Global Inequality, Human Rights and Power: a
critique of Ulrich BeckÕs cosmopolitanism
Luke Martell, University of Sussex
A later version of this article is in Critical
Sociology, 35, 2, 2009
This
article is a critique of Ulrich BeckÕs advocacy of a cosmopolitan approach to
global inequality and human rights. It is argued that cosmopolitanism does not
bring a new and unique perspective on global inequality. In fact BeckÕs
proposals on migration would reinforce inequality and anti-cosmopolitanism. It is
argued that his Ôboth/andÕ perspective on hybridisation and contextual
universalism is undermined by inequality, conflict and power that are glossed
over in BeckÕs approach. I argue that human rights interventionism as advocated
by Beck falls short of cosmopolitanism, in ways which are shown by
qualifications about power and inequality that Beck himself makes in his
arguments.
This article focuses on the
implications of Ulrich BeckÕs cosmopolitan sociology and politics for
understanding global inequality, human rights and power. Beck has creditably
stated that his desire is to outline an alternative to neoliberal and
postmodernist responses to globalization, by formulating a politics oriented
around social and human goals, including through global political interventions
(eg, 2006: 57-71, 115-6 and, on neoliberalism and responses to it, see 2000:
introduction and chs 4 and 5). Underpinning this is his prescription of a
sociological approach which attempts to break with methodological nationalism
in favour of more global and cosmopolitan vision for social science. Beck is a
public intellectual in Germany and beyond, identified with a left liberal
agenda, on the face of it critical of neoliberalism, and with cosmopolitan
proposals at a global level. He has affinities with sometimes similarly
characterised authors such as the cosmopolitan sociologists of globalization
Anthony Giddens and David Held.
Despite his important
positive intentions, and a powerful analysis of possible political responses to
neoliberalism, difficulties and contradictions undermine some of BeckÕs key
claims on global and cosmopolitan issues. Flaws in his sociology of
globalization and cosmopolitanism are at the basis of problems in his global
political prescriptions on international inequality and human rights. An
important argument in this article is that the proposal of a co-operative
humanitarian global politics fails to work when set against a critical
sociological perspective on world politics as structured by conflict and power,
including between nation-states, rather then common consciousness and
collaboration, as posited by Beck. BeckÕs approach glosses over conflicts,
inequalities and injustices in world society and harmonises contradictions
within a benign and optimistic view of international relations. A key concern
here is that some of these problems in BeckÕs theory are brought out by
internal contradictions within it.
My focus in this article is
on BeckÕs perspective on global inequality and human rights in his books Cosmopolitan
Vision (2006) and What is
Globalization? (2000) and
associated articles (eg Beck 2000a, Beck and Sznaider 2006), but they are
relevant also to his books Power in the Global Age (2005; see also Grande and Beck 2007), and, in
parts, to other cosmopolitan approaches to human rights and inequality (eg
Kaldor 2003, Held 2000, Archibugi and Held 1995). BeckÕs concerns in his
writings on globalization and cosmopolitanism follow from his earlier work on
risk society (Beck 1992, 1999), although in ways I do not have space to discuss
here. Likewise some criticisms of this earlier work focus on inequalities and
power and, as such, have links with my own critique here (eg, see Mythen 2004;
Rustin 1994). My focus is on his more recent work on globalization and cosmopolitanism
as yet less fully discussed by critical analysts.
Methodological
nationalism, cosmopolitanism and global inequality
Beck criticises
methodological nationalism and advocates the replacement of what he sees as a
redundant national outlook or container theory of society with a more
cosmopolitan vision. One place where he says this applies is in making sense of
global inequality. Here he suggests that previous perspectives have been too
methodologically nationalist to understand global inequalities and that
cosmopolitanism provides a new perspective that can do so for the first time.
In Cosmopolitan Vision Beck argues that global inequalities get Ôat best
only marginal attention in methodological nationalismÕ (2006: 38-40). There are
two main aspects to this argument. Firstly, he says that inequalities are
justified by the performance principle. Inequality is justified by the dynamism
and productivity its incentives are said to bring to society and, therefore,
the overall wealth it produces. Methodological nationalism he says uses this
performance justification internally to give inequality a positive
legitimation. Cosmopolitanism shows how the nation-state principle legitimates
global inequalities. Secondly, Beck argues that the national outlook being
nationally inward-looking conceals global inequalities. It legitimates global
inequalities negatively by concealment, therefore, as well as positively by
justifying them (2006: 38).
There are a number of
questions here. First Beck argues that methodological nationalism justifies
internal inequalities using the performance principle. However one of
sociologyÕs great contributions has been to be critical about inequality and
expose inequalities of class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality and their negative
effects on life chances and power. Sociology has been at the forefront of the
analysis of social divisions, from Marx and Weber onwards through neo-Marxists,
neo-Weberians and others in the 20th century (eg see Giddens 1981;
Crompton 1998). The performance principle as justification has been exposed by
sociology through a counter-focus on the ill-effects of inequality, rather than
reproduced by it as Beck suggests.
A second issue relates to
comparative sociology. Beck says that the nation-state principle has stopped
global inequalities being exposed. But comparative sociology while sticking to
the nation-state principle, as he has argued critically that it does (Beck and
Sznaider 2006 and Beck 2006, p.28), can show up inequalities globally through international
comparison. Comparative sociology, almost by definition, shows up global
inequalities on a cross-national basis.
Thirdly, dependency theory
and world systems theory have been important schools of thought in sociology
which have shown inequality globally (eg see Harrison 1988). This has been
partly in relations in which they show the nation-state as important and which,
as such, demonstrate that methodological nationalism is compatible with
understanding global inequality and not necessarily an introverted legitimation
for it as Beck claims. But it has also shown this in relations of
interdependency, ie in transnational relations of a more global sort. One of
the criticisms of dependency theory has been that it does not show enough of an
introverted nation-state principle, attributing too much of global inequality
to the dependency of the poor on the developed world, and failing to attribute
enough of the blame to factors internal to states, such as corruption and
internal wars. Far from being too inwardly nationally-focused to see global
inequalities, some schools in the sociology of development which have
thoroughly analysed global inequality have been criticised for attributing it
too much to external factors and insufficiently to factors internal to the
nation-state. (For a recent discussion of studies of international inequality
and development within the context of globalization see Kiely 2007).
Given these factors, BeckÕs
characterisation of methodological nationalism and previous sociology as
unequipped to be conscious of global inequality seems problematic. This raises
a fourth issue. Beck justifies his approach by changing his characterisation of
methodological nationalism from one which analyses international relations from
the point of view of the nation-state and relations between nation-states to
one which sees methodological nationalism as ÔintrovertedÕ, ie not oriented to
external relations which he is saying here are unequal. The way he can
criticise methodological nationalism for legitimating global inequality by not
analysing external relations is by defining it here as ÔintrovertedÕ. This goes
against BeckÕs definition of methodological nationalism elsewhere as open to
externalist analysis but from the point of view of inter-national nation-states
relating to one another rather than with a view of more supra-national global
relations (2006, p.79-80). If Beck had continued with the latter more
externalist definition it would have shown that there is an analysis of global
inequalities in an externally conscious methodological nationalism. It is by
introducing a stronger definition of methodological nationalism based on
introversion that it is possible to define it as blind to social inequality
transnationally.
Alternatively Beck can
argue that the national outlook can be aware of inequalities between nations
but because this stays at the level of differences between nations this is
still a national outlook and not a global perspective above and beyond nations
(2006: 79-80). Yet it is at the level of analyses of inequalities between
nations that understandings of global inequality lie and approaches mentioned
such as world systems theory and dependency theory take this beyond the level
of nation-state comparisons. It is wrong to criticise inter-national
perspectives when they do show up inequality across the world, and wrong to see
them as restricted to simply relations between nations when they look at the
dependency that maintains global inequality.
Fifthly, BeckÕs
characterisation of methodological nationalism as introverted does not give
concrete references to literature that is methodologically nationalist in this
globally unaware sense. Yet there is reference to literature on global
inequality. So there is a skewed referencing of literature. Beck mentions that
which supports his perspective, ie literature on global inequality, but not
references which would back up his criticism of alternative perspectives as
lacking (eg 2006: 38-9). This makes BeckÕs own analysis appear as a new
cosmopolitan perspective which brings to sociology for the first time an
awareness of global inequalities, but only in relation to a deficient
alternative which is never concretely referenced. Brevity in evidence and lack
of referencing to literature being criticised are also problems elsewhere in
BeckÕs theory.
Sixthly and related to the
previous point, Beck underestimates previous literature and this is connected
to an overestimation of the role of the cosmopolitan perspective in being able
to expose global inequality. So, for instance, he argues: Ôa common assumption,
but one which is seldom consistently thought through and examined, is that
national inequalities may be globally rather than nationally determined É due
to capital flows, crises and upheavals É Only in the cosmopolitan outlook É do
these restrictions on thought, inquiry and research become clear and can they
be overcomeÕ (2006: 39). So cosmopolitanism is stated as the perspective that
can introduce systematic analysis of the global bases of inequalities for the
first time. But this status and novelty for BeckÕs work and the cosmopolitan
perspective is given because it does not reference previous attempts which it
is claimed have failed to meet these criteria. Yet there is work from Marx, through
world systems and dependency theory and the whole field of development studies
to recent theorists of globalization like Leslie Sklair (2002), to name just a
few, which does analyse global dimensions of inequalities. The global bases of
national inequalities caused by factors such as capital mobility, trade and
integration has been a major research agenda in economics and other social
sciences (for recent contributions see Kaplinsky 2005 and Held and Kaya 2007).
It is only possible for Beck to claim this novel status and ground-breaking
role for cosmopolitan theory by leaving aside literatures of this sort on
global inequality.
An example he gives of the
new insight that such a cosmopolitan perspective may bring is in the instance
of developing countries asking developed western countries to move away from
their protectionist agricultural policies and be truer to the free market
principles they advocate by opening up their markets to developing
countries. This is seen as an
example of the reproduction of global inequalities that the cosmopolitan
outlook can reveal. But: a) this is not new information that required the
cosmopolitan perspective for it to become visible. This contradiction has been
discussed well beyond the confines of the cosmopolitan perspective which it is
claimed uniquely has the conceptual equipment to be aware of such dynamics of
global inequality. Left critics have exposed the protectionist hypocrisy of
developed countries who advocate free trade, as have economic liberals. The inconsistency
of developed countries on their own free trade prescriptions is regularly
covered in news media coverage of world trade talks. (Again, a recent overview
on such issues and literature is provided by Kiely 2007 and newspapers such as
the neoliberal The Economist
have covered such questions for many years). Furthermore; b) BeckÕs
highlighting of the free trade hypocrisy of developed countries contradicts his
argument for the need for a ÔbreakÕ beyond methodological nationalism because
this instance involves international and global relations but also decisions of
states made in nation-state interests and the sealing off of borders against
globalization. In short BeckÕs recognition of the importance of protectionism
here shows the continuing importance of the methodological nationalism and
anti-globalism he says is redundant in a new cosmopolitan era, at the levels of
both awareness and reality.
What the cosmopolitan
perspective brings according to Beck is a perspective in which Ôthe principles
of national blindness to global inequalities lose much of their validityÕ
(2006: 40). But the status and novelty of cosmopolitanism claimed here is only
possible by not referencing the long, rich and systematic literature in
sociology and the social sciences on global inequality that I have mentioned.
It asks those interested in this area to reject previous analyses, which it is
said problematically are methodologically nationalist and confined by national
introversion, and to find the first proper analysis of global inequality in his
cosmopolitan framework. This only works by an underestimation or denial of the
past and an overestimation of the novelty of cosmopolitanism.
Immigration and global
inequality
In fact Beck argues for an
arrangement which it seems would reproduce rather than reduce global inequality
(2000a: 92-4 and 2006: 108-9). He advocates a division of labour between low
skilled jobs in poor countries and higher skilled work being done in richer
countries and says this would involve a ÔcosmopolitanÕ sharing (ie division) of
labour that would not require migration. Rather than low skilled workers being
imported into Europe, the low-skilled work would be exported to them. This is
in the context (2006: 108) of a discussion of the possibility that he feels
neoliberalism could take a cosmopolitan turn. Here he says there could be
Ôsolidarity with strangers in the context of a global distribution of labour
and wealthÕ.
There are a number of
issues here. First, Beck appears to be endorsing a proposal to restrict
immigration into rich countries, so: a) siding with anti-immigration forces and
lending reinforcement to their arguments; b) undermining a device which could
foster cosmopolitan mixing by the intermingling of people from different
international backgrounds; c) reducing opportunities for the poor in rich
countries; and d) going against migrations that would help provide solutions to
the aging population and lack of younger workers in richer countries. In fact
this argument for a system which would inhibit migration seems to be
undermined, in a characteristic moment of inconsistency, by his argument soon
after (2006: 114) that immigrants contribute to welfare systems and provide a
solution to aging populations.
Secondly, BeckÕs proposal
endorses an unequal global division of labour between skilled work in rich
countries and unskilled work in poor countries, and involves accentuating it by
further exporting low skilled jobs from rich to poor countries. He has argued
that cosmopolitanism is uniquely able for the first time to recognise global
inequality but this proposal seems likely to reproduce inequality.
Thirdly, he sees the
proposal as having a cosmopolitan character based on solidarity with strangers
over a global distance. This is optimistic. There is a Durkheimian notion of
solidarity here, based on interdependence through different specialisations in
the division of labour, with geographical distance added to the mixture to make
these divisions more accentuated. For Beck the skilled rich will feel
solidarity with the distant poor, and vice versa, because of a shared interdependence in the
division of labour. Yet a polarisation of skilled and unskilled work and
geographical distance seem more likely to increase division and conflict as
Marx would have seen in his more conflictual and less solidaristic picture of
the division of labour than in the more optimistic and benign Durkheimian view
of Beck. The structure proposed by Beck seems to reinforce divisions along
rich/poor global lines. This is increased through a further extension of the
global division of labour, problematic on equality and social justice grounds,
but also providing a basis for undermining global and domestic cosmopolitanism
rather than promoting it.
Overall, Beck is mistaken
in positing a new and unique role for cosmopolitanism in understanding and
solving global inequality. Furthermore, one form in which he puts it into
practice leads to a proposal for a global division of labour which seems as
likely to reinforce anti-immigration arguments, reproduce inequality and reduce
cosmopolitanism as reduce inequality and conflict in favour of a global
cosmopolitanism.
A cosmopolitan
postcolonialism: hybridisation and power
Beck also advocates a
correcting of global inequalities in academic perspectives through a ÔleapÕ to
more postcolonial perspectives (Beck and Sznaider 2006: 13-14) as an antidote
to Ôthe na•ve universalism of early western sociologyÕ. This would involve
being open to many universalisms, conflicting contextual universalisms, and the
postcolonial experience.
There is no doubt that
sociology and the social sciences have suffered from a Ôwestern biasÕ that
lacks openness to postcolonial perspectives. But again Beck seems to
underestimate previous contributions in globalization studies and so
overestimate the new leap that cosmopolitanism would be instigating by
introducing a postcolonial view and the necessity for such a leap to be
grounded in a new cosmopolitan vision. What is needed is not a new leap, for
that has been made by many theorists and empirical studies already. Examples in
globalization studies could include Nederveen PieterseÕs (2004) work on
cultural globalization and studies of the history of globalization by authors
such as Abu-Lughod (1989), Hobson (2004), Frank and Gills (1993), and others
who try to correct the Euro-centrism of studies of modern western
globalization. These authors themselves draw on a significant heritage of
previous postcolonial theory.
Beck suggests a new
methodology, stated in the terms of an abstract meta-theory that is not
systematically grounded in evidence or references to the academic literature.
However what is possible for postcolonialism is a grounding in analysis that
already exists and the expansion and empirical development of existing
perspectives. Postcolonialism is not a theoretical task for a new framework. A
better approach would be the extension and critical interrogation of already
existing post-colonialism in the social sciences and its empirical application.
Where Beck does try to put
into action his cosmopolitan postcolonialism it runs into trouble (eg Beck and
Sznaider 2006). He advocates a Ôboth/andÕ perspective taking over from an
Ôeither/orÕ perspective. This is good for bringing in previously excluded
inputs to views that have stressed westernisation without understanding a
mixture of influences including from non-western sources (eg Abu-Lughod 1989).
However a Ôboth/andÕ view runs the risk of replacing westernisation
perspectives with one in which power and inequality is glossed over by an
attempt to resurrect understandings of the inputs of non-western societies.
When different global societies meet there are often some that have greater
economic, political and ideological power. To highlight this fact is not to
endorse it. And it is not to say there are not real sources of opposition and
alternatives to westernisation both academically and politically (in the latter
case from Iran to Venezuela for example). But positing a Ôboth/andÕ mix appears
to give an equality to a mix of perspectives when there are great inequalities
and power differences in that mix. In trying to give more of a role to inputs
from beyond the West it runs the risk of playing down the western power that
such inputs are subjected to.
BeckÕs own use of a
Ôboth/andÕ hybridising postcolonialism (2000a:89) underestimates these power
relations and inequalities. In a discussion of deregulation and flexibilisation
which promote an informal economy, diluted trade union representation and weak
states Beck suggests these are non-western standards being adopted by western
societies. But the direction of power is the other way around. These are
structures and effects of neoliberalism being exported by western-dominated
governments and institutions to other western and non-western societies with
the deleterious effects that Beck rightly suggests. Western power is
underestimated here when neoliberalism is seen as an effect of the importation
of poor regulation from the non-west to West rather than an expression of the
corporate and state power of western interests.
So the novelty and
uniqueness of BeckÕs cosmopolitanism for establishing a postcolonial
perspective is justified by an understatement of the extent to which
postcolonialism is already in existence and an overstatement of the role of
cosmopolitanism in having a new role in establishing this itself. At the same
time, his more hybrid postcolonial view, rather than restoring a greater
emphasis on poorer countriesÕ contribution to globalization, may underestimate
the power they are subjected to. BeckÕs postcolonialism fits into a more
general pattern in his work, of underestimating previous cosmopolitanism in
social science, overestimating the novelty of his cosmopolitan vision, and
leading down a road which rather than overcoming power and inequality seems as
much to play down how significant it is.
From the first age of
international law to the second age of human rights
BeckÕs advocacy of a global
cosmopolitan politics is oriented around the idea of humanitarian intervention
to defend human rights as a principle of the second age of modernity. Beck
argues that the second age of modernity has brought a shift from international
law to human rights, something that underpins the arrival of a new cosmopolitan
global politics. (See also Kaldor 2003, Held 2000, Fine 2006).
This seems to be influenced
by an event at the time Beck was formulating these arguments – the Kosovo
war, where western powers intervened militarily, ostensibly to stop Ôethnic
cleansingÕ in the region. Ethnic cleansing evokes links with the holocaust and
other genocidal phenomena and BeckÕs advocacy of global cosmopolitan politics
around the idea of a new age human rights is no doubt also connected with
echoes of such incidences. Beck goes on to describe contemporary military
interventions as military humanism, including the attack of the USA and allies
on Iraq in 2003. Beck is right to be concerned with the prevention of such
crimes against humanity and to search for solutions at a global level,
including an openness to military interventions if necessary, although it is
not clear the humanitarian arguments that are applied to interventions like
Kosovo can be enlarged to include also Iraq.
Cosmopolitan VisionÕs discussion
of the human rights theme (eg 2006: 120-1) was published in 2004 and in English
2006 long after the Kosovo war and later examples such as the Iraq War. So
while there seem to be ties to Kosovo, later incidences like Iraq, which have
been explained by others in terms very different from human rights ones, have
not deterred Beck from still characterising the second age of modernity in
these terms. He continues with the theme of the second modernity as marked by a
shift from international law overriding human rights to vice versa despite knowledge of interventions like Iraq, which
he includes as an intervention consistent with the second age. He calls this
shift an Ôepochal difference between the first and second modernityÕ (2006:
121) and Ôa paradigm shift from national societies to cosmopolitan societyÕ
(2006: 122). So there is no questioning the significance of the shift he is
positing.
Beck talks of a Ôhegemonic
power which ÒdefendsÓ human rights in foreign territories under the banner of
Òmilitary humanismÓÕ. What he questions is the Ôself-authorisationÕ of this
military humanism but not whether humanism and rights are the right words to
describe it. In other words, Beck questions the unilateralism of contemporary
international military interventions and their lack of grounding in global
agreement, but he does not question their characterisation in human rights
terms.
I will come back to the
question of American power and the war in Iraq. But first I will fill out a
little more what he means by the new human rights age and some questions about
it.
Human rights
cosmopolitanism beyond power
Beck argues that this new
human rights regime of the second age overrides power (2006: 141). His vision
is of global law in which Ôit is no longer the power of one state, or a
plurality of states, but rather law that determines what constitutes peaceÕ.
Here global law would be oriented around human rights and, sometimes, would use
war to bring peace.
But it is questionable
whether law can be taken out of the realm of the power of one state or of some
states. Law is seen to become something that is set out at a global level and
beyond states or power and there is no evidence at present that international
or global definitions of law or war-making exist in such a vacuum away from
state power. Nor is there is a realistic prospect that they could in the
foreseeable future given the economic, political and military power wielded by
the most powerful states and their orientation around their own national
interests, including in international fora where global agreements are made. At
best global law, insofar as it does or may soon exist, is composed by states
acting together in which some are far more powerful than others. BeckÕs is a
utopian vision without a convincing basis for seeing how human rights can or
will be beyond this sort of politics or power. (Fine 2006 recognises some of
these ÔambivalencesÕ although he also decides to nevertheless maintain a
cosmopolitan approach).
A pattern in BeckÕs work,
as I have mentioned, is that his arguments are sometimes undermined by
qualifications or contradictions he makes to them and this occurs with his
argument about human rights beyond the power of states. Beck talks about the
possibility of human rights as a way of the powerful imposing power (2006:
143). He argues that while global human rights empower powerless groups and
persecuted individuals through recognition of their rights it also empowers
powerful states to intervene in territorial states in a Ônew geography of
powerÕ. The concept of humanitarian intervention Ôis situated in a grey zoneÕ
which opens up the possibility of actors pursuing their own national or
hegemonic aims under the pretext of a cosmopolitan mission. Human rights he
says involve weak and poor states giving the rich and powerful carte blanche for intervention. It leads to a cosmopolitan
monopoly of the west on morality, law and violence. Referring to the shift from
the first to the second age of modernity, Beck argues that human rights
trumping international law is not just a question of values but also of a power
regime, resulting from the end of the cold war and the military and political
hegemony of the USA (2006: 123).
This is a good analysis.
But these are big qualifications to BeckÕs optimistic view of a global human
rights regime. They paint a picture of a situation where a regime based on
human rights and common concern can easily be subverted by the rich and
powerful in pursuit of national and hegemonic interests. In fact, Beck is
saying this power imposition becomes more possible because of the legitimation
that the human rights regime gives it.
This brings us to the issue
of human rights as western, which Beck himself raises (2006: 123). Beck says
that human rights interpretations may be seen by some parts of the world as
coming from the West and reflecting a specifically western view as opposed to
more ÔAfrican, Asian and ChineseÕ views which put a stronger stress on duties
and communitarianism (see also, amongst others, Zolo 1997: 118-20). Beck does
not provide a solution to this imbalance and this undermines his case which
relies on human rights as a cosmopolitan global form. Here it is being
suggested that human rights may be an expression of the view of actors in
particular parts of the world more than others, something which is not very
cosmopolitan and goes against some of his more cosmopolitan assertions
elsewhere.
Human rights and
contextual universalism in Cosmopolitan Vision
In Cosmopolitan Vision Beck tries to avoid human rights as a western
dominated thing by arguing for a perspective of contextual universalism, where
universal norms are combined with respect for contextual differences (2006:
60). He sketches out an answer to the balance of universalism and difference
which comes to a picture of hybridisation, a mixture or balance of universals
with difference. He calls this Ôcontextual universalismÕ and it is intended to
capture how universalism and difference can be combined, in this case by
universalism that is received differently in varying places. BeckÕs contextual
univeralism is in accordance with his preference for a Ôboth/andÕ perspective
over and Ôeither/orÕ one – you can combine both contextual and
universalism without having to choose either one or the other. In this framework
difference is compatible with universalism but there are still universals which
guard against a world of complete differences which are incommensurable.
This balancing of
universalism and difference can answer the criticism that cosmopolitanism is
just about westernisation at the expense of other inputs as he is saying
universalising tensions can be counteracted by pluralist inputs into
universalism wherever it is received. Beck argues that human rights with
universal validity claims which are western in origin are not alien or
irrelevant to non-western cultures and that local groups can make their
contextual interpretations of human rights drawing on their own cultural and
political traditions and religions. Universal law can, thus, be contextualised.
Relations of power in this
formulation do not come through. For instance, the implementation of human
rights that dominates BeckÕs cosmopolitanism is one in which humanitarian
interventions are made in the affairs of nation-states militarily, overriding their
sovereignty in order to protect human rights. But this sort of situation, which
Beck focuses on a lot, however justifiable it may sometimes be, is one in which
western norms of human rights are applied by superior military might and in
which local interpretations of human rights do not, rightly or wrongly, stand
too much of a chance. So it is not clear how contextual universalism is
possible when concrete relations of power and might are introduced.
One of the characteristics
of BeckÕs theory is that he often outlines such abstract frameworks without
much concrete reference. In this case he does give examples of how he thinks a
balancing of the universal and particular in contextual universalism rights can
work. But the examples do not work adequately to back up the theory. One
example given is of a human rights conference in 1993 where he says a synthesis
of contextualism and universalism was worked out. The conference was concerned
with issues such as violence against women and, although it is not completely
clear, Beck seems to suggest that ideas of universal rights to education were
balanced with the assertion of Muslim women that they were primarily Muslim and
wanted to wear headscarves and embrace a conservative theology. Beck gives this
as an example of his Ôboth/andÕ cosmopolitanism.
But how concretely the
balance between these opposite poles was maintained and worked out at the
conference is not described. It is just stated that they were. This is
significant because between western ideas of human rights and conservative
theology (Muslim or otherwise) there may be many areas where they could clash
and it is not described here how both inputs are balanced, in terms of the
content of both discourses and in terms of how power relations work out when both
sides find they come to contrary conclusions.
Another example given is of
a discussion on human rights between Senegalese and US experts in Dakar in
which the Senegalese were able to raise the issue of the right not to die of
starvation, in a humorous way, that left the US experts on the back foot
because they had not raised it and had to admit they had not seen this as a
right. It is not completely spelled out what Beck regards as cosmopolitan about
this moment but it seems it is that the Senegalese brought in their own
perspective on rights, a material and economic one, so contributing to a
cosmopolitan mix. The Americans presumably focused on civil and political
rights of a more liberal and post-materialist sort. And it seems that it is
that the Senegalese did this in a humorous rather than confrontational way that
also showed a cosmopolitan respect for difference.
But this example: a) shows
a contradiction of two perspectives where one has a view of human rights
potentially at odds with the other, rather than a cosmopolitan mix. Often
balancing different sorts of rights involves trade-offs, for instance civil and
political rights being compromised in pursuit of economic rights, or vice-versa. This seems as much a situation of potentially
conflicting views as a cosmopolitan mix; b) it does not account for the fact
that the US delegation represented a state with greater power. Power
differences are not accounted for in this example. They are important because
they define what ideas of human rights can become most dominant and who has the
most power to implement their own. In this case the Senegalese are said to have
asserted their definition of human rights in a contextual universalist way, but
it is not clear that in the world of political decision-making theirs has
played an equivalent role to that expressed by delegates from the worldÕs
leading hegemonic power. Methodologically there are issues here too. These are
specific examples rather than systematic evidence. Examples illustrate a
theory. Evidence which justifies it has to be more systematic than this.
Contextual Universalism
in What is Globalization?
Contextual universalism in
relation to human rights is something that Beck also argues for in What is
Globalization? (2000: 83-86). He
says that that common standards like human rights must hold across contexts,
but that they may take different forms in different contexts. For Beck, there
are no separate worlds and dialogue has to take place. Incommensurability is
not possible and mutual non-interference is ruled out. ÔGlocal living has to be
acceptedÕ, meaning both local difference but also global standards. So the
stress is that while difference has to be recognised, universals cannot be
avoided. There is the integration of the contextual into the concept of the
universal. But Beck argues also that, at the same time, there are many
universalisms in different contexts.
Just as in Cosmopolitan
Vision Beck also here brings the
idea of contextual universalism to bear on the example of human rights. Human
rights, he says, should not be allowed to be completely universalist – ie
ones that can be imposed by the West everywhere. There are other concepts of
human rights elsewhere in different versions. (2000: 85). In a situation of
universal human rights but local ideas of them Beck argues that competition and
dialogue between cultures, nations, states and religions can decide which
conceptions of human rights are most ÔhelpfulÕ for humans.
But this is in the pattern
of BeckÕs optimism and glossing over of contradictions and conflicts.
Contextual universalism involves more an admirable hope for deliberation and
dialogue than an analysis of their possibility. There is an over-optimism on
the common basis in contextual universalism and on the extent to which
successful inter-actor dialogue is possible on the idea of human rights.
For example, different
conceptions of human rights will conflict with one another. Rights can exist in
economic, political, social and civil spheres and conflict with one another in
these spheres. Rights to what or from what often conflict. Beck does not go
further than to say there have to be universalisms and contextualisms amidst
such problems which is a statement of what would be desirable rather than a
theory of how this can be done, how tensions and conflicts could be resolved,
concretely as well as theoretically and how contradictory interests are
involved. Such tensions and conflicts often canÕt be resolved and the outcome
of them encountering one another can be not getting the balance between
universalism and contextualism right but some ideas of human rights winning out
over others. It would be better to evaluate competing interests and conceptions
of human rights and where these may go than stating a wish for a common agreement
amidst contradiction. The need for an analysis of conflict in preference over a
presumption of consensus is a key argument of this article.
Contextual universalism
also does not provide a way in which things which are opposed to human rights
might be dealt with when they clash with it, for instance egalitarianism and
poverty-reduction. It also does not deal with the political reality, beyond
abstract wishes, that some who support human rights wish sometimes to be
excused from them when it is perceived to be in their self-interest on other
grounds, for instance for reasons to do with statesÕ perceptions of their needs
to maintain security or power.
Beck has a creditable
desire to achieve global co-existence and agreement on the basis of an analysis
of globalization which also recognises localisation. But the possibility of
global difference and dialogue operating at a global level does not follow
because there are conflicts, contradictions and tensions. What is here is an
attempt at a philosophical basis for global cosmopolitanism. There is an
attempt to embed it in a conception of social reality – glocalisation.
But this social reality is one where there are: a) contradictory versions of
human rights (economic, social, civil, political etc); b) instances where human
rights are subordinated to other concerns (eg equality, collectivism, religion,
economic progress, etc); and c) instances where human rights are believed in
but supported in an inconsistent and selective way according to considerations
of interests and power, for instance in the case of the USA in relation to the
International Criminal Court, Guantanamo Bay, torture and so on. A benign aim
and well intentioned aspiration to contextual universalism does not identify
the real contradictory and conflictual bases for ethics and so comes up with a
political answer, contextual universalism, which is not up to the task of
tackling in practice issues of ethical norms such as human rights.
As we shall now see, where
Beck goes beyond abstract ideas and attempts to grapple with what he sees as
the universalisation of human rights at a concrete level there are problems.
Global Cosmopolitan
Politics and US Power
Beck argues that in the
politics of the second age of modernity the single state or nation-state is no
longer the key actor. The key actor is global politics, composed in a
cosmopolitan way. He sees a shift from politics based on nation-states and
international security to non-state-centred post-international risk politics as
a Ôparadigm shiftÕ that Ôcorrelates with the distinction between first and
second modernityÕ (2006: 36). So for him cosmopolitan politics is something new
and the dating given for its rise is post-cold-war.
There is some ambiguity on
the solidity with which cosmopolitan politics has arrived. Whether it is
cosmopolitan awareness or reality that is upon us varies in BeckÕs theory in
general. One argument is that there is a global awareness of a shared
collective future but not corresponding forms of political practice (2006: 78).
The politics of a collectively shared and threatened future, he says, enjoys
only meagre institutional support. But in other places it is argued that
cosmopolitanism is very advanced and irreversible in reality but that it is in
awareness rather than reality where there may be counter movements (2006: 74).
As we shall see now there is another ambiguity where Beck, despite seeing
cosmopolitanism as post-national, says that a nation, the US, is a key actor in
making global cosmopolitanism a living thing in the contemporary world.
One obstacle to the idea of
a shared and fairly equal global cosmopolitanism is a view of the US as
subverting global cosmopolitanism by exerting its dominant power that competes
with and undermines global power and pursues national rather than global
cosmopolitan interests. This is a view of US power held by those from the
neocon Right (eg Kagan 2003) to the radical Left (eg Chomsky 2004). From both
views America exerts dominant power in a way that undermines aspirations to global
equality, does it by economic and military might and in its geopolitical
national interests rather than with common humanitarian interests as its goal.
This perspective on global power has to be shown to be lacking if global
cosmopolitanism is to be defended as a realistic possibility.
Beck overcomes this by a
view of American power as about humanitarian intervention. The USA is seen as
an actor that uses military humanism to enact the cosmopolitan human rights
approach of the second age of modernity. Beck sees US power as compatible with
global cosmopolitanism rather than opposed to it (eg 2006: 132-5). One model of
global order, he says, is Pax Americana based on the principle of global responsibility and promoting
humanitarian intervention (2006: 132). The difference between this and global
cosmopolis is not in intentions or values like responsibility or
humanitarianism but in that Pax Americana is hierarchical while global cosmopolis is more multilateral and based
on equality and cooperation. So US power may not be organised in the most
cosmopolitan way but it is cosmopolitan and humanitarian in content and intent.
Pax Americana, Beck says,
involves replacing the UN with the US (2006: 133) implying that their
objectives are the same, it is the agency that changes. (Although he says this
is Ôexaggerating somewhatÕ implying that there may be qualifications to this).
Beck says that in the US
world military power can be concentrated and directed against new dangers and
that the USA can Ôcreate an international system of freedom and fairness based
on American values of freedom and democracyÕ (2006: 133). To do so it must free
itself from the principle of non-intervention, and restrictions on intervention
include international agreements and institutions such as the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United Nations Security Council, the
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. Preventive
war is necessary for this hegemonic role to be preserved. Beck ascribes this
position to George Bush but then goes on to develop it in a way which is more
abstracted and not linked to any source and so, evidently, expressing his own
view (but with a vagueness in attribution which means while it seems that it is
his view, it could be argued not to be the case).
A key point here is that Pax
Americana and global
cosmopolitanism are distinguished on the basis of structure rather than aims,
including US power also as humanitarian and cosmopolitan (2006: 132, 135). So
in this picture the US is compatible with global cosmopolitanism rather than a
threat which undermines it, which provides an alternative view to that of US
power as part of a global politics of nations, inequalities and conflicts which
undermine global cosmopolitanism. This allows Beck to go ahead with global
cosmopolitanism, underplaying the threat from a perspective which sees the US
as using its superior power in national rather than global interests in ways
which would undermine cosmopolitanism.
One reason Beck puts
forward cosmopolitan consciousness as realisable is that in instances such as
his analysis of US power he has too strong an idea of common agendas. For
instance, his idea of cosmopolitanism is based on a liberal humanitarianism,
which he puts the Bush administration within. With this categorisation of the
Bush administration conflicts and differences are less significant and
cosmopolitanism more realistic. This is because the US then fits in with a
cosmopolitan framework rather than being seen as instrumental to structures of
conflict and power that show such a framework to be problematic. However his
view of the Bush administration, on such occasions, is over-optimistic.
For instance Beck describes
the Bush administration as having a Ôdemocratic missionÕ which is Ôa continuation
of an original project of the liberal leftÕ (2006: 119). In Cosmopolitan
Vision the objectives of the US in
the Iraq war are said to include WMDs, nuclear terrorism, regime change and
democratisation (some of which had been discredited as plausible
justifications) but do not include aims such as oil, hegemony, national
interest or geopolitical objectives (2006: 38-40, 120, 148, 151; 2006a). In
short those which suggest the US pursuing its domestic and global interests do
not get mentioned, despite being public issues in debates. The lack of
inclusion of such interests, around which conflicts occur, gives a reason for
optimism about cosmopolitan democracy. If they are brought back in the
possibilities for cosmopolitanism look more problematic. If you see President
Bush as not occupying a democratic humanitarian position then the prospects for
global cosmopolitanism become less plausible because the worldÕs most powerful
state, in military terms hugely more powerful than any other, is going against
cosmopolitanism in its aims and substance and not just in the hierarchical and
unilateralist way it pursues them.
Other evidence for the idea
of the US as cosmopolitan could also be questioned. In Cosmopolitan Vision Beck argues that the US and Europe have human
rights foreign policies in accordance with the onset of the second age human
rights regime (2006: 144ff). But the evidence given for this is a UN report,
rather than actual US or European policy, and a statement from Madeleine
Albright under the Clinton administration. This is weak evidence because it is
from unrepresentative sources (ie the UN and Clinton administration), pre-Bush
and is just two statements, and statements rather than actual policy. Many US
and European actual policies are difficult to square with the claim. This fits
into the pattern of evidential claims given by Beck which are often selective
and more illustrative than systematic evidence.
One way in which Beck
justifies Ômilitary humanismÕ is by setting up false Ôyou are with us or
against usÕ alternatives which echo George BushÕs suggestion of such a choice
in relation to the Iraq conflict (2006: 154). Beck argues that Ôif you are
against ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, then you must support the
new Òwar-peaceÓ of Òmilitary humanismÓÕ. There are a number of issues here.
First, is the reduction of alternatives to two when there are other choices
between crimes against humanity on one side and wars against those crimes on
the other. For instance there are more multilateral peaceful approaches.
Second, wars on crimes against humanity are themselves diverse – for
instance there are differences between ones pursued illegally or unilaterally
and those pursued legally and multilaterally. The war of military humanism is
itself not a simple choice as it can take different forms. Thirdly, BeckÕs
alternatives assume that the wars he has in mind are wars against crimes against humanity and not
geostrategic or energy wars, as some would understand some of them. Fourthly,
Beck groups together wars to eliminate WMDs with those to stop ethnic cleansing
when these are different issues that may require different solutions. Mass
murder within a country may in some cases require military intervention to stop
it, but it is not necessarily the case that military action would be the best
path in relation to the development of WMDs by the same state. Beck often puts
Kosovo and Iraq, two different such wars, in the same category in this way.
The contradictions of
BeckÕs arguments for US democratic humanism
BeckÕs arguments often
contain internal inconsistencies. As I have argued, you do not have to go
beyond Beck to find arguments which raise questions about his position. He
sometimes does so by qualifications or contrary arguments he makes. This
happens in relation to his argument about US democratic humanism in three areas
concerning – 1) illegality, 2) national benefits and 3) abridged
cosmopolitanism.
1) Illegality. BeckÕs endorsement of the Ôwar on terrorÕ extends
to legitimation of illegality (2006: 146-7). The label terrorism, he argues,
empowers and justifies states to free themselves from the constraints of laws
of war. He says that the contempt of terrorists for morality or humanity can
provoke abandonment of legal constraints and civilised constraints on use of
force by the state. ÔIneffectual international lawÕ, he argues, is Ôblind to
the new dangersÕ, and Ônot tailoredÕ to new threats. And Beck questions Ôwhat
grounds the legitimacy of force in an era of new threats if legality is not
tailored to these threatsÕ. So there is an endorsement of illegal war if Ôwar
on terrorÕ is given as the legitimation for the war and international laws are
seen as not up to the job or not respected by your adversary. Human rights here
(assuming they are the basis for the war on terror, something which is
contested) trump international law which does follow, to some extent, BeckÕs
emphasis on a shift from the latter to the former with the second age of
modernity. At the same time, a lack of respect for international legality does
not support global cosmopolitan politics which to be really cosmopolitan and
globally inclusive must involve shared adherence to common international laws.
A global cosmopolitanism would need actors to agree to such laws even if some
sometimes saw them as ineffectual or not adhered to by all others. It is
certain that in a global context there would always be some actors bound in to
such rules who would share such doubts and one of the bases of shared rules
being operable is that actors adhere to them even in such situations of
dissatisfaction. So internationally illegal war, endorsed by Beck, seems to
undermine global cosmopolitan politics.
2) National benefit. Beck also considers why in some cases military
humanist interventions happen while in others they do not (2006: 145-6). There
are a number of difficulties with what he suggests. Amongst these are reasons
which Beck outlines which show that the sort of military interventions he
points to could be to do with factors other than cosmopolitan humanism and
which become revealed as such by a framework based more than BeckÕs is on
conflicting interests. The advantages of a conflict perspective over BeckÕs
consensual perspective is a key theme for understanding his work.
Beck gives three reasons
why human rights interventions may happen in some cases but not others. The
first is asymmetries of power. The weaker the rogue state the more likely he
says the intervention is, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq being given as examples.
This is not completely convincing an explanation by itself as there are weaker
states than Serbia and Iraq where humanitarian concerns may have made
intervention arguable for but where attacks have not happened, Sudan for
instance.
Secondly, Beck also mentions
egoism, for instance where human rights abuses may lead to consequences for
states which are interveners and neighbours, and to more global effects in
terms of phenomena such as refugees and terrorist attacks. But this explanation
does not always work because in the cases focused on - Kosovo, Iraq and
Afghanistan – there was little evidence that human rights abuses there
were going to have a serious knock-on effect for the intervening states. In the
case of Afghanistan and Iraq it may have been thought that terrorist attacks
would have global consequences, although it later became clear that the WMD
evidence on Iraq had been weak. It was also evident that terrorist attacks were
as likely to be increased as a result of intervening as curtailed by doing so.
The July 7th bombings in London can be explained in this way.
But the key issue concerns
the explanation which is most convincing. Beck highlights national benefit,
such as oil and geostrategic advantages, as a reason which may make a human
rights intervention happen. But it is not clear why national benefit is an
add-on advantage which facilitates a human rights intervention in some places
over others rather than the other way round, human rights as a legitimation for
what is primarily a national benefit intervention. Why national benefit should
be considered as an addition to human rights justifications for intervention
rather than a principle reason above human rights interventions in the cases
outlined, is not clear. The latter possibility undermines the case for
cosmopolitanism as the basis for human rights interventions.
3) Abridged
Cosmopolitanism. In specific
comments on US military interventions Beck adds qualifications which cast doubt
on interpretations of such interventions as in accordance with global
cosmopolitanism. As in other parts of his theories Beck adds these as
qualifications rather than seeing them as points which undermine the basis of
his argument. For instance Beck argues that US power constitutes an abridged
cosmopolitanism (2006: 125-6). He says that Ôcosmopolitan America has an
elective affinity with Amnesty International É American mega-power throws its
weight behind the global realization of human rights and democracyÕ. But this
is a contestable interpretation and Beck goes on to say that this
cosmopolitanism is abridged.
First, he argues that human
rights and democracy are norms on which it is expected that other parts of the
world should live up to American values. This undermines some of his arguments
for cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism reflects, or will be seen to reflect, a US
or western view of how the world should be rather than a genuinely cosmopolitan
view.
Second, Beck sees the US as
a global ordering power, possessing super-sovereignty, which has an anti-cosmopolitan
moment when it sees itself above borders in an absolutist manner and refuses to
submit to norms itself. This happens, for instance, on arms reduction, and so,
he says, destroys the contractual architecture of disarmament. To this could be
added other areas where US non-collaboration also may have such effects, for
instance agreements on reducing global warming and international justice. Beck
says there is a contradiction in a state committing itself to global democracy
while paying scant regard to democratic norms itself in a project of hegemonic
universalism. This seems to damn the possibility of cosmopolitan democracy
through the US. Yet for Beck these comments are added to his prescription of US
cosmopolitanism as a qualification or anti-cosmopolitan ÔmomentÕ rather than as
something which is more fundamentally undermining. They are put in as
qualifications or additions to the argument on the US as cosmopolitan, rather
than as structuring the argument on its cosmopolitanism to show that it is not
so (2006: 125-6).
This takes on extra
significance when Beck argues that global cosmopolitanism must also be a
military humanism and cannot dispense with the means of violence (2006: 127-8).
If human rights and cosmopolitanism are as ÔabridgedÕ as Beck says, in fact
even more undermined and compromised than merely ÔabridgedÕ as I am suggesting
his arguments imply, then adding military power to this project becomes
especially problematic. Beck also argues that military humanism should be
multilateral and co-operative (2006: 129), something which was quite limited in
the cases he mentions frequently, Kosovo and Iraq, where the extent of
multilateralism or co-operation is arguable. So he is arguing for a military
dimension to a politics which is much less cosmopolitan and multilateral than
he suggests.
Another qualification that
Beck makes further undermines the case for the USA as cosmopolitan (2006: 140).
Beck argues that there is a new logic which involves turning a blind eye to
human rights violations. The danger of terrorism, he says, suppresses the
alertness of political allies to human rights violations. As in other places in
BeckÕs analysis this is stated in an abstract way without references to a
concrete case in particular. However it is difficult not to see this as
applicable to the US who Beck has otherwise defined as driven by human rights
concerns, and who with this argument now fall into his category for those who
violate human rights in pursuit of a Ôwar on terrorÕ.
Beck further extends his
argument on state violations of human rights in such situations. He says this
can be endorsed by international institutions. States have a carte blanche in defining their enemies as ÔterroristsÕ which
then gets the blessing of the international community and human rights
violations are treated Ôwith discretionÕ. Elsewhere he refers to the view that
criticises the West not for having human rights standards but for failing to
apply them when it provides support for dictatorships, corrupt regimes or state
terror (2006: 167). The indication, then, seems to be that western regimes
which can be the agents of cosmopolitanism fall short on their own standards of
human rights.
These qualifications on the
second age of modernity as a cosmopolitan one in which the US acts with
cosmopolitan intent build up to an extent that the theory they are qualifying
seems increasingly undermined in its basic substance. BeckÕs points undermine
his claims about the US, Europe and the WestÕs human rights cosmopolitan
responsibility. Elsewhere in a lecture which labels the Iraq war as a WMD
intervention his case becomes more undermined when he describes this war as a
fake cosmopolitanism (2006a: 17). He says a fake cosmopolitanism
instrumentalises cosmopolitan rhetoric for national-hegemonic purposes and the
Iraq war is given as an example. He warns against the abuse of cosmopolitanism
and knocks down the case he has made elsewhere about Iraq as a humanitarian war
about WMD.
To sum up some of these
points, Beck has outlined qualifications which show how cosmopolitanism can be
illegal according to international agreements, involve asymmetries of power,
the pursuit of national-hegemonic egoism, human rights violations which are
legitimised, westernisation imposed on others, and the exemption of
cosmopolitan actors from cosmopolitan norms on human rights. All of this adds
up to what is said can be an abridged or fake cosmopolitanism which can be
militarily imposed. These are intended as qualifications to the outline of
cosmopolitanism but in the range and significance of what has been outlined as
aspects of cosmopolitan interventions Beck has undermined the claim that they
can be seen as cosmopolitan.
For reasons of space
conclusions to this article have to be brief. I have looked at arguments for a
cosmopolitan approach to global inequality and human rights. 1) Cosmopolitanism
does not bring a new and unique perspective on global inequality, as suggested.
In fact BeckÕs proposals on migration would reinforce inequality and
anti-cosmopolitanism. 2) I have argued that the Ôboth/andÕ perspective on
hybridisation and contextual universalism is undermined by structures of
conflict and power that are glossed over. 3) It has also been argued that the
western humanitarian intervention prescribed falls short of cosmopolitanism, in
ways which are shown by qualifications that Beck himself makes in his
arguments. BeckÕs approach effectively disguises conflicts, inequalities and
injustices in world society and harmonises contradictions with a well meant but
benign and optimistic view of international relations. An understanding of
conflict and power in the tradition of critical sociology can bring out the
problems in cosmopolitan sociology and politics and provide the basis for an
alternative perspective for understanding global inequality and human rights.
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