The Third Wave in Globalisation
Theory
Luke Martell, University of Sussex
A later version of this was published in International Studies Review, 9, 2, Summer 2007, pp 173-196.
This article examines a
separation made in the literature between three waves in globalisation theory –
globalist, sceptical and post-sceptical or transformationalist - and argues
that this literature requires a new look. The article is a critique of the
third of these waves and its relationship with the second wave. Contributors to
the third wave defend the idea of globalisation from criticism by the sceptics
but also try to construct a more complex and qualified theory of globalisation
than provided by first wave accounts. The core new argument of this article is
that third wave authors come to conclusions that try to defend globalisation yet
include qualifications that in practice reaffirm sceptical claims. This feature
of the literature has been overlooked in debates and the aim of this article is
to revisit the area and identify and bring out this problem. This has political
implications. Third wavers propose globalist cosmopolitan democracy when the
substance of their arguments do more in practice to bolster the sceptical view
of politics based around inequality and conflict, nation-states and regional
blocs, and alliances of common interest or ideology, rather than cosmopolitan
global structures. Some recent contributions in the globalisation literature have
identified three waves or perspectives in globalisation theory – globalists,
sceptics and transformationalists or post-sceptics (eg Held et al 1999; Holton
2005). Globalisation theory, seen to have started in about the 1980s, is said
to have begun with strong accounts of the globalisation of economy, politics
and culture and the sweeping away of the significance of territorial boundaries
and national economies, states and cultures. Ohmae (1990, 1995) is often picked
out as an example of this wave in globalisation theory and other proponents are
said by some to include writers like Reich (1991) and Albrow (1996) and discourses
in the business world, media and politics (Hay and Marsh 2000: 4. One example
is Blair 1997). The first wave in globalisation theory is said to have a
‘hyper’ globalist account of the economy where national economies are much less
significant or even no longer existent because of the role of capital mobility,
multinational corporations and economic interdependency. Because of reduced political
restrictions on the movement of money and technological change in the form of
the computerisation of financial transactions, large amounts of money can be
moved almost instantaneously with little to constrain it within national
boundaries. Many corporations are seen now to be multinational rather than
national, in their ownership and internationally distributed production
facilities, workforces and consumers. Such corporations that often get
mentioned include Coca-Cola and McDonalds, or media multinationals such as News
Corporation that have stakes in many forms of media, from newspapers to book publishing,
the internet and TV, and across different areas of the globe (Thompson 1995; McChesney
1999). Consequently the global economy is seen to have opened up, integrated
and included more parts of the world, although whether this has been a positive
thing or not is debated – both Marxists and economic liberals have seen the
world as very globalised and can agree on it as a fact whilst disagreeing whether
it is good one or not (eg Sklair 2002; Wolf 2004). Along such lines there is
also debate about whether opening up and integration has happened or
globalisation has had an equalising and levelling effect or not (eg Wolf and
Wade 2002; Friedman 2006). The globalist perspective is sometimes seen as quite economistic (Held
et al 1999: 3-4) with economic changes having political and cultural
implications. Nation-states lose power and influence or even sovereignty
because they have to (or choose to) tailor their policies to the needs of
mobile capital, with consequences for the viability of social democracy or the
welfare state which are curtailed to fit in with the wishes of business
interests (eg Gray 1996; Strange 1996; Cerny and Evans 2004; Crouch 2004). Culturally
it is said to lead to the decline of national cultures and more homogenised (or
sometimes hybridised) global cultures where national differences become less marked
as globally people consume culture from around the world rather than so
exclusively from their own nation (Tomlinson 1999; Sklair 2002; Nederveen
Pieterse 2004). This is facilitated further by global electronic
communications, such as the internet, globalised TV broadcasts, migration and
tourism. The role of new technologies has made globalisation seem to some a
relatively recent thing, perhaps of the post-1960s or post-1980s period (eg
Scholte 2005). Politically nation-states in the hyperglobalist perspective are
also seen to be superseded by international organisations such as the UN and
IMF, social movements which are global or even a global civil society (eg Gill
2000; Keane 2003). Economically, politically and culturally globalists see transnational,
global forces taking over from nations as the main sources of economy,
sovereignty and identity. For some this means that social science has to move
away from a methodological nationalism it is attached to, even from ideas of
society to more cosmopolitan and global perspectives on social relations (eg Beck
2006; Urry 2000; but see a response from Outhwaite 2006). Then, it is said by writers on the three waves, there was a more sober
set of accounts that reacted against this with scepticism and argued that
globalisation is not new and that probably the processes being described are
not very global either (eg Hirst and Thompson 1996. See also Krugman 1996). I
will return to second and third wave perspectives in more detail throughout
this article and wish to avoid repetition but an initial outline can be made
here. Sceptics are concerned with the abstract nature of globalist perspectives,
which seem to be thin on empirical substantiation and make sweeping claims
about processes as if they affect all areas of the world evenly and with the
same responses. They see evidence of the continuing role of nation-states, both
within their own boundaries and as agents of the transnational processes of
globalisation, through which they maintain as much as lose power. In the cases
of the core, for instance in North America and Sceptics have wanted to test the claims of globalism against evidence,
and when they have done so have sometimes found it wanting. They have also been
concerned to see whether globalisation is received evenly and with the same
response everywhere and, not surprisingly, have found signs of differentiation in
its spread. Sceptics have tended to see the global economy as not globally
inclusive. For instance areas of sub-Saharan Africa are much less integrated
than the powerhouses of East Asia, Europe and North America, with global
inequality rising and protectionism still rife, for example in Europe and the
USA in response to imports from growing Asian economies. As we shall see sceptics
argue that the global economy is inter-nationalised and triadic rather than
global and that its internationalisation is not unprecedented in recent years,
in fact that it may even have been more internationalised a hundred years ago
than it is now (see also Osterhammel and Petersson 2005 and O’Rourke and Williamson
1999 on historical forms of globalisation and, going even further back in
history, Frank and Gills 1993 and Abu-Lughod 1989). Whether globalisation or
free trade, insofar as there really is free trade, is the answer to global
poverty is questioned. Liberal policies and integration into the global economy
may have helped some parts of the world, Politically the effects of globalisation could be said to be uneven – states
have gained as well as lost powers in processes of globalisation, many states
are more powerful than others globally and some are able to continue with more social
democratic policies in defiance of hyperglobalist perspectives which see
pressure from globalisation for compliance with neoliberalism (Mann 1997; Mosley
2005). This suggests nation-states retain autonomy and sovereignty in many ways,
and unevenly so (see also Weiss 1998). Bodies like the UN seem to be as much
inter-national as transnational, composed of nation-states and driven by them
as much as above and beyond them. Global governance, from the UN Security
Council to agreements on global warming, nuclear proliferation and
international justice, is treated with scepticism by some critics, seen as
inevitably the tool of the most powerful nations, who bypass or exempt
themselves from their rules when it doesn’t suit them, and use such bodies to
impose their will for their own benefit when it does (Zolo 1997, 2002). Culturally it is said that nations may well respond to globalisation
differently. Macdonalds may have proliferated around the world, but the
ingredients vary to fit in with local customs (from shrimp burgers in Japan to
kosher burgers for Jewish customers), its consumers are more working class or
middle class depending on location, and eating customs vary from fast to
leisurely in different contexts. From However there have been another set of reactions alongside and in
response to the sceptic alternative to hyperglobalism. There are those who
share the concerns of the sceptics about evidence and differentiation but can’t
help but see processes of globalisation before their eyes, moving ahead at unprecedented
levels in recent times. Economic interdependency, for instance, is seen as
having grown significantly so that national economies are no longer contained
within national territorial boundaries. Third wavers have been keen to
critically reassess the claims of globalism but without throwing out the baby
with the bathwater (eg Held et al 1999 and Held and McGrew 2003 who name Giddens
1990 and Rosenau 1997 as other fellow ‘transformationalists’). The outcome of
this has been a departure from some of the conclusions of sceptics and instead
a more complex picture of globalisation, in which globalisation is seen as occurring
but without just sweeping all away before it, as hyper-globalists might have it
(see also Scholte 2005). The global nature of institutions such as finance, problems such as the environment,
drugs and crime and developments in international communications and transport
lead to more global political forms. National economic, political and cultural
forces are transformed and have to share their sovereignty with other entities
(of global governance and international law, as well as with mobile capital, multi-national
corporations and global social movements) but they are not removed. Globalisation
may have a differentiated effect depending on type (eg, economic, cultural or
political) or location where it is experienced, whilst still being a force. Global
inequality is seen as having moved from a simple core-periphery shape to more
of a three tier structure including a middle group, without clear geographical
demarcations because, for instance, the marginalised may live in the same
cities as the elites (eg Hoogvelt 1997; Bauman 1998). All of these involve both
the continuation and transformation of existing structures, something in
between what is described by sceptics and hyper-globalists. Globalisation’s future may be uncertain and open-ended, it could take
different forms (perhaps more neoliberal or more social democratic) or even be
reversed, rather than the future being one of unavoidable globalisation or just
continuity with unaffected nation-state structures. With a recognition of
uncertainty comes a recognition of the importance of agency in deciding what
happens to globalisation rather than an assumption that it is predetermined or
inevitable, as is suggested is the case in some first wave accounts (Holton
2005). In short a third wave has emerged which is critical of hyperglobalism
and wishes to formulate a more sophisticated picture but feels, contrary to
scepticism, that globalisation is changing the world. Third wave perspectives have
been ones that do not go as far as the sceptics in that they do not deny that
real significant changes have happened. They acknowledge the reality of globalising
changes and so defend a globalist position but one that is modified to be more
complex than that of the hyperglobalists. To avoid repetition I will not dwell
further just yet on the claims of the third wave. This article is focused on
this third wave in globalisation theory and we will see more of its detailed
claims on economy, politics and culture as the article proceeds. The table below summarises the three waves or perspectives as they have
been presented in the literature. The table presents images of the three waves.
Individual contributors, including those cited above, do not always fit only
into one wave, and, as we shall see, one wave presents itself in one way but
when you look more closely at the details seems to actually reinforce one of
the other waves it seeks to criticise. So
the emphasis in this table is on how the three waves are presented. What the
reality is, is explored in the rest of this article. (See also Held et al 1999:
10). Table 1: Images of the Three Waves Globalists Sceptics Transformationalists Globalisation Globalisation Globalisation as causal Globalisation is a discourse Internationalisation as effect of other causes Global transformations, but differentiation and embeddedness Method Abstract, general approach Empirical approach Qualitative rather than quantitative approach Economy Global economy Integration, open Free trade Inter-national economy Triadic, regional, unequal State intervention and protectionism Globally transformed New stratification Globalised but differentiated Politics Global governance or neo-liberalism Decline of nation-state Loss of national sovereignty Nation-states, regional blocs, inter-national Power and inequality Political agency possible Politics globally transformed Nation-states important but reconstructed Sovereignty shared Culture Homogenisation Clashes of culture Nationalism Americanisation Globalisation differentiated Globally transformed Hybridisation Complex, differentiated globalisation History Globalisation is new Internationalisation is old Globalisation old but present forms unprecedented Normative politics Global governance or neoliberalism End of social democratic welfare state Reformist social democracy and international regulation possible Cosmopolitan democracy Future Globalisation Nation-state, triad, conflicts, inequality Uncertain, agency Left or Right Continued, stalled or reversed The three waves identified The three waves are not absolutely clear-cut from one another. Some
authors fit into more than one perspective, although in this article I suggest
this leads to some contradictions. But they do show different waves, tendencies
or perspectives in globalisation theory. I am focusing here on this third wave
and will be looking at: Hay and Marsh (2000) who outline three waves and
associate themselves with what they see as an emerging third wave; and Held et
al (1999) who outline three perspectives which match the three waves - they
define their views in terms of the third perspective, transformationalism,
which has similarities with Hay and Marsh’s third wave (see also Held and
McGrew 2003). I will look briefly at Scholte’s (2005) concept of globalisation.
This does not explicitly talk of three waves, but his approach is based on
giving a more complex definition of globalisation than more extreme globalists
but in a way which tries to keep up globalisation rather than lapsing into
scepticism. In this way, Scholte is in practice a third waver on globalisation.
For reasons of space and to ensure greater depth of analysis I focus in
this article on particular representatives of scepticism and
transformationalism or post-scepticism. I focus on Hirst and Thompson (1996) and
Held at el (1999) as they are widely seen as representatives of the second and
third waves respectively, much read and cited as such, and rightly so as their
perspectives are theoretically and empirically developed, and have addressed
each others findings (eg Open Democracy 2002). Hay and Marsh (2000) I focus on
because they have reflected explicitly on the second and third waves, advocated
the latter, and have been cited as important authors in this area (see Holton
2005). Some third wavers practice a third perspective but without such a
conscious reflection on the fact as in the case of Hay and Marsh. Scholte (2005)
falls into the former category. He does not refer to the waves idea but his
ideas include all the characteristics of the third wave. His book is clear,
accessible, user-friendly and widely discussed and cited. He provides a good
example of the third wave in practice and the tensions that I wish to discuss
in this article. A number of others such as Hopkins (2002), Cameron and Palan (2004), Holton
(2005) and Hopper (2007), also identify three waves but without going into any
greater detail on this issue than the above thinkers. Kofman and Youngs (1996)
made an early brief outline of perspectives on globalisation but discuss two
waves rather than three. That they have done this is significant for my
argument and I will come to their approach at the end of this article. Bruff (2005) talks about three waves but in a way which categorises them
differently, his first wave including more moderate globalisers such as Held
and Scholte who most others categorise within the third wave, hyperglobalists excluded
from the first wave within which most place them, and his third wave including neo-Gramscian
and poststructuralist perspectives. This article touches on the power of
discourse as highlighted in neo-Gramscian and poststructuralist perspectives
but there is not space here to expand further on such approaches. Neo-Gramscian
and post-structuralist perspectives like those of Bruff and Cameron and Palan (2004)
provide important advances in discussions of globalisation perspectives but my
argument is that there is a problem in some of the earlier waves debates that
has gone without being noted, that third wave theories reinforce the scepticism
they seek to undermine. Alongside some of the more recent discussions which
take debates forward I think it is important to return to this earlier problem which
has not been previously identified and needs to be brought out in the
literature. There is a large and growing literature on cultural globalisation (Tomlinson
1999; Nederveen Pieterse 2004) and on areas such as transnational civil society
(Keane 2003). There is not space in this article to cover all areas of globalisation
studies so I will focus primarily on the economic and political dimensions of
globalisation that are a main emphasis of some of the authors I am looking at,
although I hope that I have highlighted some of the cultural dimensions above. Beyond the second wave? This article is concerned with the second and third waves of globalisation
theory. The first wave is seen by those in the second and third waves as having
exaggerated the extent of globalisation, and as having argued for globalisation
in an abstract and generalising way which does not account sufficiently for
empirical evidence or for unevenness and agency in processes of globalisation.
Third wave theorists try, to different degrees, to distance themselves from
both more radical globalists and outright sceptics. They try to defend an idea
of globalisation, and so distance themselves from the sceptics, but in a more
complicated way than has been put forward by the first wave. My core argument
is that in doing this they add qualifications and complexities which actually
bolster second wave sceptic arguments. This is not always the case and there
are some differences between third wavers and sceptics. But third wavers in trying
to rescue globalisation theory by adding complexities and qualifications
actually in some ways undermine it and add to the case for the sceptics. Third wave analysis claims to either rescue globalist arguments (Held et
al 1999) or to have a more sophisticated advance on second wave arguments (Hay
and Marsh 2000). As such it directs readers away from sceptical viewpoints to
either a modified globalism (Held et al) or what is said to be a more
sophisticated scepticism (Hay and Marsh), the latter of which is couched in
terms which accept a form of globalisation as an actuality. The theory of
second wave sceptics is projected as a weaker analysis. But if it transpires
that third wavers are in fact confirming the second wave, whether they intend
to or not, then it is important that the sceptical view is validated rather
than treated as a less adequate analysis as it is by third wavers who are
claiming to be able to provide something better. Getting a correct
understanding of what the third wave is actually saying is important to us
understanding globalisation properly. Sceptics and third wavers have argued the
toss over which of their perspectives is more adequate (eg, Open Democracy
2002) but if it is the case that in fact third wavers are in practice reinforcing
second wave scepticism then this new dimension needs to be identified. As I will outline in more
detail later, a side-effect is that there are political consequences of this.
By drawing globalist conclusions, albeit more complex ones, from their analysis,
and arguing they have shown the flaws in scepticism, some third wavers, such as
Held et al, then go on to conclude that forms of politics such as cosmopolitan
global democracy are the most appropriate ways for trying to direct globalisation
along more progressive paths. Surmising that their analysis supports globalist
perspectives leads them to such conclusions. By drawing conclusions which go
against scepticism they undermine the sceptical analysis of politics which
argues for a more realist view of the world in which such global forms are not
possible because of the superior power of advanced states, especially western
states and the G3, the conflicting interests and ideologies of global actors, and
the importance of politics at the level of nation-states, regional blocs and other
alliances. Sceptical analysis leads to conclusions which stress power, inequality,
conflict and the importance of the nation-state, all of which point to a
politics other than (or as well as) global democracy. This might rely on
states, political alliances at a more decentralised level between states with
similar objectives or interests, for instance perhaps a shared antipathy to
what are perceived as neoliberalism or US imperialism, and specific global
social movements who have related objectives. This is rather than, or in
addition to, more global universal structures, in which common agreement may
not be possible and which may be hijacked by more powerful actors. If third
wave analysis leads more in the direction of the sceptics’ findings than it
says it does, as is the argument of this article, then an analysis of global
power inequalities and nation-state power in political strategy, of the sort
highlighted by the sceptics, should become more part of the picture and cosmopolitan
global democracy looks more problematic. It may be significant that Hay and Marsh do not show the same faith in
cosmopolitan global democracy as Held et al. Their political conclusions are
based more around the possibilities of nation-state politics. This may be one
reason why, as we shall see, they teeter between the second and third waves in
their chapter on the topic. The second wave
Much of my case will be about what implications third wave argument has
for the second wave. In order to pursue this I need first to lay out some of
the claims of the second wave. When looking at the third wave we can then
compare arguments. The crux of this article is an argument about the status of
third wave arguments in relation to second wave arguments, but for this to be
made an outline of both waves is necessary. To do this I will focus on Hirst
and Thompson’s arguments. Hirst and Thompson (1996) are frequently cited as
leading proponents of the sceptical point of view and have engaged directly in
discussions with third wavers, for instance in Paul Hirst’s Open Democracy
(2002) debate with David Held. Theoretically and empirically their analysis
makes them a good choice to focus on for an outline of the sceptic case. Hirst and Thompson’s analysis of globalisation claims are mainly
economic and rely on using empirical data to test an ideal type of globalisation.
The ideal type they use is, they say, an extreme one, but represents what
globalisation would be if it were occurring and they say it is one that shapes
discussions in business and political circles. Though they do not address
culture they argue that many of the changes in culture and politics claimed by
globalisation theorists would follow from economic globalisation, so that if
claims about the latter are found wanting then claims about the former look
problematic also. What are their main points? (See Hirst and Thompson 1996:
ch.1). §
There has been internationalisation of financial
markets, technology and some sections of manufacturing and services, especially
since the 1970s, and some of these changes put constraints on radical policies
in national level governance. For instance, it is risky to pursue radical
policies at a national level because internationalisation allows investment to
flee across national boundaries more easily. §
The current highly internationalised economy is not
unprecedented. In particular the international economy was more open between
1870 and 1914, its international dimensions are contingent and some have been
interrupted or reversed. For instance, Hirst and Thompson outline figures which
show high levels of trade and migration before 1914, much of which was reversed
in the inter-war period, showing how globalisation is not going along an
evolutionary or predetermined path, but one that can stop or even go into
reverse. §
Greater international trade and investment is
happening but within existing structures rather than there being a new global
economic structure developed. What is happening is between nations, ie
international, especially between dominant states or regions, rather than
something which has extended globally or gone above and beyond nations or the
inter-national or inter-regional. §
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are rare. Most
companies are nationally based and trade multinationally (ie MNCs rather than
TNCs). There is no major tendency towards truly global companies. So a company
may be based in one country and sell its goods or services abroad. But this
makes it a national company operating in the international marketplace, rather
than a global company. §
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is concentrated
amongst advanced industrial economies rather than there being any massive shift
of investment and employment towards third world countries. The latter remain
marginal in trade. The exceptions to this are some newly industrialising
countries (NICs) in Latin American and §
The world economy is not global but trade, investment
and financial flows are concentrated in the triad of Europe, §
The G3 have the capacity to exert powerful economic
governance over financial markets but choose not to for reasons of ideology and
economic interest. They have an ideological commitment to unfettered finance or
find that they benefit from it. This is the reason for any restraint in
economic governance rather than because it is impossible. States, by
themselves, or in regional or international collaborations have the capacity to
regulate the global economy and pursue reformist policies if they chose to do
so. §
Radical expansionary and redistributive strategies of
national economic management are not possible because of domestic and
international requirements such as norms acceptable to international financial
markets. Capital would flee if governments were to pursue policies which were
too radically socialist. Governments and other actors are forced to behave
differently because of internationalisation. But globalisation theory leads to
too much of a sense of fatalism, and the injunction that neoliberalism is
unavoidable because of globalisation is as much ideological as an actual
inevitability. Politicians may say that neoliberalism is inevitable as much to
justify policies they are ideologically committed to as because they really are
inevitable. Reformist strategies at national and international level are
possible, using existing institutions and practices. You can see here that Hirst and Thompson argue that in some respects the
world economy is very
internationalised (see also Hirst and Thompson 2000 on the ‘over-internationalisation’
of the British economy). But they use the word ‘internationalisation’ rather
than ‘globalisation’ and argue that evidence from the former is sometime used
to justify claims about the latter. They see the world as internationalised
rather than globalised because of a number of the conclusions in the list
above: for instance that there are distinct national economies and companies;
that internationalisation of the economy is restricted to advanced economies
and the triad rather than being of global extent, ie worldwide; and that
internationalisation is happening within existing structures rather than
creating new global ones that go beyond national or inter-national structures.
Let us look now at those taking the third perspective on globalisation.
This tries to maintain a globalist outlook, one that does not retreat from
globalist claims as the sceptics do, but attempts to outline a more complex
globalism than outlined by the first wave of hyperglobalists. Hay and Marsh – between the second and third waves
Hay and Marsh in their edited book on ‘Demystifying Globalisation’ say
that what they want to do is ‘cast a critical and in large part sceptical gaze
over some of the often wildly exaggerated … claims made in the name of globalisation’
(2000: 2-3). They say that this echoes the second wave of globalisation theory
but that they wish to contribute to a third wave approach which has a
multi-dimensional view of the many processes of globalisation that develop in
complex and uneven ways. This they see as ‘part of an emerging and distinctive
“third wave” of writings on globalisation’ (2000: 4). The first wave is seen as one which portrayed globalisation as
inevitable, a singular process across different areas, eroding the boundaries
of nation-states, welfare states and societies. It is said that this is a view
which is popular in the media, business and political worlds, amongst some
academics and on the neoliberal right as well as the left. It is argued that
the first wave perspective is sustained by a lack of empirical evidence or its
misuse (2000: 4). The second sceptical wave is seen to have brought empirical evidence to
bear in a way which has undermined the first globalist wave. Focusing on the
critique of business globalisation, Hay and Marsh say that the second wave has shown
state interventionism as effective (against the idea that globalisation
undermines the nation-state), limits to the mobility of capital and FDI, lack
of global convergence in economic indicators and policy, a domestic focus to
production, the concentration of flows of capital in the G3 regions, and
precedents for flows of FDI (suggesting that globalisation is not new) (2000: 4-5).
All of these give empirical reasons to doubt the case of the first wave. In advocating a third wave, Hay and Marsh, while talking of a sceptical
and critical view, do so within a framework that does not treat globalisation
as something they are rejecting, as sceptics like Hirst and Thompson do. Their
analysis is, therefore, one that tries to develop a complex theory of globalisation
rather than one that tries to debunk it as a phenomenon. As such it can be seen
as being, like Held et al’s, an attempt to rescue globalisation theory in a
more critical and sophisticated form. The tone is more sceptical than Held et
al’s but their analysis is of a form of globalisation, conceptualised in a
particular way. Hay and Marsh praise the second wave but say that it is still derivative
of the ‘globaloney’ of the first wave and that a third wave is needed building
on the foundations of the second’s criticisms (2000: 6). They argue that this
third wave needs to see globalisation not as a process or end-state but a
tendency to which there are counter-tendencies (2000: 6). It is changing and
can be reversed or go in different directions. And, as If these things need to be taken forward by a third wave the implication
is that the second wave does not do so. If the new work that needs to be done
involves that of a new wave then the second wave must be lacking to the extent
that it could not be improved by extra work within its existing framework. Hay and Marsh argue that they are developing innovations which
differentiate them from the second wave (2000: 7) and that they ‘see the need
to initiate a break with the second-wave globalisation literature’ (2000: 13).
Following this they identify four common themes of their book (2000: 7-13)
which they say indicate ‘some of the central themes that will need to be taken
up if a third wave is to develop’ (2000: 13). One is that the discourse of
globalisation yields material effects. For instance governments reacting to
capital flight may be reacting just as much to discourses about capital flight
as its reality. Politicians’ statements that globalisation means governments
have no choice but to pursue business-friendly policies may be as much a
response to the discourse of globalisation as to reality in which this actually
may not be the only possible path. Or politicians may themselves be the agents
of this discourse which justifies policies which are chosen for ideological
reasons but presented to the electorate as necessary because of globalisation. A second theme is that in previous waves globalisation is given a causal
power it does not have. In fact, Hay and Marsh argue, globalisation is more an
effect of other causes than a cause itself and is something that is contingent,
caused by political will and subject to de-globalisation. Rather than being
inevitable and out of control, as the phrase ‘runaway world’ implies (Giddens
1999), and driving other economic, political and cultural processes,
globalisation could be caused by the decisions of companies and politicians, by
capitalism and the interests of states, and so something that is under control
and could be taken in other directions or reversed if companies and politicians
made other decisions. Third, globalisation is seen as something heterogeneous with varying
effects in different forms and locations rather than something which is
homogeneous and general. So financial globalisation is different to cultural
globalisation, they may be proceeding at different paces and extents, and
either of them may have different effects in different areas, for example American
culture proliferating more widely in, say, Britain or Japan than North Korea or
China. Fourth, Hay and Marsh stress that there is an interplay between culture
and economy in globalisation rather than these being two separate spheres best
explained by different disciplines. Cultural globalisation may follow from the
attempt to sell it, from economic globalisation and the spread of capitalism. Or
economic globalisation may be driven by people believing in discourses of it, so
resulting from the culture of globalisation. But all four of these observations in fact affirm arguments made by
second wave sceptics rather than moving analysis on to a third wave. Third wave
critique aims to move on from the second wave but in practice confirms the
latter. Let’s see here where Hay and Marsh are reinforcing second wave
arguments rather than moving on to a new third wave as suggested. First, globalisation is a discourse and sometimes subjects’ actions are
a response to this rather than to any reality. Hay and Marsh put this
proposition forward as one of the third wave innovations differentiating it
from previous waves. But this reinforces what Hirst and Thompson have said.
Hirst and Thompson argue that the norms of international financial markets put
restrictions on radical policies. But they also argue that evidence of
internationalisation is used to falsely justify that globalisation is
happening. Globalisation theory, they say, leads to a false fatalism and they
suggest that the argument that neoliberalism is inevitable is more ideological
than a reality. Reforming strategies are in fact possible at national and
international levels – perhaps redistribution, regulations to make companies
more responsible towards workers and communities, or increased spending on
health, education and welfare. Hay and Marsh have gone into greater detail on
the power of discourses of globalisation in their work than Hirst and Thompson
have with their more economically focused approach (for example, see Hay and
Rosamond 2002 and Marsh, Smith and Holti 2005 and see also, for instance,
Cameron and Palan 2004 and Bruff 2005). Nevertheless, on this question Hay and
Marsh reinforce second wave claims rather than moving on from them as they say
their point does. Second, Hay and Marsh say that an innovating and differentiating
analysis is one that sees globalisation as the effect of causes and agency
rather than a cause itself and inevitable. Hirst and Thompson see what is going
on as internationalisation rather than globalisation. But the historical
account they outline shows internationalisation as the consequence of actors’
decisions as much as a cause or subject-less process. For instance, as we have
seen, they say that it is the ideology and interests of G3 actors that leads
internationalisation to go in the direction it does, rather than in an
alternative more regulated direction which would be possible. Again Hay and
Marsh are reinforcing the second wave rather than providing something that
moves on from it. Third, for Hay and Marsh a third wave innovation is to develop the
analysis of globalisation as something heterogeneous with specific effects
rather than homogeneous and general. But again this reiterates the findings of
sceptics rather than moving beyond them. Hirst and Thompson’s see more advanced
internationalisation in financial markets than in other sectors. They see
internationalisation as variable and reversible in different historical
conjunctures, the belle époque having
been a high point of globalisation after which there were reversals (eg 1930s) and
advances (eg 1970s), and they argue that some advanced and newly
industrialising countries are more integrated into the international economy
while others are relatively outside the world of trade and investment. In
short, Hirst and Thompson show globalisation to be a very uneven process. Fourth, in third wave analysis there is by Hay and Marsh said to be an
interplay between culture and economics rather than these being separate
spheres of study by different disciplines. But Hirst and Thompson argue for
such an interplay. They say that their book focuses on economics but that they
feel if there are doubts about the globalisation of the world economy then
there have to be doubts also about the globalisation of culture, because the latter
is strongly connected to the former. Hirst and Thompson’s points do not analyse
culture and its relationship with economics, and Hay and Marsh pay more
attention to this area, but they do posit this relationship. So Hay and Marsh’s
suggestion of analysis of this interplay is within a framework like the second
wave’s rather than one that moves on from it except in that it pursues it more
concretely. Hay and Marsh also say that in the third wave globalisation can be seen
as a tendency with counter-tendencies rather than a fact or a process which is
going only in one direction. But Hirst and Thompson’s analysis shows that
globalisation is far from accomplished and that internationalisation has had
moments of advance and moments of reversal and that it is within the capacity
of agents like the G3 to change its direction. As with the previous four points
it seems that the innovations Hay and Marsh are arguing for are not so much
innovations as, in practice, confirmations of and continuous with second wave sceptical
analysis. So, many of the approaches and insights that Hay and Marsh argue are
needed already exist within the second wave. What is by implication a
suggestion of limits in the second wave in practice reinforces it by raising
and endorsing points it has already made. The general argument of this article
follows this line – that third wavers try to move on from second wave thinking,
proposing a more advanced qualified globalism. But in doing so they emphasise
features highlighted by the second wave and so reinforce the second wave’s
sceptical approach. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Hay and Marsh identify their
book as ‘somewhere between the second and third waves of the globalisation
debate’ (2000: 7) and that they ‘do not regard the present volume as
unambiguously pioneering this third wave’.
But this qualification, along with their theoretical assertions which in
practice replicate second wave analysis, undermines their claim that they are
initiating a third wave and moving in the direction of innovating and
differentiation from the second wave. The qualifications and the arguments they
make reinforce the second wave rather than show a move forward from it. Held et al – transformationalists, a modified globalism The situation with Held et al does not exactly replicate that in Hay and
Marsh’s analysis and its relationship with the sceptics. Hay and Marsh are more
sceptical in tone and Held et al more globalist in leaning. But there are some
parallels between the way these two sets of third wavers deal with the sceptics
and globalisation. Held et al try to distance themselves from the sceptics,
saying that the latter have attacked a false ideal type and that globalisation
is a real process. But they argue that globalisation needs to be put forward as
more complex and uncertain than it is by first wave hyperglobalists. Held et al
advance a third perspective, transformationalism, which outlines such a more
complex picture of globalisation. This is done most notably in their book Global
Transformations (1999) but also in a number of other places - for instance
in the Open Democracy (2002) debate between David Held and Paul Hirst
(and Held and McGrew 2003). My argument is that there are elements in Held et al’s arguments which
go in different directions to each other. Held et al are trying to defend
globalisation theory by putting forward a modified version of it. But the
qualifications and complexities they add to globalisation theory lead to
confirmation of many claims in the sceptics’ theses and so do not undermine
scepticism or support globalisation as much as is claimed. Let us look at what Held et al set out as the transformationalist
position and what they criticise about scepticism. The examples given below to
illustrate transformationalism are my own. Held et al tend to focus most on
transformations to political forms while Hirst and Thompson, as we have seen,
focus on economics. But there is still substantial overlap in the areas they
focus their analysis on. According to the transformationalist position (Held et al 1999: 7-14): §
Contemporary globalisation is historically
unprecedented. At the same time, transformationalists say, it is a long-term
historical process with pre-modern forms. So there may have been trade and
migration, for instance between Asia, the Middle-East and fringes of §
Globalisation involves profound transformative change
and is a central driving force behind changes reshaping the world. There are not
clear distinctions between the domestic and the international in economic,
social and political processes. For instance, aspects of national culture such
as media, film, religion, food, fashion and music are so infused with inputs
from international sources that national culture is no longer separate from the
international. This is a transformatory driving force because this
globalisation changes peoples’ life experiences. §
Economies are becoming deterritorialised, global and
transnational. This is happening through, for example, the mobility of capital
across national boundaries, the role of multinational corporations and
interdependency between different nations’ economies. §
While they are still legally sovereign, nation-states’
powers, functions and authority are being reconstituted by international
governance and law, by global ecological, transportation and communications
developments and non-territorial organisations such as multinational
corporations (MNCs) and transnational social movements. The nation-state is not
a self-governing, autonomous unit (although they say states never have had
complete sovereignty) and authority is more diffused. Held et al also say that
states have become more activist and their power is not necessarily diminished
but is being reconstituted. This is unlike both the globalists’ claim that
nation-state sovereignty has ended and what is said to be the sceptic position
that nothing much has changed. §
Territorial boundaries are still important but the
idea that they are the primary markers of modern life has become more
problematic. Economic, social and political activities are locally rooted but
become territorially disembedded or reterritorialised in new forms of localisation
and nationalisation. So a company may have roots in a particular territorial
area but become disembedded as its workforce become internationally located or
its products sold internationally. It may be reterritorialised in terms of the
new places where the workforce is located or the way its products are tailored
for markets in different areas. Types of music may start off from a locality
but become disembedded as they are performed or sold globally, or take on
global influences. They can become influences on, and infused into, other types
of music globally or in other national places where fusions of music create new
forms of local or national culture in that area, ie new forms of localisation
and nationalisation. §
Transformationalists say they do not reduce the world
to a single fixed ideal type, as other perspectives do, and that they recognise
it is contradictory and contingent. They feel that globalists and sceptics reduce
the world to global or non-global types respectively, without realising how
contradictory it is, with aspects of both and middle elements where things like
cultures may stay national while what the national is is changed by global
inputs - so a mixture of the national and
global. And they see globalists or sceptics as suggesting inevitabilities when
whether the world becomes more or less global is not predetermined but is open
to going in different possible directions. §
Sceptics are said to see the world as a singular
process when actually it is differentiated with different patterns in different
areas of life. So, for instance, some types of globalisation (eg finance) may
be more globalised than others (eg corporations), and some countries in the
world (for instance those most needing of inward investment) may experience the
impact of global finance more than others. §
Held et al argue that sceptics are empiricist because
statistical evidence is taken to confirm, qualify or reject the globalisation
thesis when more qualitative evidence and interpretive analysis is needed. Migration
or trade, for example, may (arguably) be no more globalised now than in the belle époque in terms of quantitative
indicators such as value of goods exchanged or numbers of people on the move. But
the qualitative impact of migration and trade on economies, politics and
culture could be greater in the current period. Quantitative indicators of
limited change do not necessarily demonstrate lack of qualitative change. §
There is a single global system that nearly all
societies are part of but not global convergence or a single world society.
National societies and systems are enmeshed in patterns of interregional
networks but these are different from global integration which does not exist
because it implies too much singularity, and different from convergence which
does not exist because that would assume homogeneity. For example, there may be
global economic interdependency but that does not mean there is global
convergence on economic factors like prices or interest rates. So a global
economic system can exist but without global convergence or a single economy. §
Globalisation involves new patterns of stratification
across and within societies, some becoming enmeshed and some marginalised but
in new configurations different to the old core-periphery, North-South and
first world-third world classifications. It follows that globalisation is not
universalisation because globalisation is not experienced to the same extent by
all people. In place of the core-periphery model of global inequality there is
now a model that shows a middle group of developing countries in Latin America
and Asia that have grown significantly and become more integrated into the
global economy, so lifting themselves out of the periphery, but others, some
African countries for example, who have become more debilitated and left out in
the periphery. So a bipolar model is replaced by a more complex stratification
with both greater inclusion of some but also exclusion and greater polarisation
between the top and bottom. Globalisation here has an uneven effect, some
becoming more integrated into it and others more excluded. §
Transformationalists say that unlike hyperglobalists
and sceptics they recognise that the future direction of globalisation is
uncertain rather than teleological and linear with a given future end-state. So
rather than globalisation being destined to sweep ahead, or the status quo
being the predetermined future, transformationalists are saying that the
international future is open and can be decided in a number of directions by
factors such as the choices of big corporations and governments or the
influence of civil society and social movements in the world. §
Government strategies for dealing with the globalised
world are said to include neoliberalism, the developmental or catalytic state
and more outward looking strategies based on international regulation, which is
a line of government action that global or cosmopolitan democrats like Held et
al favour (Held and McGrew 2002). So with openness in the paths that
globalisation could take in the future, comes a number of options that governments
can take to influence that direction, including economic liberalism, greater
state intervention in guiding the future of economies and societies, or global
governance of the world economy and global problems. Transformationalists and sceptics compared But how much does this transformationalist third wave as outlined by
Held et al rescue globalisation in a modified form and undermine the sceptics?
Let us go through some of Held et al’s points. There is no doubt that there are differences between the
transformationalists and sceptics: on definition (should the processes they see
be defined as internationalisation or globalisation?); on historical periodisation
(is current globalisation unprecedented or the period between 1870-1914 the
most globalised?); and normative proposals (divergence between seeing
nation-states and international blocs or global democracy as the bases for
future political action). Hirst and Thompson are accused of attacking an extreme ideal type to
undermine the case for globalisation. This is a fair point and Hirst and
Thompson agree that this is what they do. They take a model of what they think
globalisation would be were it to exist and show that this model does not exist
in reality. However this is an ideal type that shapes business and political
debate and Held et al themselves justify their own transformationalist position
in relation to a strong hyperglobalist position that they criticise. More
important than these points, however, is that the ideal type that Hirst and Thompson
criticise portrays something that they say does not exist. In comparing
transformationalists and sceptics views it is more sensible to compare like
with like. Rather than comparing Held et al’s outline of global transformations
that they say are happening with a model of what Hirst and Thompson say is not
happening, it is more useful to compare what Hirst and Thompson say is going on
in the world – internationalisation – with what Held et al say is going on in
the world – global transformation. Then we can see if there are real
differences in their positions that need to be evaluated. We can do this by
going through the transformationalist points outlined above. Held et al say that contemporary globalisation is historically
unprecedented but that there are earlier pre-modern forms of globalisation.
This sounds like a contradictory statement, but it means that there are
precedents for globalisation but none as intense, extensive, fast and of such
great volume and impact as at present. Sceptics and transformationalists may
not disagree that globalisation is something quite long-running. But there is a
difference between Hirst and Thompson’s view that its heyday was the 1870-1914
period and that it is less intense now and Held et al’s view that the current
period is the most advanced. Held et al argue that there are not clear differences between domestic
and international processes. This is something sceptics agree on. As can be
seen from the summary of the sceptics’ position above, they see domestic economies
as very much internationalised, for instance in terms of finance, trade and
investment. Where there is a difference is on whether international processes
are characterised as ‘global’ or not but their view on the interpenetration of
the national with the international does not mark transformationalism off from
scepticism. Held et al argue that economies are becoming deterritorialised, global
and transnational. This sounds like a more radical position than that of the
sceptics but Held et al qualify this argument with the view that territorial
boundaries are still important. Economic, social and political activities are
locally rooted and become territorially disembedded or reterritorialised in new
forms of localisation and nationalisation. How different is this from the
sceptic position that there are national economies trading internationally, and
companies with local bases whose production, trading and investment activities
go on beyond this location? The emphasis on deterritorialisation and disembeddeness
goes beyond the sceptical position but rootedness and reterritorialisation does
not. The view of nation-states that Held et al have is of agents, legally
sovereign with their power not necessarily diminished but reconstituted, more
activist, but with authority diffused and lacking self-governing autonomous
powers. For example, a nation-state may have reconstituted itself in regional and
international organisations, so having its authority diffused more and
self-governing power diminished by this and by global economic pressures. But
it is still legally sovereign, taking an active role in so reconstituting
itself in a more globalised world in a way which maintains or even enhances its
powers. This is said to be unlike the sceptic position that nothing much has
changed. However this distinction from the sceptical position is problematic on
three counts. First of all sceptics do not say nothing has changed. They say a lot has
changed, in the earlier belle époque
period, and in the 1970s and 1980s, but that this does not mean that we live in
a globalised era. As noted in the summary of their position above, they argue
that there have been big transformations in the international economy, although
within existing structures. Companies have to act differently and the norms of
international financial markets have come to restrict what it is possible for
nation-states to do, for instance that this rules out radical macro-economic
policies. Second, sceptics agree that nation-states lack complete sovereignty and
have to share this. For instance they outline the role of international
organisations and international finance in the world and, as we have seen,
constraints on radical redistributional politics at state level. Their
qualification is that this has always been the case and is not new. But they do
not depart from the view that there is not clear sovereignty that does not have
to be shared. Thirdly, they agree with the view of the activist state, but if anything
the transformationalists’ emphasis on this gives credence to the sceptic view
that nation-states are important actors in the world stage with the power at
national and international levels to determine the forms that what is called
globalisation takes. Sceptics argue that nation-states have the autonomy to
determine the future of globalisation and Held et al’s outline of alternative
strategies such as neoliberalism, the developmental state, the catalytic state
and cosmopolitan democracy seems to reinforce the view that, in their globalised
world, nation-states have some autonomy and power to determine the future, in
the way that Hirst and Thompson also argue. This is not to say that the
transformationalists and sceptics are in complete harmony on the role of the
nation-state in the current global or international world. But it does seem
that the qualifications in the transformationalist analysis affirm many of the
arguments of the sceptical case as much as rebutting them. For Held et al one difference between the transformationalist and sceptical
positions is that the former recognise the multidimensional, contingent,
contradictory nature of the world and its uncertain direction whereas the
latter see it as singular and linear and with a given end-state. But this
appears to misinterpret the sceptical position. Hirst and Thompson focus on the
economy rather than other areas so there is not too much indication of how they
see globalisation as it affects different areas. But they argue that
internationalisation has many different effects in different parts of the
world, with much activity being concentrated in advanced economies while other
areas of the world are less integrated. They state that internationalisation is
not linear but is subject to reversals, such as that after the belle époque, and that the idea that
globalisation is predetermined and inevitable is a myth used to justify
neoliberal policies, the reality being that nation-states individually or organised
internationally have it in their power to alter the course of internationalisation.
The difference from scepticism created by the transformationalists here is
based on a misunderstanding of what the sceptics say. In fact what
transformationalists argue on these points seems to be in accordance with the
sceptics. Finally, transformationalists argue that there is a single global system
in which all societies are enmeshed, something that appears to differ from the
sceptic position that much significant activity in the international economy is
concentrated in the triad of Japan, the EU and North America, with some NICs up
and coming into this sphere of influence, and other parts of the world much
less integrated. However the differences seem smaller when it is considered
that transformationalists outline a situation in which, while there is a single
world system, they say there is not global convergence or a single world
society, that they see patterns of stratification across and within societies
involving some becoming enmeshed and some marginalised, and in which globalisation
is not universal because globalisation is not experienced to the same extent by
all people. The unevenness of integration into the global system comes closer
to the sceptics’ outline which leads the latter to the conclusion that there is
no global economy because of such patterns of inclusion and exclusion. The Politics of Globalisation So, attempts to rebut scepticism and defend a modified globalism seem
often to actually share substantive ground with the sceptics’ analysis, one
that raises doubts about the reality of globalisation. Rhetorically
transformationalists are stronger in defending globalism as a fact, despite
such commonality with the sceptics, and this may be partly what leads to one
area of significant difference. Despite the shared ground with scepticism,
transformationalists remain committed to a globalist outlook and their
normative suggestions about a politics which can respond to globalisation puts
strong emphasis on cosmopolitan global democracy (see Archibugi and Held 1995; Held
1995; Archibugi 2004; Beck 2006; Fine 2006). This involves global political
fora in which different communities and interests can participate to reach
agreements on issues, many of which have a global character and cannot be
solved purely at national levels. Issues like human rights and war, ecological
problems, drugs and crime, economic instability and inequality are seen as
global rather than national problems which require global co-ordination or
global interventions to be solved. Cosmopolitans look to global cosmopolitan
fora or international interventions, based in global cosmopolitan consciousness,
to solve such problems. Sceptics whose analysis does not lead to such globalist conclusions do
not share this faith in global politics (see Zolo 1997 and 2002; Hirst 2001; Open
Democracy 2002). This is because sceptics do not believe that powerful western
states would be willing to put up with the political equalisation that global
democracy would allow. They would resist political equality and inclusivity and
try to maintain their superior power in global fora. They would use global
politics against others when in their interests and evade being subjected to it
where it was against their interests. There are important conflicts of interest
and ideology and over resources between nation-states, increasing as a
consequence of ecological problems such as climate change. Solutions to global
problems would have to involve the interests or ideologies of some being
favoured and those of others gone against – there are not win-win solutions to
such problems. So conflict is more likely in global politics and the
co-operative consciousness that cosmopolitanism would rely on is unlikely. An example of some of these issues can be found in the role of the Cosmopolitans are well-intentioned, right to be concerned about issues
such as ecology, rights and inequality and to see such problems as global and
solutions as needing often to be transnational. But if cosmopolitan politics is
unlikely or undesirable for the reasons mentioned what might an alternative politics
to solve such issues involve? For sceptics the future lies in nation-states
acting alone or, because such problems are transnational, acting together
multilaterally (rather than globally), for instance in regional blocs or
alliances of the likeminded. So this
involves not universal or global agreements but multilaterally and bilaterally
agreed blocs and alliances based on shared objectives, interests and ideologies.
It
may be better for states and other political actors to ally transnationally
with those actors who are likeminded and with shared interests rather than
trying for cosmopolitan consciousness at a global level were many have opposed
interests and ideologies and are more powerful. This is a politics that works
more with a reality of divisions, antagonism and state alliances than the global
commonality and agreement required for global cosmopolitan democracy. Such
alliances could be forged, for instance, between states or movements who see
themselves as anti-neoliberal or anti-imperialist, such as left-wing
governments in Latin America and other places, the non-aligned movement, or the
global justice movement (eg see Gill 2000; Gills 2000; Motta 2006; which is not
to say that there aren’t aspects to the
practices of some such governments which are not defensible and where there
have been failures). International institutions
exist and have to be engaged with so such actors should participate in
cosmopolitan institutions. But they will also see these as representing
particular as much as global universal interests and as a tool for the powerful
as much as equality and democracy. As such their politics has to operate also
outside such institutions, with agents forming alliances with each other, using
what resources (eg, energy resources and human expertise) they have for mutual
assistance, in a politics of conflict (rather than cosmopolitan universality)
against powerful forces where these preserve inequality or lack of democracy or
are amongst those who transgress human rights and are behind ecological
problems or war. This politics is neither statist
nor globally centralist (although it uses both levels). It does not ally a
scepticism about cosmopolitan politics with anti-interventionism, pacifism or inertia.
It favours activism and intervention transnationally in issues of global
concern and relevance but through a recognition of conflict because these issues
involve conflicting rather than common interests and objectives; and transnationally
and beyond the state through multilateral and bilateral blocs of actors with
common agendas and interests where they exist or can be forged rather than through
the isolated state or global universals. This is an alternative to statism and
centralism/globalism, operating at both these levels but also at a level in
between of conflictual politics and selected transnational multilateralism. It involves
harnessing the interests of the poorer and less powerful rather than globalist hopes
or a visionary holism. Furthermore, transnational politics
needs to be not just procedural and based on institutional solutions to global
problems, for instance cosmopolitan democracy and international law. It has to
have a substance beyond legal or institutional procedures being advocated
because many of the problems outlined above are ones which require particular
sorts of substantive policies as much as the right sort of institutional means.
Different institutional means can lead to varying substantive policies and the
choice of the latter is as important as the appropriate means being chosen. The differences in sceptics and transformationalists’ normative
political conclusions seem to stem more from the transformationalists’
globalist conclusions than from the substance of their arguments which in
practice often share similar ground with the more sceptical approach.
Transformationalists’ analysis, as outlined above, gives a picture of:
unevenness of integration; inequality, stratification and power; nation-states
(albeit reconstituted ones) for whom there are different possible activist
strategies; and reterritorialisation and regional blocs. On this basis the
politics of cosmopolitan global democracy they favour seem unlikely. Their
analysis shows up inequalities and conflicts which would make it difficult for
global agreements to be realised. These are often between nation-states who
remain in their outline still powerful actors. The more appropriate political
conclusion from such a picture of the world order would seem to be one which
recognises inequality and conflict, nation-states and regional or multilateral
likeminded blocs, as identified by sceptics as more likely structures in future
politics. One problem, then, with transformationalism is that in drawing globalist
conclusions they are led to globalist politics. But if it is the case that what
they say actually lends more credence to the sceptic case then such global
politics may only offer some hope. It may be better to have a more realistic
view of politics as about economic and political conflicts of a sort that do
not lend themselves to global democracy but more to nation-states, regional and
other blocs, alliances, and struggles between them and other opposed interests
in civil society, rather than universality and global agreement. One reason to
get the analysis of globalisation right in the three waves is to make sure that
the political conclusions reached are the best ones. So the transformationalist approach tries to rebut the sceptics while rescuing
globalisation theory in a more sophisticated form than that in which
hyperglobalists have advanced it. But there are some problems with this. In
general transformationalism is a perspective which rhetorically defends globalisation
but in practice bolsters up quite a bit of the sceptical case. One reason for
this is that transformationalists add significant qualifications and
complexities to their outline of globalisation. This brings them on to greater
shared ground with the sceptics than it appears at face value. In many areas
both perspectives share key elements of outlook, as shown above. A second
reason is that transformationalists, as we have seen above, do not always give
an accurate picture of scepticism. Sometimes pictures of scepticism are given
which make it possible to dismiss it. But when the sceptical view is looked at
more carefully it is possible to see that on occasion scepticism does not quite
say what it is said to and its perspective stands up to criticism. Scholte – a qualified globalism In some ways Jan Aart Scholte’s (2005) attempt to modify globalisation
theory yet hang on to its key claims leads to similar results as Held et al’s
analysis. Scholte does not explicitly specify first, second and third waves or
perspectives in globalisation theory in the way that Hay and Marsh (2000) and
Held et al (1999) do. But he does attempt to provide a more complex concept of
globalisation with qualifications, one that goes beyond an extreme concept of
globalisation but does not go as far as the sceptics. In doing so he hopes to
defend an idea of globalisation as a reality rather than allow it to be
debunked. In these ways he falls into the third wave post-sceptic camp. Scholte argues that globalisation involves supraterritorial rather than transplanetary
relations. The latter are more like the international links that sceptics say
characterise world relations. Transplanetary connectivity, he says, involves
relations between different parts of the world. These have become more dense,
involve more people, more often, more extensively, more intensively and in
greater volume. However they have been around for many centuries and are
essentially inter-national links between different parts of the world. Supraterrritoriality, however, he argues is relatively new and breaks
with territorialist geography. This involves not just an intensification of
transplanetary links but also different types of global connectivity which go
above and beyond territorial units. They transcend territorial geography and
are delinked from it. Examples may include transworld simultaneity (eg people
across the world consuming the same make of coffee), or transworld
instantaneity (eg international telephone calls). Other examples of
supraterritorialism he gives include travel by jet plane, people movements,
consumption, telecommunications, global media, finance, ecological problems,
global organisations, global health problems, international law, and global
consciousness (eg in global sports events and global consciousness of human
rights). Supraterritoriality involves more than the compression of time relative
to space characteristic of intensified transplanetary connectivity. It involves
social relations that also go beyond territorial space. The difference between
the time-space compression of transplanetary links and supraterritoriality is
of a qualitative kind. Territorial domains, for Scholte, remain important but
do not define the whole macro spatial framework which now has supra-territorial
dimensions. Scholte makes some qualifications to this picture. In the second edition
of his book on globalisation, which I am referring to here, he drops the word
‘deterritorialisation’ previously used to encapsulate global relations because
it implies that territory does not matter any more and he suggests this may
have been taking things too far. The emphasis is on the term
‘supraterritoriality’, which captures something that goes above and beyond
territory, but in which it is implicit that territory is still present even if
transcended. He argues that territorialism remains important – for instance in
production, governance, ecology and identities and that globalism has not
eliminated it. All of these examples have supra-territorial dimensions but also
have territorially rooted aspects to them. The world, he says, is both
territorial and global and there is no pure globality that exists independently
of territorial spaces. The world is territorial and supraterritorial and both
intersect. The global is not a domain unto itself separate from regional,
national, provincial and local levels. There is an intersection of all these. The problem here is that Scholte’s discussion, which is intended to
defend the concept and reality of globalisation by giving a more complex and
nuanced account of it, introduces qualifications and reservations which
effectively bring his analysis on to common ground with quite a bit of
sceptical perspectives. Many of the examples that Scholte gives, some mentioned above, originate
from a time before the post-1960s period in which globalisation, he says, has
taken off. Also many of them are of transplanetary connectivity rather than of
the supraterritoriality which goes beyond territory. World sports events, for
instance, are composed of national teams competing with one another in which
spectators often identify passionately with national identities. Movements of
people involve patterns and experiences which are heavily affected by what the
national origins and destinations of the migrants are. Climate change exhibits
clear variations in the national origins of the problems, and national power
differences and conflicts in the negotiation of solutions. These doubts over
the supraterritorial character of his examples are reflected also in Scholte’s
qualification I have mentioned, which having posited supra-territorial
relations then says that such relations are not beyond territory but are
embedded in it. In short, Scholte’s outline shows a similar pattern to the arguments of
Hay and Marsh (2000) and Held et al (1999). An argument is set out which it is
said will defend globalisation. It will show how complex globalisation is. But
the qualifications made to do this sometimes undermine the globalist
conclusions that are reached. In general the way third wave transformationalists
try to combine globalism with qualifications sometimes means they are less
coherent than first wave globalists or sceptics and end up giving support to
one or other of the other waves or, in differing ways, to both of the positions
they are criticising at the same time. ( Conclusions I have argued that the third wave tries to construct a more complex
globalisation theory than that which came in the first wave. It is argued by
third wavers that this more complex picture shows the reality of globalisation
today, one which undermines sceptics’ claims that we live at best in an era of
internationalisation rather than of a new global plane above and beyond this. But it is perhaps no coincidence that Hay and Marsh say that their
theory aims to move towards a third wave but has not got there yet. This may
well be because to do so would involve abandoning a second wave which their
conclusions seem to consolidate rather than show to be in need of moving on
from. Held et al argue for a globalist theory and globalist normative
conclusions, but many of their substantive arguments seem to outline a picture
of a world system which is sometimes quite like that suggested by the sceptics.
A modified globalism is set out in a way which sometimes seems in detail as
close to the sceptics as to globalisation theory. Scholte’s outline follows
this pattern too. This phenomenon in the three waves literature has gone
unidentified as discussions have developed. The aim of this article has been to
revisit this field to identify this problem in the literature and bring out its
implications. It is probably significant that an early contribution to the idea of
waves in globalisation theory, that by Kofman and Youngs (1996), suggests only
two waves, the second, which they argue for, seems to outline views which both
sceptics and transformationalists have been putting forward. Kofman and Youngs argue that globalisation theory has been too
generalising and universalising and has not paid enough attention to the
specificities of what globalisation involves in particular contexts. For them if globalisation is something new,
it is also a reformulation of the old. Old relations are evident in new forms,
which also involve inequality, politics and power. Power is very one way, from
the West, but small states have been able to participate and shape debates
through collaboration with each other. Capital has flowed more freely but states have been stricter on
controlling immigration, ie people movements. States are retaining sovereignty
but this is being reshaped and shifting because of things like the rise of
regional institutions. There are global flows of media, communications,
technology and finance but rather than place being obliterated, such flows are
articulated and concretised in specific ways in particular places and these
places are the intersections of the local, regional, national and
international. This perspective does not distinguish between a sceptical and
post-sceptical outlook or between scepticism and transformationalism. Just as
Hay and Marsh (2000) have found it as yet not possible to move beyond the
second wave to a desired third wave, Kofman and Youngs outline only a second
wave. This outline is one that is consistent with both sceptical and
transformationalist perspectives that have been discussed in this article.
There are differences in the conclusions that sceptical and transformationalist
perspectives come to, on definition, periodisation, and normative politics, for
instance. But the areas of underlying substantive analysis, exemplified in
Kofman and Young’s second wave which can straddle both perspectives, suggest
that differences on globalisation between sceptics and transformationalists can
be exaggerated. Transformationalists share many of the doubts of the sceptics
in practice, and express them in their own analyses, but move away from them
when coming to more globalist conclusions. Politically these conclusions are important. If transformationalists are
basing normative globalist proposals on an analysis which shares with the
sceptics a view of a world of unevenness of integration, stratification,
reconstituted but active nation-states with different possible options, reterritorialisation
and regional blocs then the politics of cosmopolitan global democracy that they
come down on the side of seems unlikely. A politics of power, inequality and
conflict, via nation-states, regional blocs and political alliances between
actors with similar interests and ideologies, over resources and diverging
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Luke Martell is Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Sussex and author of The Sociology of Globalization, Polity Press, 2010.