparison confirms that education strongly predicts a cosmopolitan identity, with twice as many people identifying with the world or continent in the highest than lowest category. There is a modest gender gap, with women marginally more localized than men, while urbanization has a significant impact, with far more localists among those in rural areas and more cosmopolitans living in large towns and cities. Among the cultural zones, cosmopolitanism was most clearly evident among those sharing an English-speaking background while the lowest group shared a Confucian tradition. Post-material attitudes operated in the expected direction, with far more globalists among the post-materialist category, while the type of democracy also had a modest association. We can conclude that perhaps the most significant indicator of an emerging cosmopolitan orientation comes from the generational patterns that we have observed, but not from any major differences between post-industrial and developing societies. The post-war generation who grew up in conditions of relative peace and security seem most at home in the world, more comfortable with cosmopolitan identities than their fathers or grandfathers. Still it needs to be stressed that visionary claims that we are all becoming citizens of the world are way off base, since most people in most societies, continents and cultures are rooted in the old forms of belonging via their local community or nation-state.

²⁹ Ronald Inglehart. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Confidence in the Institutions of Global Governance

People may still be rooted in their local and national communities, but how do they feel about the new institutions of global governance, such as the World Trade Organization, the United Nations, or the European Commission? Attitudes towards the core institutions of representative democracy have received widespread attention in recent years, particularly research monitoring the erosion of confidence and trust in parliaments, parties, and governments³⁰. We know far less about the trends in support for transnational levels of governance, still less how attitudes differ between post-industrial and developing societies.

If economic and political integration were contributing towards cosmopolitanism, we would expect this phenomenon to be most evident in states linked to others via strong regional associations. The member-states of the European Union could be expected to have gone furthest towards a transnational identity by developing a genuinely pan-European consciousness, where the Germans, French, and Italians come to see themselves as members of a common community with shared economic and political interests. The Community is the most ambitious attempt at trans-national cooperation and integration. The 1992 Single European Act aimed to eliminate physical, technical and fiscal frontiers between member states, to reduce regional inequalities, to harmonize rules governing working conditions, to strengthen research and development, to protect the environment, and to facilitate monetary cooperation. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1996, strengthens political as well as economic union, including common foreign and security policies. Economic and monetary union took a major step forward in January 1999 with the launching of the euro on the world currency market. If the process of European integration has influenced national identities we would expect to find stronger feelings of attachment to 'Europe' in EU member states like Germany that in countries like Switzerland, Poland, and Bulgaria. Although less integrated politically, other trading blocs could play a similar role, such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur), the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), and the Southern African Development Community.

³⁰ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip Zelikow and David C. King. Eds. *Why People Don't Trust Government*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Pippa Norris. 1999. (ed) *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

To analyze how far people trusted international and multilateral organizations, the World Values Study asked the following:

“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?”

- *The United Nations*
- *The European Union**

*[*In all European countries; in other societies ask about the most important regional organization³¹.]*

[Table 3 about here]

The results in Table 3, broken down by nation in Figures 1 and 2, show the proportion that said they had ‘a great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence. Overall the majority of the population (57%) expressed confidence in the United Nations in the early to mid-1990s, perhaps a remarkably high vote of support, while 44% trusted regional associations like the EU and NAFTA. Moreover, one of the most striking findings is that people trusted these global and regional institutions far more than their own domestic government, where overall only one-third of the public (34%) expressed any confidence. The gap between confidence in national governments and the UN was modest in developing countries, since both were given considerable support (56%). But the difference was marked in post-industrial societies, where 56% trusted the UN while in contrast only 36% trusted their national governments. An even bigger chasm was evident in post-Communist societies, where (at least pre-Kosovo) 27% trusted their domestic rulers while 60% trusted the United Nations. If the growth of ‘critical citizens’ has eroded support for the core institutions of representative government like parties, parliaments and executives in many established democracies, as argued elsewhere³², it appears that this process has not yet undermined the public’s confidence in the UN.

Further analysis of the profile of those who supported the UN and regional associations in

³¹ Eg NAFTA (U.S., Canada), MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay), Organization of African Unity (South Africa, Nigeria), South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation SAARC (India, Bangladesh), El Tratado de Libre Comercio (Mexico), ASEAN (Philippines), Organizacion de Estados Americanos (Dominican Republic), Andean Pact (Venezuela), etc

³² Pippa Norris. Ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Table 3 confirms many of the observations made earlier concerning a more cosmopolitan orientation. Again cohort of birth is significantly associated with internationalism, with 60% of the sixties generation supporting the UN compared with only 43% of the pre-Great War generation, and there is a parallel age gap in confidence in regional associations. Again, a more global perspective was associated with higher levels of educational and urbanization, although in this table women were more significantly supportive of the UN than men. In this analysis post-materialism failed to point in a consistent direction but the type of government was important, with the greatest support for the UN and for regional associations among non-democracies. There are many factors which could help to explain the cross-national variations which emerge, such as whether developing countries are major beneficiaries from aid flows and official development assistance from the United Nations, as well as the role of regional associations in promoting trade and export markets for member states.

Support for Globalization Policies

Lastly, at the most specific level, we can examine attitudes to see how far the public in different countries support economic policies designed to promote globalization, such as those promoting free trade and the migration of labor. The following questions were asked:

[FREE TRADE] “Do you think it is better if:

- *Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; or,*
- *That there should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country.”*

[MIGRANTS] “How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?

- *Let anyone come who wants to?*
- *Let people come as long as there are jobs available?*
- *Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here?*
- *Prohibit people coming here from other countries?”*

[Table 4 about here]

Table 4 shows that overall only a third of the public favored free trade over protectionism, with most people preferring trade limitations to protect jobs, even in post-

industrial societies in the relatively affluent mid-1990s. Concerns about the threat of unemployment, which remained fairly high throughout most of Western Europe in these years, as well as having massive unemployment in the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, may have fuelled some of these attitudes. The public also opted to restrict immigration, with very few (7%) supporting the idea of open borders so that anyone could enter to work, although 38% favored allowing people to enter so long as jobs were available. The most popular option (supported by 43%) was to place strict limits on the number of foreigners who could enter the country, while 12% would prohibit any entry at all.

If we look at the profile of those who support free market policies the pattern on both indicators confirms a secular trend towards increasing support among younger cohorts. Again the youngest generation is almost three times as likely to support free trade as the oldest group (see Figure 3). Perhaps surprisingly, given the legacy of protectionism in the old Soviet Union, by the early to mid-1990s there is remarkably little difference in attitudes between post-Communist societies and Western countries. The role of education, urbanization, and post-material attitudes, observed earlier, are also consistent predictors of a more internationalist or free market orientation towards economic policy.

A Cosmopolitan Orientation?

So far we have examined different attitudinal indicators, but is there such a thing as a coherent ‘cosmopolitan’ orientation, or is this a multidimensional phenomenon? Factor analysis can be used to see how far the attitudes examined in this chapter cluster together into a coherent schema in the public’s mind, or whether responses are unrelated to each other.

[Table 6 about here]

The factor loadings presented in Table 6 confirm that attitudes towards globalization fall into the predicted dimensions, as suggested theoretically, in terms of cosmopolitan identities, institutional confidence, and policy support. That is to say, people who support the idea of free trade are also likely to favor the free movement of migrant labor across national boundaries. People who have confidence in the UN are also likely to trust multilateral regional associations like the EU and NAFTA. Overall the factor loadings explain two-thirds of the variance in attitudes (67%).

To examine the core scales more fully we can use standardized regression analysis

models, entering a range of predictors of a cosmopolitan orientation. Factors at the level of the nation include the level of human development (UNDP HDI Index), democratic development (the Freedom House Gastil Index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties), and the number of years that each country has been a continuous democracy. The social background variables are the ones already discussed plus whether the individual was born in the country. The attitudinal factors include national pride, ratings of the current political system, left-right ideological self-placement, and post-materialism. The independent variables were entered in this order into each of the models, with scales of cosmopolitan identity, support for UN and regional institutions, and support for globalization economic policies as the dependent variables.

[Table 7 about here]

The results in Table 7 *remain preliminary and subject to further revision*, but they indicate a range of factors that are worth exploring further in subsequent work. At this stage it is worth commenting on the variables that are consistent predictors of a more cosmopolitan orientation across all three scales. Most importantly, the models confirm that the factors that significantly predict a more cosmopolitan perspective, even after controlling for national-level factors, include age, urbanization, left-right ideology, post-materialism and whether someone was born in the country. Immigrants proved slightly more internationalist than the native-population, and cosmopolitanism was also weakly associated with a more left-leaning ideology, as might be expected by the association of populist nationalism with right-wing parties. The other factors require further analysis for confirmation.

Conclusions: The Future of Cosmopolitan Citizenship

Other chapters in this volume demonstrate that while there is considerable evidence to study global trends in the free flow of goods, services, capital, people, ideas and force, we know far less about the consequences of these developments on public opinion. Has globalization increased the number of cosmopolitans, citizens of the world who feel comfortable traveling, living and working within different societies, or in reaction has there been a resurgence of nationalism, or even localism? Growing cultural globalism is often assumed but, beyond aggregate indicators, such as trends in news flows, movie receipts or the number of MacDonalds around the world (discussed in Chapter 5), we know little about what it means for how people feel about the world and whether structural changes have altered fundamental identities. As

McCrone and SurrIDGE remark³³, “National identity is one of the most discussed but least understood concepts of the late 20th century.” The idea of cosmopolitanism is even more elusive and complex.

The evidence in this chapter suggests that the most important indicator of cultural change is the persistent differences in attitudes evident among different generations. To summarize the findings, the more optimistic claims of some theorists concerning the decline of the nation-state and erosion of nationalism are not yet evident - but at the same time cohort analysis suggests that in the long-term public opinion is moving in a more internationalist direction (see Figure 3). Most strikingly, almost one fifth of the baby boomers born after the Second World War see themselves as cosmopolitan citizens of the globe, identifying with their continent or the world as a whole, this is true of only one in ten of the group brought up in the Interwar years, and of even less of the pre-war generation. A similar generational divide is evident across the other indicators in this study like support for the institutions of global governance and especially for the policies of free trade and open labor markets. Through the gradual process of generational turnover we can therefore expect to see a rising tide of popular support for globalization in future decades, which has important implications for the democratic legitimacy of bodies like the United Nations and the European Union.

³³ David McCrone and Paula SurrIDGE. 1998. ‘National Identity and National Pride.’ In *British and European Social Attitudes, the 15th Report* edited by Roger Jowell et al. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Table 1: Primary Type of Territorial Identity

		World-Continent	National	Local-Regional
ALL		15	38	47
Type of Society	Post-Industrial	15	41	44
	Post-Communist	16	32	53
	Developing	14	37	49
Cohort	1905-1914	6	33	62
	1915-1924	10	35	55
	1925-1934	10	38	53
	1935-1944	11	38	51
	1945-1954	19	37	44
	1955-1964	17	35	48
	1965-1978	21	34	44
Continent	North America	16	43	41
	South America	17	37	45
	North Europe	11	36	53
	North-Western Europe	13	25	62
	South-Western Europe	13	23	64
	Eastern Europe	8	34	58
	Former Soviet Union	15	32	53
	Middle East	12	49	39
	Asia	13	32	55
	Africa	9	41	49
Education	Highest	18	42	40
	Lowest	7	29	64
Gender	Men	16	40	45
	Women	14	36	49
Size of town	Low (Less than 2000)	11	34	55
	High (More than 500K)	21	36	43
Type of Culture	Northern European	12	36	53
	English	19	41	41
	Catholic European	13	24	64
	Confucian	5	44	52
	Central European	7	33	60
	Soviet	16	31	53
	Latin American	8	50	43
	South-East Asian	8	29	63
	African	9	41	49
Post-Materialism	Materialist	12	38	50
	Mixed	16	39	45
	Post-Materialist	20	37	43
Type of Democracy	Free	16	39	45
	Partly Free	15	32	53
	Non-Free	10	32	58

Note: “To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong *first of all*?”

- *The locality or town where you live*
- *The state or region of the country in which you live*
- *Your country [The U.S, France, etc.] as a whole**
- *The continent in which you live [North America/Europe/Asia/Latin America, etc] **
- *The world as a whole”*

Source: World Values Surveys combined waves 1990-91 and 1995-7, weighted data (N.147319)

Table 2: Multiple Territorial Identities (Percentage of Total)

	<i>Belong 2nd (Col)</i>					
<i>Belong 1st (Row)</i>	Local	Region	Nation	Continent	World	<i>ALL 1st</i>
Local	-	15.5	17.5	1.0	2.6	36.7
Region	4.1	-	5.9	0.5	0.8	11.2
Nation	18.0	9.4	-	3.6	6.1	37.1
Continent	0.5	0.5	1.3	-	0.4	2.7
World	3.5	1.2	5.9	1.6	-	12.2
<i>ALL 2nd</i>	26.1	26.6	30.6	6.8	9.9	100%

Note: “To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong first of all?
And the next?”

- The locality or town where you live
- The state or region of the country in which you live
- Your country [**The U.S, France, etc.**] as a whole*
- The continent in which you live [**North America/Europe/Asia/Latin America, etc**] *
- The world as a whole”

Source: World Values Surveys combined waves 1990-91 and 1995-7, weighted date (N.147319)

Table 3: Support for UN and Regional Associations

		U.N.	Regional Associations
ALL		57	44
Type of Society	Post-Industrial	56	40
	Post-Communist	60	51
	Developing	59	52
Cohort	1905-1914	43	36
	1915-1924	54	44
	1925-1934	51	37
	1935-1944	53	39
	1945-1954	53	38
	1955-1964	52	38
	1965-1978	60	49
Continent	North America	56	41
	South America	53	45
	North Europe	54	33
	North-Western Europe	45	47
	South-Western Europe	47	57
	Eastern Europe	51	42
	Former Soviet Union	61	53
	Middle East	47	45
	Asia	66	49
	Africa	61	57
Education	Highest	60	51
	Lowest	52	34
Gender	Men	54	43
	Women	60	44
Urbanization	Low (Less than 2000)	52	40
	High (More than 500K)	57	49
Type of Culture	Northern European	54	33
	English	51	36
	Catholic European	47	57
	Confucian	60	35
	Central European	39	46
	Soviet	60	52
	Latin American	70	54
	South-East Asian	54	44
African	61	57	
Post-Materialism	Materialist	55	43
	Mixed	60	45
	Post-Materialist	52	41
Type of Democracy	Free	52	37
	Partly Free	60	53
	Non-Free	69	59

Note: “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?”

- *The United Nations*
- *The European Union** [*In all European countries; in other societies ask about the most important regional organization.]

% With a ‘great deal’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence.

Source: World Values Surveys combined waves 1990-91 and 1995-7, weighted data (N.147319)

Table 4: Support for Economic Free Trade & Labor Markets

% Approve		Free Trade	Migrant Labor
ALL		30	42
Type of Society	Post-Industrial	28	37
	Post-Communist	32	54
	Developing	31	39
Cohort	1905-1914	15	31
	1915-1924	17	32
	1925-1934	20	36
	1935-1944	26	44
	1945-1954	31	46
	1955-1964	34	46
	1965-1978	40	52
Continent	North America	25	35
	South America	15	56
	North Europe	39	40
	North-Western Europe	50	65
	South-Western Europe	26	79
	Eastern Europe	31	37
	Former Soviet Union	33	55
	Middle East	15	38
	Asia	28	39
	Africa	38	34
	Education	Highest	40
Lowest		31	31
Gender	Men	33	42
	Women	26	43
Size of town	Low (Less than 2000)	21	37
	High (More than 500K)	37	54
Type of Culture	Northern European	39	40
	English	26	38
	Catholic European	26	79
	Confucian	35	46
	Central European	39	54
	Soviet	32	54
	Latin American	21	32
	South-East Asian	38	50
	African	38	34
Post-Materialism	Materialist	26	40
	Mixed	30	43
	Post-Materialist	34	46
Type of Democracy	Free	30	38
	Partly Free	33	54
	Non-Free	38	50

Source: World Values Surveys combined waves 1990-91 and 1995-7, weighted date (N.147319)

Table 5: Dimensions of Public Opinion towards Globalization

	Factor 1 Global Community	Factor 2 Global Institutions	Factor 3 Global Policies
Community	Global1 .728 Global2 .736		
Institutions		UN .915 Regional .917 Association	
Policies			Free Trade .770 Migrant Labor .770
Total variance explained	17.8	28.1	20.9

Note: The figures represent the loadings from principal component factor analysis using varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization, with coefficients dropped below .40.

Source: World Values Surveys combined waves 1990-91 and 1995-7, weighted data (N.147319)

Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3:




Table 7: Predictors of Support for Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitan	Identity Local-Global Scale	Institutions Trust UN+ Regional Assoc	Policies Support Free Trade+ Migrant Labor	Coding
National Development				
Level of Human Development	.15	-.33	-.10	<i>UNDP Human</i>
Level of Democratic Development	.10	-.31	.05	<i>Freedom Hous</i>
Years Democratic	-.05	-.18	-.01	<i>Years of Conti</i>
Social Background				
Age	-.11	-.08	-.09	<i>Years old</i>
Education	.05	-.01	.08	<i>9-pt Scale</i>
Gender: Male	.05	-.07	.02	<i>Male (1)/Femc</i>
Urbanization	.10	.09	.08	<i>6-point scale c</i>
HH Income	-.01	-.01	.01	<i>Household inc</i>
Born in country	-.05	-.03	-.09	<i>Yes (1)/ No (0)</i>
Political Attitudes				
National pride	.004	-.07	.07	<i>4-item scale: l</i>
Rating of current political system	-.003	.19	.11	<i>10-point scale</i>
Left-right party support	-.02	-.05	-.03	<i>Scaled from le</i>
Post-Materialism	.12	.02	.25	<i>12-item scale.</i>
Constant	2.83	11.4	4.28	
Adjusted R²	.052	.088	.130	
R	.227	.296	.361	

Note: The dependent variables are those described in tables 1-4. The coefficients represent standardized least-squared regression models. Coefficients in **bold** are significant at <.01 level. **Source:** World Values Su