
Allcock has spent over thirty years studying Yugoslavia, ranging over a wide variety of issues: historical, economic, social, and political. His book covers the country with the same comprehensiveness: chapters include examinations of modernity, markets, agrarian reform, demographics, class and status, national identity, and state formation. He approaches these issues, and the country, from the perspective of historical sociology, which he believes allows him to maintain the requisite level of cohesion between the varying aspects of the Yugoslav problem. History, he feels, is too historical, economics too economical, and politics too political.

Allcock’s thesis is that Yugoslavia has been misrepresented, both in the academy and in the popular press. On one hand, the violent break up of Yugoslavia is characterised as being ‘business as usual in the Balkans’. ‘Ethnic strife is endemic and always has been’ is the opinion of many casual observers. On the other hand, there are many who claim that the state of contemporary Yugoslavia is an utter break with the past, a complete aberration. It is a unique confluence of events, including the death of Tito, the end of the Cold War, and the rise of cancerous nationalism, incarnate in Slobodan Milosevic, that has given rise to violence and ugliness unseen in Europe for over fifty years. Furthermore, to most observers, the Balkans are somewhere else, they are alterity. They are ‘on the doorstep of Europe’, to quote Tony Blair, the edge of civilisation, the borderlands between Ottoman and Habsburg; they are not Europe and they are not like us. Allcock refutes these theses, stating that they are unsophisticated and provide no insight as to what makes Yugoslavia tick.

Accordingly, then, he sets out to synthesise his experience and his studies to achieve the daunting task of being able to explain the conundrum that is, and has been, Yugoslavia. For this, no one can fault his ambition. In spite of his best intentions, though, he falls short of the mark. He describes Yugoslavia, but fails to actually explain it.

One example of the tension between what Alcock promises and what he delivers can be found in how he treats the topic of ethnic nationalism. He claims that too much of what has plagued Yugoslavia has been attributed to nationalism, asserting
that the situation is far more nuanced than that. However, he does not offer the reader an alternative explanation. The most Allcock does is to leave the reader free to assume that increased ‘republicanisation’ is linked to a rise in ethnic nationalism. Again, hoping to shed light on the issue of how Serbs ended up on top in the Yugoslav dog-pile, Allcock does not follow through. He does not explain how it is that certain trends have produced the results they have.

Allcock insists that no study of Yugoslavia can be complete without a thorough look at the demographics, including the movements of peoples throughout history, as well as the current statistics of ethnic origin, birth and death rates, and per capita income. Here, too, Allcock misses his mark: by trawling through the same demographic minefield as chauvinists on both sides, as well as the international press, he allows the reader to interpret the ‘my people were here first’ argument as being meaningful. These arguments necessitate a delicate touch, and this seems to have eluded Allcock. Indeed, as a source of one of his statistics he quotes Franjo Tudjman, the late leader of a nationally resurgent Croatia. Demography in Yugoslavia is difficult to separate from the political ‘legitimacy’ it is mistakenly seen to embody. Furthermore, his treatment of the subject is sadly unsophisticated, especially in light of Noel Malcolm’s comprehensive myth debunking, socio-linguistic and demographic work, Kosovo: A Short History. Unfortunately, as it appeared late in the preparation of his book, Allcock was unable to incorporate much of it into his work. Explaining Yugoslavia is a poorer book for that omission.

Quite a part of Allcock’s lack of explanatory ability is his handling of the issue of rape in the Balkans. His insensitive and detached discussion adds nothing to the topic, academically speaking or otherwise. Commenting on rape, rape camps, and rape as war crime, he tries to explain that these phenomena are not unique to the Balkans. In doing so, he enters into a pedantic exposition of statistics showing how rape has been an element of many conflicts, not just Yugoslav ones. Furthermore, when he compares the numbers of rapes during the conflict with the amount of domestic violence that usually exists in the society, he concludes that ‘rape in Yugoslavia has not been particularly unusual. There is doubt as to whether it can be considered “aberrant” (sociologically speaking at least: its moral status is another matter!)’ (p. 405). Allcock may be trying—in the name of academic perspective and objectivity—to distance himself from the horrific violence that is rape; what comes across, though, is a ham-fisted, inconsiderate couple of pages.

Despite its title, Explaining Yugoslavia leaves the reader to continue guessing, assuming, and wondering about the countries, the peoples, and the histories of its subject Balkan states.

CHRISTOPHER ANKESEN

Christopher Ankersen is a Consultant in London and has served in the Balkans in a peacekeeping force
Dennis Altman, *Global Sex* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001, 219 pp., £15.50 hbk.).

Roughly 30 years after the publication of Kate Millet’s classic analysis on *Sexual Politics*, Dennis Altman adds to the literature on the topic emphasizing its relationship to the phenomenon commonly known as globalisation. Altman is particularly interested in how ‘changes in our understandings and attitudes to sexuality are both affected by and reflect the larger changes of globalization’ (p. 1) being careful to note that globalisation leads to simultaneously, greater inequality and greater homogeneity.

The first part of the book broadly introduces the themes of globalisation and sexuality before going into greater detail on specific themes. Globalisation, for him, is to some extent ‘merely another term for the further stage of capitalism and the incorporation…of larger parts of the world than ever before into the capitalist system’ (p. 21). While he is committed to ‘discussing sexuality in the context of larger socioeconomic factors’ (p. 34), he cautions that this should not imply that ‘all forms of oppression and exploitation can be reduced to economic relations’ (p. 36).

Drawing also on feminist theorising, Altman sees ‘sexuality and gender [as] inextricably interconnected, and often regulated through similar ideological and institutional means’ (p. 4). Yet, structural inequalities, suggested by terms, such as ‘patriarchy’ or ‘hegemonic masculinity’, should not be neglected but analysed with regard to their varied impact on different individuals. For instance, it is often women and children who are victimised through attempts at controlling sexualities (p. 47), though also men might be severely punished or disadvantaged for their failure to hold up hegemonic masculinity (p. 6), which is especially pertinent with regard to gay men for which Altman provides an excellent array of examples. Generally, it is possible to maintain that sexual violence is a growing (or at least more visible) part of ‘the current global disorder’ (p. 7).

Besides noting these broader theoretical questions, the main theme of *Global Sex* is the complexity of the interconnections between gender/sexuality/bodies and international political/social/economic regimes. Altman weaves together a plethora of issues from a comparison of Vienna 1900 and Bangkok 2000 as ‘global brothels’ in transition from old-established monarchies towards democracies and centres of their respective realms (pp. 10-14), to moral panics in the United States ‘characterized by the constant tension between hugely successful consumerism and deeply entrenched puritan values’ (p. 148). He specifically devotes a chapter to HIV/AIDS, noting how ‘the growing internationalization of trade in both sex and drugs has played a major role in the diffusion of HIV and its rapid spread into almost every corner of the world’ (p. 71). Moreover, he shows how certain hegemonic epistemological frameworks and understanding of an illness (pp. 73-74) and with it concepts of distinct sexual orientations (pp. 74-75) are being spread. This chapter is certainly the most convincing of the book as it manages to address the variety of implications of HIV/AIDS for differently located individuals,
without, as some of the other chapters tend to, becoming narrowly focused on the topic of male homosexuality. The somewhat dominant focus on homosexuality is one of the weaknesses of *Global Sex*, whose title would suggest a wider engagement. This is not to say that (global) homosexuality is not an important topic. However, having noted in the beginning how ‘a great deal of what is taken for granted is constructed’ (p. 35), throughout the book and especially in his chapter on ‘The Globalization of Sexual Identities’, Altman pays little attention to the globalisation of heterosexual identities and the implications for those who, structurally, have little power. This theme, which would be fundamental to the kind of exploration the title of the book suggests, has been studied in the feminist literature by Cynthia Enloe, V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, and Jan Jindy Pettman, among others.

Altman’s engagement with feminist writings on the topic remains limited. This is also the case with regard to the suggestions for new themes of research in IR, which he enumerates in the chapter on ‘Sexual Politics and International Relations’. Most of these issues have already been subjected to feminist scrutiny. A final point of contention then, is that while Altman stresses the necessity for a political economy of (global) sexual politics, Rosemary Hennessy’s *Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism* might be a better guide to this topic. Nonetheless, *Global Sex* is a welcome addition to the literature on (global) sexual politics. It depicts many of the issues at stake in this unevenly globalising world, leaving one curious to explore the topics in greater analytical depth.

**ANNICK T. R. WIBBEN**

Annick T. R. Wibben is currently a Visiting Fellow in the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University

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The recent years have witnessed a surge of articles and books dedicated to examining the (mainly negative) effects of the on-going EU enlargement on the Kaliningrad Oblast (region). Kaliningrad is on its way to becoming an isolated exclave from mainland Russia after Poland and Lithuania become EU members. As the book’s subtitle suggests, the impact of the EU enlargement is the starting
point for *The EU & Kaliningrad* as well. However, the book, which is based on papers presented to a round table in Brussels in March 2000, manages to take a broader view on the topic, avoiding the pitfall of concentrating only on border-related issues. This is not to say that the negative effects of the Schengen *acquis* is not an important question but, as the book shows, the region has many other serious problems, ranging from the appalling state of basic infrastructure and environment to communicable diseases and organised crime, which have to be taken into account as well.

The book offers a wide variety of voices on the topic. It is divided into five parts, each with a theme of its own. In the first part Finnish diplomat René Nyberg and Russian scholar Yuri Borko provide an overview of the current state of play in the EU-Russian relationship. The second part introduces the peculiarities of the Kaliningrad *Oblast* in economic terms (Stephen Dewar) while also putting it in the broader framework of relations between the centre and the regions (Igor Leshukov). This part also contains contributions from the Regional Duma (Alexander Songal) and from Kaliningrad City (Sylvia Gourova).

The third part gives an account of the neighbours’ view on Kaliningrad as representatives of Lithuanian (Vygaudas Usackas) and Polish (Wojciech Zajaczkowski) foreign ministries analyse the challenges posed by the region. It also contains a contribution from Pertti Joenniemi, who discusses the Kaliningrad question in the light of borders and the challenges presented by this question to both Russia and the European Union. The fourth part of the book, finally, discusses the problems and threats emanating from the *Oblast* (Dewar, Andrew Dolan and Christopher Donnelly), while the last part seeks to sketch ways forward for the region (Dag Hartelius and Dewar).

The book offers a good and a comprehensive read. The multiplicity of voices is a strength, although many of the articles are ‘typical’ round table papers, in the sense that they restrain from giving an official governmental position on the topic. From this otherwise broad selection, however, the voice of the Russian government is missing. Despite the representation of the Kaliningrad’s officials this can be considered a serious defect, as it is, after all, the centre that will set the ‘rules of the game’ for the region’s future development, both internally and externally, and it is with Moscow that the European Union clearly prefers to negotiate in the matter.

However, many articles in the book do offer new insights and good analysis. Especially the chapters written by Dewar, Joenniemi and Leshukov deserve special mentioning. In his, three articles Dewar displays a level of in-depth knowledge and clear insight about the situation in Kaliningrad that is rarely found in most of the literature on the topic. Joenniemi’s article is the most interesting contribution in the book from an academic viewpoint. He analyses the *Oblast*’s role in challenging the clear binary divisions of inside/outside and arrives at a conclusion that a solution requires a break from the modernist script in both the EU and Russia. Leshukov, for his part, offers an interesting, although a rather bleak picture of the current state and future prospects of centre-region relationship in Russia.
To sum up, the main question in the book is to what extent the European Union and Russia might be willing and able to find innovative solutions to the problems posed on Kaliningrad by the EU enlargement. *The EU & Kaliningrad* shows that so far it has been mainly Russia that has suggested new initiatives called for common solutions. Yet, in my, mind this brings forth an important question concerning the very foundations of this activism: is there perhaps a danger that Russia’s initiatives do not reflect so much a positive new beginning in its relations with the EU, as perhaps a certain amount of misunderstanding concerning the enlargement process and the nature of the European integration in general? It would seem to me that what Russia has been suggesting is that the Kaliningrad question could best be solved by treating the Oblast as a special case, something that is not compatible with the EU’s approach on enlargement, and indeed on its relations with Russia.

HISKI HAUKKALA

*Hiski Haukkala is a Researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland.*

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Italian political philosopher Norberto Bobbio is by now well known by the English speaking public, and this translation is just the latest of a sequence, which begun in the 1980s. *In Praise of Meekness* collects eleven essays written in the last forty years, concerning one of Bobbio’s main interests: moral and political philosophy. Through these essays—only indirectly interrelated—Bobbio sheds light on some particularly relevant issues in contemporary social debate.

The opening essay, which gives the name to the book, deals with the rehabilitation of the non-political, weak virtue of meekness. This is defined as a main feature of a non-violent person, who is socially committed to exerting the ‘power of letting the other be himself’. The meek person is, nevertheless, neither submissive nor sad, in Bobbio’s account. It is not clear, however, whether it is possible in the domain of art—and extra-political field nevertheless equally
relevant for society; to conciliate this personal meek attitude with an aesthetic approach to life, which apparently requires a more positive individualism.

The first part analyses the relationship between morality and politics. Two main theoretical trends are assessed: one, derived from Aristotle and Christian thought, for which ethics and politics should be tightly tied, and the other, a realistic one emerging from Cicero and Machiavelli, for which Reason of State has always practical priority. Consequently, some criteria to judge democracies are inferred. The second part deals with the nature of racist prejudice and the way to relate to the other. Different reasons for discrimination and different policies for immigration are examined. The phrases ‘all equal’ and ‘all different’ are considered useless statements, if taken singularly. Considering the ‘is-ought’ moral distinction, Bobbio believes that an integrated attitude to identity and difference should be implemented. The third part is dedicated to tolerance and truth. A distinction is made between the problem of political and religious beliefs, on the one hand, and social and physical discrimination, on the other. The former are based on a claim for truth, while the latter are grounded on prejudice. Accordingly, alternative ways of confronting these questions are proposed, within the framework of an inclusive democratic model.

In part four and in the appendix, the tone becomes graver as the author discusses, from a non-religious point of view, the meaning of history and the existence of evil. The historical conception of a non-believer lacks the hope for future salvation, and many natural events appear reason-less. While active evil can be understood, faced with passive evil (i.e. endured evil), the non-believer is ignorant and impotent. The insoluble mystery of evil is evident if we agree with Bobbio that in human history ‘evil has always prevailed over good, pain over joy, suffering over pleasure, unhappiness over happiness, and death over life’ (p. 141). In this regard, we should really doubt whether we can speak of moral progress of humanity. Even though the book ends with a quite pessimistic conclusion, it does not deny the social value of the meek person. We might even suggest that this historical tendency requires meekness even more.

One of the main virtues of this text is its capacity to synthesise in a clear way. This is, after all, not something new in Bobbio’s writings. His ability to start from practical cases, which he identifies in a very sympathetic way, and to arrive at very general and deep statements is already well appreciated in the European academic world. Another virtue evident in this book is Bobbio’s ability to show how every single contemporary theoretical issue was not autonomously born but deeply rooted in historical discussion. It is, in fact, one of Bobbio’s methodological assumptions that any reasoning that does not recognise the lesson of the classics, and that fails to identify the historical emergence of contemporary conceptual categories, is blind to proper debate.

One finds it very difficult to disagree with the general conclusions Bobbio offers on issues of everyday life, because they are both rational and reasonable. Although the title is neither properly academic nor immediately political (Bobbio himself defined it once as ‘extravagant’), this book is remarkable for its capacity to arouse
incisive thinking about everyday problems, and to convince ‘deeply and yet meekly’.

RAFFAELE MARCHETTI

Raffaele Marchetti is a Research Student in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science


Ahron Bregman has produced a well balanced and concise account/chronology of all the major wars Israel has been involved in with its Arab neighbours. Relying primarily on recollections of military and civilian personalities in Israel, Bregman surveys all the major conflicts (1948 War of Independence, Six-Day-War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, 1982 Invasion into Lebanon, and the Intifada 1987-93) in his six chapters. He focuses on the pre-war context, major actors, course of events and the political/social outcomes of each of these wars.

The crux of his argument is that although neither the Israeli nor the Arab side has achieved total victory on the battlefield, the Israeli government has been extremely successful in its own propaganda war, spreading the message to its own people as well as the rest of the world that Israel is to be perceived as a victim of Arab aggressions. Hence, foreign conflicts have served the important purpose of uniting Israelis from all walks of life and instilling them with a shared sense of victimisation.

However, with the generational shift in Israeli society came a ‘shift from collective ideals and priorities to individual ones’ (p. 137). While the now diminishing Holocaust generation, namely the founders and builders of the state, had an ‘ideological sense of mission’ and believed that state should take precedent over the individual, the new generation of Israelis have come to value individual achievement over patriotic values (p. 137). This new generation has become less willing to support and carry the burdens of war (high taxes and long military services) since the external threat is no longer persistent. This change in public opinion became especially evident after the Israeli invasion into Lebanon in 1982.

In his narrative discussion of the conflicts, Bregman highlights certain features of each conflict and puts forward key statements. In 1948 he contends that ‘manpower mobilisation on the Israeli side made up for the quantitative
demographic inferiority of a small nation like Israel’ (p. 15), and the Arab states failed to coordinate their moves and adequately prepare themselves for the war. Israel’s subsequent involvement in the Suez Canal crisis in 1956 was largely due to geopolitical interests (Straits of Tiran) and not because of some acute external danger that was threatening Israel. The 1967 War was primarily the result of the Soviet Union’s false intelligence reports and part of a larger competition with the US to create ‘another trouble spot for the US in addition to the already existing Vietnam’ (p. 45). Prior to the Yom Kippur War in 1973 Sadat’s right hand man turned out to actually be a double agent acting for both the Egyptians and the Israelis, misleading the later as to the timing of Egyptian strikes during the 1973 war. ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’ was initially planned as a small-scale invasion into Lebanon but Ariel Sharon and his Israeli commanders had always intended on moving into Beirut, which was kept a secret from the Israeli ministers. The Intifada surprised the Israelis, catching them off guard and further polarising and drawing sharper lines between them and the Arab-Israelis.

Bregman, however, does not take into account the ‘new history’ scholarship, which several Israeli scholars have advanced to. This school of thought critically questions Israel’s share of responsibility in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Its advocates cast that it was not mindless Arab anti-Semitism but Zionism’s insistence of creating a Jewish state in Palestine, which was the root of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, Bregman does not address, but could have possibly shed some light on the important issue of Israel’s often strained relationship between its secular and ultra-orthodox Jews and its relevance to military service, or how this has affected the moral fabric of its fighting force.

This said, Israel’s Wars, 1947-93 is an interesting and fair treatment of a highly sensitive/controversial topic, and is especially interesting to those who seek to understand the Israeli side of the story and how all these wars have affected Israeli society.

KRISTIAN ALEXANDER

Kristian Alexander is a Research Student in the Department of Political Science at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA

As European Union (EU) enlargement is getting closer, the issue of how the Cyprus conflict relates to the EU is becoming more and more urgent. While initial hopes that the prospect of membership would spark a catalytic effect towards a peaceful settlement have so far been disappointed, it is by now widely regarded as unlikely that Cyprus will not be part of the first enlargement round to come, whether the conflict is resolved or not. This is, as Christopher Brewin shows in his welcome overview of EU-Cyprus relations, different from the stance that the EU has taken earlier. One of the central arguments he puts forth in this book is that the EU has shifted from a policy of ‘even-handedness’ to one of siding with the Greek Cypriots and the officially recognised government of the Republic of Cyprus. The final change, Brewin claims, came when in March 1995 the Foreign Affairs Council of Ministers dropped the solution of the conflict as a precondition for membership. To the author, this was part of a package deal struck by the French EU Presidency, with Greece at the same time agreeing to the completion of the EU’s Customs Union with Turkey.

Brewin is not alone in emphasising the role of Greek EU membership in the transformation (p. 87), and others have dated back the policy-shift to the European Council in Corfu under the Greek Presidency of June 1994. A large part of Brewin’s study is devoted to show how earlier the EU had consulted both communities when negotiating the Association Agreement of 1971, and how the EU’s openness to goods coming from the northern part of the island was only abandoned after a 1994 European Court of Justice ruling (the Anastasiou case), which effectively boycotted goods from the north, requiring them to be certified by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. As late as 1993, the Commission’s opinion on Cypriot membership had still implied a link between a settlement and membership (p. 75). As Brewin further points out, at least some member states such as France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, have at various points raised doubts about membership of a divided island, citing for instance the impact this may have on the development of EU foreign policy (p. 80).

This historical analysis is the strongest part in Brewin’s book, and stands out against the much shorter and schematic chapters on the Greek Cypriots’ and the Turkish Cypriots’ point of view. As for the Greek Cypriots, the author rightly emphasises that the attraction of membership ‘is to strengthen the Republic of Cyprus against its local enemies’ (p. 160). The Turkish Cypriots, meanwhile, prefer the security of their links with Turkey to the uncertainties of the economic promise entailed in exposing their economy to EU competition (p. 198). Both sides, then, seem to be more concerned with issues of military, political and societal security, rather than, as is often assumed, with the (contested) economic benefits of a settlement and EU membership. A similarly short chapter is devoted to an overview of other international actors, in which Brewin, unfortunately, does
not delve deeper into their relations with the EU, particularly in case of membership.

Brewin’s analysis makes him take a sceptical view of EU involvement. Various critical remarks are scattered throughout the book, and lead to the conclusion that because of its close links to one side of the conflict, the EU is not in a good position to contribute to a settlement, unless it finds ways to gain the trust of the Turkish Cypriots. If the EU is to have a positive role, Brewin suggests it may rather be as a financial and military guarantor after a settlement.

Any review of a book on Cyprus is inevitably coloured by the reviewer’s stance towards the conflict. Since I agree with the broad line of argument concerning the EU’s policy that Brewin presents, I found the book an extremely useful source of information and a necessary addition to the wealth of books and pamphlets that is being published on this issue. In my reading, Brewin tries to apply the even-handedness that the EU should not have given up to his analysis, which separates his book from the many where reading the first page will be sufficient to foresee the rest of the argument. If this makes his book more controversial, then all the better. There is, of course, always room for improvement, and in this case, the argument would have probably gained in clarity if Brewin had taken a more explicitly theoretical perspective, rather than focusing on historical ‘facts’. But those on the lookout for more, and relatively balanced information on the history of the conflict and the relations between Cyprus and the EU will find this book extremely useful.

THOMAS DIEZ

*Thomas Diez is Lecturer in International Relations Theory at the University of Birmingham*


Jan Herman Brinks’s examination of Germany’s post-war right wing politics, of the reasons underlying the rise of the far right, and of outbreaks of sporadic racist violence against foreigners after unification, could not be more timely. Germany has been unified for over a decade, yet memories of the Third Reich continue to fuel the political extremism espoused by the right, wreaking socio-political havoc.
on Germany’s domestic political systems and its international image. The rise of the extreme right in Germany after unification threatens to overshadow all of its political and economic achievements after the Second World War.

In order to explain the roots of this political extremism in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Federal Republic (FRG), as well as what Brinks perceived to be a Rechtsruck (swing to the right) after German unification, he divides his book into three main parts. In the first, he explains the significance of Germany’s division in shaping a national identity in both the east and west; the socio-political and economic consequences of unification for both east and west Germans and the subsequent emergence of a two-tier society; a brief history of xenophobia and right-wing radical tendencies amongst east Germans in the former GDR; and, finally, the prevalence of national revolutionary sentiments in the former GDR. The second part focuses entirely on the GDR’s history and political culture by examining the roles of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), the Nationale Volksarmee and the infamous Stasi intelligence machinery in imposing strict order and discipline on the population. Brinks also explains how the legacies of German political Lutheranism and Prussian political thought permeated the GDR’s political culture, especially its rigid authoritarianism after the Second World War. Part three finally dissects what the reader would expect to be the core of the book: the role of the right wing in Germany after unification. In several short chapters on anti-fascism, the notorious Historikerstreit, the emergence of the new right, the Republikaner Party, anti-Semitism, the asylum-seeker debate, the significance of Poland in German conservative opinion, and a concluding chapter on similarities between the Berlin and Weimar Republics, Brinks discusses the principal factors which have dominated the right wing political agenda in Germany.

The ‘swing to the right’ in Germany has roots which are firmly embedded in its National Socialist legacy as well as the socio-political problems stemming from unification. In the former GDR, Brinks argues that there was an intimate relationship between the creation of its political and military structures and those of the Third Reich. Conservative German politicians, especially in the right wings of the CDU and CSU political parties, fuelled the asylum seeker debate and the decision to permanently recognise the Oder-Neisse line as Germany’s frontier with Poland with rhetoric unbecoming of two mainstream political parties. In the former GDR, the principal focus of Brinks’s study, the rise of the far right could be explained further by the rapid development of a two-tier society, which threatened to de-rail the critical social dimension of unification. Indeed, the former GDR acts as a fertile recruitment ground for the far right, which seeks to exploit social and economic despair, rapidly rising rates of unemployment, and a disillusioned east German youth. Given the current rise in violent attacks against foreigners in Germany over the preceding year, the omens are not good. Brinks dismisses the analogy between Weimar and a reunified Germany but warns quite perceptively that ‘right wing violence in the Germany issues from the fringes of society, but the
epicentre of this aggression seems to be located at the heart of that society’ (p. 161).

Germany’s post-war right-wing politics has been the subject of much discussion both in Germany and abroad. Brinks manages successfully to explain the various links between this phenomena and the emergence of the far right after unification. His analysis serves as a useful introduction to a vital topic but, unfortunately, fails to provide a thorough examination of the principal factors he highlights. The scope of the topic is simply too large for the rather cursory attention Brinks pays to the main leitmotifs of his argument. More worryingly, the book lacks an effective conclusion. Moreover, suggestions for political and economic strategies for confronting the far right are few and far between. The causes of increased political extremism and racist violence being perpetrated by the far right are addressed but Brinks spends insufficient time analysing the implications of his arguments for Germany’s future socio-political development. Brink’s brief overview will benefit the uninitiated reader but the academic or policy-maker seeking to learn more about the rise of the right in German politics after unification will be left uninspired. Brinks has provided us with a general and competent overview of the main problems at hand. However, additional research will be required if we are to understand the complex phenomena of the far right, which continues to plague Germany as well as many of its western and eastern European counterparts.

CHAD PETERSON

Chad Peterson is Editor of the RUSI Journal at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies

Alex Callinicos, Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, 160pp., £40.00 hbk.).
Alex Callinicos, Against The Third Way: an Anti-Capitalist Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001, 152pp., £40.00 hbk, £10.99 pbk.).

These are not just books about ideas but about the political economy and sociology of capitalism underlying them. Against the Third Way starts with Callinicos questioning the usefulness of the separation between hyperglobalists, transformationalists and sceptics about globalisation. For him, a more productive distinction is between ‘boosters’ and ‘critics’. Corporations have not detached themselves from national bases, and state intervention has been important to the development of globalisation. But nonetheless there has, he suggests, been a
qualitative increase in global economic integration in the last 100 years or so. The problem is that governments have yielded acquiescently before it. Yet, for Callinicos this is more an old story of capital placing constraints than anything new to do with globalisation.

Callinicos is dismissive of claims about the information economy by authors such as Leadbeater and Castells, chiding them for suggesting that informationalism has a dynamic, which has replaced that of capital reproduction. The information economy is, in fact, all about the drive for profit. And far from a benign, democratic, the ‘network’ society of the information economy yields inequalities, concentration and centralisation. The information industries have had less impact than many other revolutionary inventions, air travel for instance, merely shifting activities from one medium to another and diminishing in significance since the initial arrival of word processing. They are over-hyped and will go belly up, Callinicos predicts.

Leaving aside social analysis, Callinicos moves on to third way values; while he covers both political economy and normative philosophy in these books he sometimes fails to link them. Here the Equality book is central. Callinicos argues, with Norberto Bobbio, that egalitarianism has always been the issue, which divides left from right and it shows up New Labour’s shift along this axis. New Labour advocate a shift from equality of outcome to an equality of opportunities that parallels that advocated by Dworkin, Sen and Cohen. For these philosophers equality is about overcoming the negative consequences of brute luck (such as class or natural talents) after which individuals are free to act on a basis of equal opportunity, leading inevitably to difference and inequality in the end. Callinicos is keen to highlight, following Balibar, the togetherness of equality and liberty, as in Amartya Sen’s ideas of capability and functioning, rather than counterpoising them as is traditionally done. He also argues for an account of capabilities that is objective, rather than based on preferences: often the latter are not freely chosen or are distorted by capitalist social relations. Callinicos is also sceptical about a role for desert in theories of equality, especially about Miller’s claim that a market socialist economy will reward desert. He questions whether difference is as incompatible with equality as sometimes claimed, and suggests that difference theorists, despite their best efforts, divorce culture from economics too much in analysing social justice. Callinicos wants to move the debate back to exploitation, unjust in its own right, but also at the basis of inequalities in a way glossed over by the egalitarian liberals. A key problem with the liberal philosophers (and basic income advocates), he suggests, is their failure to engage with the undermining of equality by capitalist institutions.

For New Labour equal opportunities can be secured via skills. These give people access to paid employment and so more of a chance in life. Perhaps Callinicos should call this minimum opportunities rather than equal opportunities because it sees everyone as getting a chance but not necessarily an equal chance. It is about ‘inclusion’ in a supposed meritocracy, where inequality may follow based on merit rather than brute luck. This skills-based approach happens also, according to New
Labour, to give Britain an advantage in the global knowledge economy; social justice and economic efficiency at the same time.

Callinicos argues that the emphasis on paid employment will not do much to help those who cannot work, such as the elderly or the disabled. Education he argues works less as a route to equality than a reflection of economic inequalities. The actual record he says is that inequality and poverty has increased under New Labour, partly because old methods such as the funding of universal benefits through redistributive taxation have been ruled out. But also the attempt to blend economic efficiency with social justice cannot work; the neoliberalism of the former undermines equality in the latter. As with the egalitarian liberals, there is the false assumption that equality of opportunity can be secured within the context of capitalist relations, a more deregulated capitalism if New Labour get their way.

Callinicos identifies community as the other chief value held by Labour and sees an illiberal and authoritarian face in the New Deal and reforms to law and order and asylum policies, for example. He claims that no serious, principled arguments are given for duties or the community being given priority over individual rights. This is unfair perhaps, as it is not that the government lacks such arguments, but rather a question as to whether they are good ones. Callinicos makes important points about the government’s illiberalism but I find his socialist criticisms of lack of equality more telling. His strongest argument on community comes where he sees in New Labour, as in Thatcherism, neo-liberal economics paired with moral authoritarianism; not a contradiction so much as the latter following from the former. A felt ethos of community rather than an imposed one is, he argues, incompatible with the sort of modernising commodified market society Gordon Brown and Tony Blair promote.

Callinicos is scathing about the Kosovo intervention for being selective and designed to demonstrate American military power and maintain US hegemony in Eurasia. The consequence, he argues, was to exacerbate ethnic cleansing rather than halt it. Callinicos has strong points about the events and their consequences but his reduction of all to geopolitical intentions tends to lead to a dismissal of any attempt to pursue international humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, it is not clear where this leaves persecuted groups when they need military assistance. Meanwhile, Callinicos paints a telling picture of an international order in which Russia, China and other alliances of states offer the main threats (militarily and economically) to US hegemony. The US’s response is to exert leadership over friendly states and divide its potential opponents. Blair’s advocacy of transparency in international institutions and financial deregulation gets short shrift from Callinicos, as do more demanding political globalisers; their hopes lie with forms of global governance which Callinicos argues are based on, and will institutionalise, American hegemony rather than ‘cosmopolitan democracy’. Maybe so, but the globalists’ ambitions are a matter for struggle, rather than something decided, and Callinicos offers little himself by way of a convincing alternative to their approach.
Not surprisingly, he sees equality and the objectives of the third way as unrealisable within capitalism. What is needed, he argues, is revolutionary change to real socialism and his hopes lie with the workers movement and the recent anti-capitalist protests. Yet, while trade unions may in principle have the strategic importance that Callinicos suggests they have long been some way from translating this into any sort of socialist action. And, as he admits, anti-globalisation protests are incoherent and disorganised. While they have excitingly put anti-capitalism back on the agenda, many of them are not anti-capitalist (so much as being in focused on a single issue or against Anglo-American capitalism) and not anti-globalisation (so much as being against American imperialism). Callinicos’s refusal to countenance change through established institutions, except in odd moments of sympathy for radical reformism, disengages him from less inspiring but politically more open avenues for change. His model of a socialist society, meanwhile, is made up only of passing references to democratic planning, spiced up with hope in the power of changed circumstances to show us what socialism should look like and how it might promote more collectivist human motivations. There are some very important old Marxist truths applied effectively to the contemporary context in these books. But his outline of the alternative future and, how to get there, is too undeveloped to persuade me on to Callinicos’s political road.

LUKE MARTELL

*Luke Martell is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Sussex*

Dario Castiglione and Iain Hampshire-Monk (eds.), *The History of Political Thought in National Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 313 pp., £40.00 hbk.).

The history of political thought has long been an area of intellectual endeavour in which the manifest failings of mainstream approaches to IR have appeared most apparent. It is still common practice within IR discourse(s) to employ canonical thinkers—Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Grotius and Kant foremost amongst them—as legitimating figures, quoted unproblematically in order to bolster current intellectual fashions, to add some authority to contemporary theoretical claims. This crude and unreflective scripturalism illustrates an apparent unawareness of or
disinterest in important ideas relating to historical interpretation, developed over the course of the last thirty years, whether in the influential prescriptions of Anglo-American contextualism, the German Begriffgeschichte or French genealogical practices. Although the proponents of realism have been by far the worst offenders, liberals have also shown scant regard for the historical identities of the figures and arguments that they rely on to provide their own accounts with trans-historical validity. Both camps would benefit from reading this book.

_The History of Political Thought in National Context_ is a collection of essays dedicated to the task of examining the way in which the study of political thought has followed often very different trajectories in various countries, and moreover ‘the way national context shapes not only different histories, but even different conceptions of ‘histories’ (p. xiii). In this task it is largely successful, although the collection is mixed: some papers provide broad schematic surveys, others seek to justify particular approaches to interpretation, whilst a couple concentrate on more idiosyncratic topics. The result of this eclecticism is a lack of intellectual coherence; a piecemeal ensemble. Nevertheless, this is a valuable collection, treating a topic that is rarely viewed from a comparative perspective, and as such it represents a significant resource for scholars of history, as well as for social and political theorists. The value resides primarily in two factors. Firstly, a number of the pieces are either written by or are concerned with theorists who have played a major role in shaping the history of political thought in recent decades. For example, there is an eloquent essay by Quentin Skinner, defending his ‘Collingwoodian’ approach to historical understanding, as well as a defence by Pierre Rosanvallon of his own conception of a ‘philosophical history of the present’. These pieces are complemented by Melvin Richter’s expository essay on Reinhart Koselleck, which in particular seeks to locate his hermeneutic sensibility in relation to Gadamer and Heidegger, the philosophical mentors from whom he has since made a decisive break, and by Malachi Hacohen’s essay on the influence of Karl Popper in Central Europe.

The second valuable factor lies in the idiosyncratic subjects discussed by some of the other contributors, wherein a number of interesting insights are generated. For example, Robert Wokler analyses the history of what he takes to be the three most distinguished chairs of political thought in England, the Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford, the Graham Wallas, Professor at the LSE and Cambridge. He argues, correctly I believe, that what such an analysis highlights is that there has never been a consensus in England (and most probably elsewhere) as to the nature of the study of politics, its relation to history or in the role of social science in the analysis of the political; a point reiterated by Stefan Collini in his postscript, when he writes that the history of political thought is an ‘ineliminably hybrid activity’ (p. 295). Wokler furthermore illustrates the steady withdrawal of the English professoriate from public debate; a position which is to be contrasted with the role of, for example, Jürgen Habermas in Germany, or Pierre Bourdieu in France. Once again, national political and intellectual cultures are shown to be of vital importance.
The rest of the essays are more general, providing brief but informative analyses of intellectual developments in various countries during the post-war period. Thus, Wolfgang Mommsen writes on the struggle which German historians and philosophers had to come to terms with their recent past, Jeremy Jennings highlights the general distaste felt, until recently, in the *Annales* dominated French historical profession for the study of political ideas, whilst Terence Ball provides a succinct and personal reflection on the development of American histories of political thought. Aside from the lack of coherence displayed in this collection— which, as noted, actually leads it down some interesting and unexpected avenues—it should also be noted that the scope of the study is very narrow and overwhelmingly Eurocentric. Aside from this criticism, though, *The History of Political Thought in National Context* is a fascinating and instructive study, which should be of interest to historians and political theorists alike. In IR is it high time that the long-running interpretative disputes that intellectual historians have generated are engaged with adequately, and this book provides a useful portal through which to survey these important debates.

DUNCAN S. A. BELL

*Duncan S. A. Bell is a Research Student in the Centre of International Studies at Cambridge University*


The continuing strains and increase in inequality that deepens as globalisation carries on remorselessly, highlighting the cruel differences in life chances between developed and underdeveloped nations threatens the very project that boasts of its wide diffusion of benefits (witness the debate over globalisation’s essential ‘goodness’ in the pages of *The Economist*). Clearly, something is up and we need to understand what this is: what are the forces that are leading the greater development and continuing expansion of capitalism, with all its epoch-changing transformations impacting on states and societies at a bewildering pace? Can theories grounded in an understanding of what constitutes imperialism have anything to say to us when trying to make sense of it all? The chapters in this book suggest that imperialism does still indeed retain some conceptual purchase within international political economy. Underpinning this book is the acceptance and
advancement of the thesis that capitalism lies at the root of both development and what we understand to be imperialism.

The book is divided into three sections. The first section provides an overview of the intellectual history of imperialism, looking at the rise of the concept within political economy. Barrat Brown’s chapter on ‘Imperialism Revisited’ is particularly thought provoking, making the point that the increasing availability of technology opens up pathways for new and interesting sites of resistance to imperialism and neoliberal globalisation. Nowell’s chapter on Hobson’s *Imperialism* is also sound and would be a good teaching resource. Section Two is more specifically Marxian in character, with Willoughby providing a sound treatment of earlier Marxist critiques of capitalist development, particularly looking at the legacy of Marx and of Lenin. Blaut’s critique of Eurocentrism in Marxism is well guided and interesting. As Blaut points out, globalisation theories have tended to portray the South as essentially or partly pre-capitalist both during and after colonialism. In contemporary times, goes the theory, capitalism has spread to these parts of the world, becoming global in nature and in doing so bringing widespread benefits to the South and its peoples. In essence, globalisation theorists advance the line that the Industrial Revolution is diffusing outward over the rest of the world and in this process modernisation and development follow in its wake. But as Blaut (and others) points out, there is significant evidence against this thesis. Authentic industrialisation is appearing in very few regions, certainly very few in Africa.

Those regions that have experienced a degree of industrialisation are mainly areas in which a substantial amount of heavy industry exited already in the ‘pre-globalisation’ period. Brazil, India, and Mexico are usually cited as conspicuous examples of this. Yet, Mexico is relatively unique due to its close proximity to the global hegemon and the fact that now it is within NAFTA. Brazil and India have, in strictly quantitative terms, a large and important industrial sector, as well as a huge labour force employed in manufacturing. But, in proportion to their huge size, both countries may not be any more industrialised than average countries in the South. Other parts of the South indeed posses types of industries that remain peripheral to the domestic economy: branch plants of Northern transnational corporations; factories for mostly Northern consumers, often utilising materials imported from the North for assembly or exporting primary products for refinement in the North. This cannot be seen as comprehensive industrialisation. Nor is it the diffusion of the industrial revolution! Blaut argues that the effect of Northern capitalism on the South is either destructive and contradictory or, perhaps, stimulates a combination of both development and underdevelopment, which may be positive in some favoured regions but negative in others. As Blaut points out, capitalism was global a long time ago, although its effects in the current epoch are perhaps deeper. But what remains is that globalisation, as theorists of neoliberal character, have long pointed out, increases immiseration. With its strong neoliberal character, it is also engendering a double movement that is generating a build-up of resistance and rejection, echoing the anti-imperial struggles of the last
century. Blaut’s main point, which I concur with, is that Marxism is eurocentric, but that this eurocentrism can be recognised and accounted for. Once freed of this bias, Marxist theories of imperialism remain conceptually powerful and useful.

Section Three, with chapters by Munck, Patnaik and Petras round off what is a most excellent and thought-provoking book that should encourage readers to rethink their understanding of globalisation and the forces that energise the era in which we live in. The book is recommended as a useful source for courses on globalisation, as well as more broader topics related to international political economy and development.

IAN TAYLOR

Ian Taylor is Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Administrative Studies at the University of Botswana


In 1986, Trevor Taylor argued that sport and International Relations (IR) were strangers and that there was a ‘mutual neglect’ in the study of the two subjects. The editors of the Handbook of Sports Studies contend that despite the growing significance of sport in society, the academic pursuit of sport has yet to reach its full potential. In an age where disciplinary boundaries are collapsing, many of the 44 chapters included in this volume, which were written by non-IR scholars (mainly sociologists) still have much to say to those analysing international society.

The first section outlines how each of the seven major theoretical perspectives in the sociology of sport (functionalism, Marxism, incorporating critical theory, cultural studies, feminism, interpretative sociology, figurational sociology and post-structuralism) frame their analyses of sport in society. These paradigmatic debates are mirrored across the social sciences.

The second section displays how multi-disciplinary the study of sport has become with seven chapters summarising each discipline’s contribution (anthropology, economics, human geography, social history, philosophy, politics and psychology). The editors note that these chapters ‘illustrate collectively the richness, diversity and breadth of scholarly enquiry on sport and society’ (p. 140). Yet, there is no specific chapter highlighting IR’s input. This is not the fault of the
editors for, aside from a handful of books and journal articles, the discipline has little to offer. This ‘gap’ is evident throughout the book. Blanchard in chapter eight, for instance, suggests that future research should concentrate on links between sport and IR, noting that ‘the dream of world peace is well served by efforts to understand sporting diversity, encourage international and interdisciplinary cooperation, and revisit the original spirit of the Olympics’ (p. 151). That said, Houlihan in chapter 13 provides an excellent overview of research themes linking sport and—predominantly international—politics. These include: the increasingly important role of International Sporting Federations (such as the International Olympic Committee) and non-state actors; the potential role of sport in international conflict resolution; sport in global regimes; sport as a source of resistance; sport in building national identity and projecting the state on an international stage; usage of athletic events in diplomacy and sanctions; and sport as a ‘promoter’ of capitalism, modernity, progress, inclusion, exclusion, and discrimination.

The third section, with eighteen chapters spanning 280 pages, is the most substantive and has most to offer to IR, picking up on themes identified by Houlihan. Guttmann in chapter 15, details how sport emerged as a vehicle for modernity and progress, how it spread with economic/military colonialism, and the ways in which it is linked to capitalism. The use of mass media, particularly since the 1960s, as a vehicle for spreading the messages, which sport carries (commercialisation; gender, sexual and ethnic divisions; and national identity) are analysed by Whannel in chapter 18. Theberge in chapter 20 considers how sport has assisted in ascribing differences based on gendered and sexualised lines. The linkage of racism and ethnicity with sport is discussed by Jarvie in chapter 21. This is followed by two excellent chapters. Firstly, Lincoln Allison notes his views on the connections between sport and nationalism, intimating that although sport may be ‘a vehicle for expressing nationalism’ (p. 354) and national identity makes sport ‘a marketable product’ (p. 346), the growing importance of international sporting organisations as global actors challenges to an extent the ‘primacy of the state’. Secondly, Joseph Maguire critically evaluates perspectives, which emphasise that sport represents a form of a globalising Western colonialisation. Finally, Kevin Young scrutinises forms of conflict resolution (policing) in chapter 25 on ‘Sport and Violence’.

Part four, entitled ‘Sport and Society: Research around the Globe’, offers little more than an overview of the non Anglo-American research. The need to articulate ‘non-Western’ voices is acute throughout the social sciences, yet this section of twelve chapters disappoints, as only limited space is dedicated to the research conducted in each region (these are Africa, Australian and New Zealand, Eastern Europe, France, Germany, India, Japan, Korea and South East Asia, Latin America, the Nordic countries, Portugal, and Spain). This allows enough space to list university courses and to document the literature surrounding each of the regional research themes. Ironically, most authors reflect that ‘their region’ is
influenced by the parameters of sports studies, which is established in the Anglo-American tradition.

Although this book fails to explore the themes it generates in any great depth, it is a valuable source for the social sciences in that it acts as a reference and overview of the diversity of scholarly endeavour in sports studies. Despite focusing predominantly on sociological themes, there is much that is relevant and appealing to IR scholars. The book also embarrasses IR, highlighting the poverty of research in an area of global life that has very real and serious consequences for international society.

ROGER LEVERMORE

Roger Levermore is Research Assistant at the University of Plymouth

Robert G. Darst, Smokestack Diplomacy: Cooperation and Conflict in East-West Environmental Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, 300 pp., £41.50 hbk., £20.50 pbk.).

One of the most fascinating questions in environmental politics today is why environmental protection measures in the New Independent States (NIS) have not improved markedly since the end of the Cold War, given the transition toward democratic governments and market economies and increased international assistance to the region. Robert G. Darst addresses this paradox by analysing East-West co-operation and conflict on three transnational environmental issues—pollution of the Baltic Sea, transboundary air pollution, and nuclear power safety. Darst examines these three issues from the late 1960s to the present in the Soviet Union and five post-Soviet states; Russia, Ukraine, and the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Darst argues that previous explanations of states’ engagement in transnational environmental politics are insufficient to fully explain Soviet or newly industrialised states (NIS) co-operation. Instead, he contends that the Soviet Union and its successor states were rarely motivated to take actions based on a genuine concern for the environment, but rather engaged in the ‘instrumental manipulation’ of external environmental concerns. The greatest efforts at East-West co-operation paradoxically occurred in the in the late 1980s, when it participated in international environmental co-operation to create a co-operative context to advance other goals.
With the end of the Cold War, the form of this instrumental manipulation changed with the increased transnational subsidisation of environmental protection measures in the NIS by Western countries. The NIS manipulated Western concerns to obtain financing to modernise firms or address internal environmental problems. Darst finds that this transnational subsidisation, in turn, had several unintended consequences: moral hazard, polluter life extension, and in two extreme cases, environmental blackmail.

Darst’s model of instrumental manipulation of environmental concerns is built upon the work of economist Ronald Coase, who argued that if the victim had the legal right to a clean environment, then the polluter would pay the victim to accept the pollution; conversely, if the polluter held the right to pollute, the victim would pay the polluter to reduce emissions. Darst applies the ‘Coase Theorem’ (p. 37) to the case of East-West environmental politics. In this instance, the Soviet Union and the NIS held the right to pollute, while the more affluent Western countries victim to that pollution would pay them to reduce their emissions.

This is a fascinating book that digs beneath the surface to explain the motivations for transnational environmental protection in some of the most polluted areas of the world. One limitation of Darst’s analysis, however, is one he himself raises, which is the difficulty of determining the intentions of the leaders of governments involved (p. 11); were they really engaging in moral hazard, polluter life extension and environmental blackmail in their decision making processes, or were they forced to take these actions because there were no real alternatives? Darst states ‘the newly independent states were uniformly less willing to take deliberate, independent, effective action to address the sources of transboundary pollution than had been the Soviet Union under Gorbachev’ (p. 3). But the real question is whether they were less willing—or less able—to take action.

Darst does acknowledge the limitations and lack of real alternatives of these governments to an extent, for example with the conflicted statements of Russian Environment Minister Danilov-Danlyan on the decision to dump radioactive wastes into the Arctic and Pacific Oceans. Rather than environmental blackmail, the decisions of the governments of Ukraine, and especially Lithuania and Armenia, to extend the operation of their nuclear power plants may have had more to do with the lack of immediate energy alternatives, the need to maintain the independence of their nations, and their inability to safely decommission the plants without assistance. For example, the Ignalina Plant provides 70 per cent of the power for Lithuania, while in Armenia, the decision to restart the Medzamor nuclear power plant was taken to end the extreme energy crisis of the early 1990s and ensure the survival of the newly independent nation. From the perspectives of the NIS countries, maintaining operation of the plants was a necessary evil.

One of the most important points of the book is that the environment really has become a political issue. However, I suspect that the NIS are not the only countries or entities engaging in instrumental manipulation of environmental issues; but also developing countries, Western aid agencies and engineering firms, and even international organisations and implementing agencies. The book is less about
East-West environmental politics, than the nuances of international environmental politics in the post-Rio era. One must also consider whether the gains of transnational subsidisation of environmental projects in the NIS are greater than the unintended consequences (and whether there are ‘positive’ consequences such as a spill-over effect to other issues). Finally, Darst’s major recommendations focus on the need to build regulatory capacity and civil society in the NIS—basically to promote greater democratisation. All of these factors constitute a rich future research agenda.

This is an extremely well researched and written book. The fascinating description of environmental politics makes it enticing to read and informative for both practitioners and scholars in the fields of environmental politics, international relations, and comparative politics.

ALLISON MORRILL CHATRCHYAN

Allison Morrill Chatrchyan is a Research Student with the Harrison Program in the Department of Government at the University of Maryland, USA

Gerard Delanty, Citizenship in a Global Age: Society, Culture, Politics (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000, 165 pp., £50.00 hbk, £15.99 pbk.).

Conceived as an intervention in the debate on globalisation and democracy, Gerard Delanty’s Citizenship in a Global Age is a welcome critical response to the ever-expanding literature on cosmopolitan citizenship. Reflecting on the concern that both capitalism and democracy appear to have become disconnected from the public culture and the rule of law that had tamed them in modernity, Delanty asks how the very concept of ‘citizenship’ might be able to withstand this dual disengagement. While he acknowledges the destabilising effects of globalisation on the nation-state, which indeed suggest the need for a cosmopolitan perspective broadly conceived, he simultaneously questions the ‘adequacy of cosmopolitanism’ as put forward by a number of recent writings, such as those of Jürgen Habermas, David Held, Andrew Linklater, Richard Falk and others.

According to Delanty’s analysis of globalisation, understood as the ‘release of political and economic considerations’ from a civic culture, capitalism and democracy no longer appear to maintain a connection to the legal and social institution of citizenship. Whereas in the modern era democracy had served as the foremost restraint to capitalism, the danger in this late modern transition is that
democracy is legitimating both triumphant capitalism but also an undeterred kind of populist nationalism. The literature on cosmopolitan citizenship, which attempts to theorise this transition, addresses itself to the theoretic and ontological challenges that globalisation entails by conceiving of membership in a world community as replacing membership to a national and territorial community. As Delanty points out, however, the institutions of democracy that had characterised its statist articulation have not spilled over in any ‘substantive form’ into the global sphere: rather, ‘it is capitalism, not citizenship, that is truly global today’ he writes (p. 2).

The pressing question, then, becomes whether the versions of cosmopolitanism increasingly prominent in academic discourse are able to resist globalisation and reconnect citizenship with both democracy and capitalism. Criticising the ‘false promises of cosmopolitanism’, Delanty outlines his own account of a post-national, and therefore, cosmopolitan citizenship. Delanty rightly contends that any reconceptualisation of citizenship cannot but also address the challenges that globalisation poses to ‘the democratic field’ as such (p. 134-136). The appearance of levels of governance beyond the national indicates the reconfiguration of democracy itself as a ‘multi-levelled polity’, a transformation most evident in the European Union. This notion of a multi-level democratic order shows a way to rethink citizenship itself, in a ‘cosmopolitan’ fashion but otherwise than membership to a world community.

This ‘restructuring of citizenship’ entails bringing ‘the dimension of community and autonomy, the basis of national models of citizenship, closer to the emergent reality of a cosmopolitan citizenship’ (p. 5). In order for such an attempt to be successful, however, citizenship must be understood as approximating in a theoretic sense the emerging social reality: it must be, in other words, conceived as multi-levelled, ‘cutting across the subnational, the national and the transnational’ domains. It seems that, for Delanty, this linkage of citizenship with the multiple strata of ties and social connections is crucial for two reasons. First, it is apparent that all levels are increasingly interacting with each other, and across each other, in a global context. Thus, Delanty wishes to support the idea of a ‘cosmopolitan public sphere’, which signifies the interaction of these levels and their resulting transformation. Second, citizenship ought to be linked across these strata because they reflect the levels of participation into civic culture or community. For example, local and regional levels engender forms of participation that are more direct and might counter the dis-embedding effects of globalising capitalism. At the transnational level, there is great scope, Delanty suggests, for linking current regulatory efforts with participatory politics, although he does not expand this in great detail.

Delanty remains critical and cautious about the conflation of a ‘cosmopolitan public sphere’ with a ‘global civil society’ understood by most popular cosmopolitan accounts to connote ‘a legal and political form of transnational governance’ (p. 5). His insistence at maintaining the distinction between them gives rise to a more limited understanding of cosmopolitanism, which Delanty calls
‘civic’, which is not solely preoccupied by transnational issues of governance as such. Rather, its potency lies in its communicative aspect, that is, its ability to reflexively transform embedded cultural models and expand the loci of enunciation for other perspectives.

The book’s central concern, then, is crucial to students and scholars of politics, international relations and sociology who are conceptualising the globalising world and its effects on current theories of democracy and citizenship. Delanty’s restructuring of citizenship attempts to ‘rethink the relationship between community and cosmopolitanism’, between the ‘cosmos and the polis’, in other words, during the emergence of a post-national order driven by globalised capital. The book is, therefore, a unique attempt to critique and, at the same time, participate in the cosmopolitan citizenship debate in a productive way. Delanty might very well have pointed to a new agenda, which future cosmopolitan thinking will definitely endeavour to address.

LOUIZA ODYSSEOS

Louiza Odysseos is a Research Student and Tutorial Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science


These are two very different books. But while perspective and content differ, they cover (in essence) the same subject: how to secure South Asia. Durrani looks to the region, whereas Kapur’s perspective is global. These differing starting points reflect the changing view from Islamabad and New Delhi.

Mahmud Durrani’s India and Pakistan: The Cost of Conflict and the Benefits of Peace is another right thinking broadside against the wrong headed confrontation between India and Pakistan. The wanton waste of militarisation in South Asia has been catalogued countless times. Even so, Durrani’s contribution is a useful one. While it draws on existing studies, it is not—nor does it claim to be—particularly
academic. Instead, it sets out a number of practical proposals towards an improvement in the relations between the two countries.

Indo-Pakistan free trade is one of them. This is a sound proposal. At present, despite a virtual absence of direct, formal trade between the two South Asian neighbours, a tremendous amount of illicit trade thrives. Much of it runs through Dubai, explaining in part Dubai’s persistent growth as a trading centre. Some of it is the result of cross-border smuggling, making a welcome change from weapons, drugs, and militants. Direct, formalised free trade between India and Pakistan would benefit both countries, but particularly Pakistan. Smaller economies, as Gautam Sen frequently points out, tend to gain the most from free trade agreements.

Durrani makes other useful proposals. Defence expenditure could be reduced (this is already beginning to happen if President Musharraf’s spending freeze proves to be just that). The author also calls for SAARC, the regional South Asian organisation, to be strengthened. Effective regionalism would be a useful boost, but, as with ASEAN, SAARC has suffered from dominant players giving it short shrift. It remains a weak regional organisation. India largely prefers to manage its relationships bilaterally, and hostility between the two countries continues to restrict regional co-operation. Sometimes the author pulls his punches. While critical of high defence expenditure, he writes ‘it is not the intention to justify or criticise the actual military expenditures by India and Pakistan’ (p. 9). Perhaps, he continues, they have a positive as well as a negative impact. This somewhat undermines the case, he then goes on to make, for a reduction in expenditure. Some growth-related arguments could have been included; for example, the absolute relationship between expenditure on education and economic development.

Most of the time, Durrani treads over familiar ground. What matters, though, is his rank; the fact that as a senior officer from the days of Zia, he now endorses engagement and a ratcheting down of military expenditure. To get to a more positive Indo-Pakistan framework, he writes, will require ‘great statesmanship and bold initiatives’. Too true. Whether President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee can deliver this promise against a backdrop of potentially hostile domestic opposition is still an open question, but few analysts expect swift change. In *Pokhran and Beyond: India’s Nuclear Behaviour*, Ashok Kapur has produced a thoroughly realist and state-centric study of India’s nuclear behaviour. At its heart is a fierce critique of what the author dubs the ‘Nehru-Gandhi foreign policy line’. This, he writes, was a reactive rather than proactive approach to strategy.

He has produced an enjoyable and provocative book. In short, he argues that China is India’s real rival, and it is with China—and the P5—in mind that India should proceed to define its nuclear policy. Historically, India’s nuclear development was marked by two contrasting elements. Reactive and bureaucratic approaches have stood in sharp contrast to purposeful, positive policy-making. In assessing this inheritance, Kapur explores the behavioural relationships between key policy-making groups in the Indian establishment. He also looks into the
Millennium

development of nuclear policy during the Nehru-Gandhi years. *Pokhran and Beyond* is a firm rejoinder to George Perkovitch’s seminal study of Indian nuclearisation, *India’s Nuclear Bomb* (1998). Kapur disagrees with most of Percovitch’s conclusions. Indian nuclearisation, argues Kapur, should be read in the context of a long-drawn out reaction to other international actors. He does not believe it was the product of ad hoc, largely domestic, imperatives, as Percovitch argues.

Kapur takes great exception to unilateralists like Kanti Bajpai. Other key commentators on the Indian nuclear issue, like Arundhati Roy, do not even get a mention. Even discussion of Percovitch’s work, which Kapur seeks to differ from, is restricted to the preface. Certainly, this book could have drawn more evenly on existing literature. All in all, Kapur has achieved two things. He has written a powerful revisionist account of Indian nuclearisation, giving it a form and direction (mainly derived from international politics) that few writers have done before. In setting out the past, he also makes recommendations for the future. His proposals are decidedly realist, and, to a large extent, derive from an ambitious global view of where India will sit in the years to come. This makes his book all the more interesting to read.

His final conclusions, though, are the products of a specific way of looking at security. Recommending a more ‘proactive’ policy—with overt weaponisation no doubt a part—fits with Kapur’s view that ‘power struggles are inevitable and can be settled only by coercive means’ (p. 249). However, his recommendations have to be assessed with respect to the behavioural patterns that can influence international politics. Misperception is ubiquitous. In a South Asian context, it could be lethal. While non-deployment may, as Kapur argues, be interpreted as a ‘sign of weakness by the enemy’ (p. 245), deployment itself can send out unintentional—and potentially dangerous—messages. Without serious consideration of how a proactive nuclear policy will work in practice, Kapur’s ambitious strategic view falters.

Here more attention needs to be paid to one of his proposals. He suggests that unilateral self-restraint should be replaced by negotiated restraint. This is intriguing; he is not excluding the notion of agreements altogether, but arguing that they should only be derived from a robust bargaining process. Perhaps this is a recipe for Indian security, but it is one that will carry a greater risk of confrontation with the US (with which India has finally established warm relations) and the other P5 countries.

Neither Durrani’s warm words of peace nor Kapur’s paean to Indian ambition address some of the future security issues in South Asia. Many of these are equally valid from a realist or liberal perspective. One, rarely discussed, is the spectre of HIV. The likely economic impact of HIV on both India and Pakistan is huge, and could negate any positive developments in reducing tension and furthering economic development. If infection rates reach Southern African levels, which seems entirely possible, any peace dividend from engagement would be largely wiped out. Even ambitious India, were it to follow Kapur’s proactive agenda, may
falter in the face of this all too human security threat. The costs of weaponisation, and the economic costs of AIDS, could unravel the most important Indian project of all; to grow its economy. From this most goodness and greatness flows. Sometimes fine-tuning nuclear policy or focusing mainly on defence expenditure, is not enough.

ALEXANDER EVANS

Alexander Evans is a Research Associate in the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s College, London


While the early initiatives to establish centres for peace and conflict research occurred in America, associated especially with the work of Kenneth Boulding at the University of Michigan and Theodore Lentz at St Louis, Missouri, the main elaboration and development of peace research came from Scandinavia; most remarkably in the work of Johan Galtung. Galtung was the founder of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) and the founding editor of the Journal of Peace Research launched in 1964. Galtung’s academic output since 1960 has been massive and his influence on the institutionalisation and the ideas of peace research seminal. This publication, written with Carl Jacobsen (Professor of International Peace and Conflict Studies at Carleton University), and containing some additional contributions from Finn Tschudi (from the University of Oslo) and Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen provides an insight into the ways in which the ‘Galtungian project’ for peace research and action has matured over the past 40 years, and an account of the analyses and methodologies (in essence the TRANSCEND approach) which currently direct it.

The book is divided into four parts. The first part, ‘Conflict Resolution: Perspectives and Assumptions’, revisits the argument which is axiomatic to most of those who would identify themselves as working within the peace/conflict research tradition: the idea that conventional western state-centred security thinking is dominated by a realist ‘war culture’, which, though designed to deter threats, has the effect of promoting conflict. The thesis of the book is that there is evidence in recent years that this war culture is being eroded and challenged by contrary dynamics or ‘phenomenological challenges’ which help to discern the
core components for an emergent peace culture. Jacobsen suggests that these phenomenological challenges come from the development of academic game theory (which demonstrates that co-operative solidarity strategies best protects the interests of parties in conflict); from the ending of the Cold War with Gorbachev’s ‘astounding inversion of past arms race and arms control truisms’ (p. 26) and his rejection of zero sum international politics; and, finally, from what Jacobsen sees as an increasingly consensually accepted idea that state based formulas do not address the underlying differences that generate violent conflicts. The book, then, presents an exploration of the case for a new ‘forum to address underlying structures and cultures of violence, and the need for new language, dialogue and perspectives such as might offer more creative and viable alternatives for the twenty first century’ (p. 47).

The second part, ‘Conflict Formations for the Twenty-first Century’, presents Galtung’s strategic conflict analysis, delineating his prognosis for the main fault lines or conflict detonators for the new century: firstly, a geoeconomic conflict formation based on an increasing north/south or centre/periphery polarisation of wealth and poverty; secondly, a geomilitary conflict formation based on US global superpower ambition; thirdly, a geopolitical conflict formation based on the state/nation dichotomy; fourthly, a geocultural conflict formation based on the Islam/Christianity dichotomy; and, finally, Galtung considers the possibility of a Euroregional conflict formation associated with fault lines converging on the Balkans. Jacobsen adds further analyses focused on Russia, China and on Eurasian and Asian dynamics. For each group of threats posed by each conflict formation, Galtung characteristically has both a prognosis and a ‘therapy’. Underlying all his therapies is a mistrust of large hierarchies and structures; advocacy of smaller and looser networks; and the need to be courageous, imaginative and creative in transforming the war culture into a peace culture.

The instrument to perform the therapies required for such a transformation is described in the third part of the book, ‘A Practice for Peace: The TRANSCEND Approach’. Galtung has always been committed to the theory-practice link in peace research and has for years been an advocate of developing a specialism of scholar-practitioners as ‘conflict workers’ whose role in dealing with conflict is akin to the medical profession in dealing with disease. In 1993 Galtung formed TRANSCEND as an organisation to pursue these ideas. Chapters 3.1 and 3.2 written by Galtung himself provide a fascinating self-assessment of the impact of his work, as he puts it, in 40 conflicts over 40 years. Each conflict is profiled briefly through three levels of analysis (diagnosis, prognosis, and therapy), in a manner which might be regarded as over-schematic and superficial in conventional political science. While the realities and specificities of each and every conflict may elude such neat categorisation, let alone be receptive to the apparently painless therapies recommended, one nevertheless has to be impressed by the creative thinking offered here. Conflict research as a coherent field does depend on the validation of the hypothesis that conflict is not purely anarchic, chaotic and unpredictable, and that there are regularities and dynamics in terms both of causation and resolution
which are observable and generalisable: this study supports the hypothesis. In chapter 3.4, ‘Crafting Peace’ written with Finn Tschudi, the underlying methodology of the whole approach (dialogue for conflict transformation) is usefully elaborated. It may be suggested that too much is claimed about the effectiveness of the methodology and its impact on specific cases, and there is certainly a case for a more critical appraisal of the approach, yet, in the face of the impacts of the conflict formations discussed here, the creative and stimulating thinking evident in this book is to be congratulated.

TOM WOODHOUSE

*Tom Woodhouse is Professor of Conflict Resolution in the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford*


Any book with a title that combines weighty keywords such as ‘Marxism’ and ‘social science’ deserves immediate recognition for the sheer audacity of its ambitions. However one addresses the interaction between these two categories, there will always be dissatisfied punters on either side of the equation: many Marxists are likely to disagree with both the interpretations of historical materialism contained in this book and with the selection of ‘critical engagements’ and ‘substantive issues’ made by the editors; other social scientists may take issue with the accounts of their specialist area presented in the volume, or indeed to the defence it mounts of Marxism as a thriving tradition of contemporary social theory. Whatever the likely criticisms, the consistently high quality of writing and argumentation displayed in the book’s sixteen essays will at the very least guarantee an exacting standard of critical debate. The one unpardonable feature of the volume is that it includes only one female contributor: Stevi Jackson writing on ‘Marxism and Feminism’.

In the introductory essay, Andrew Gamble sets the terrain of engagement between Marxism and social science in bold, controversial but impeccably materialist fashion: ‘Nothing as cataclysmic…has occurred before in the history of Marxism as the collapse of communism’ (p. 1). Only sectarian fantasists (some of whose ideas are judiciously explored in a penultimate chapter by Neil Robinson on ‘Marxism, Communism and Post-Communism’) would deny the association—
however troubled—of Marxism with the experience of historical communism, and the consequent need for Marxists to re-evaluate the place of historical materialism after the end of the Cold War. According to Gamble, this new world-historical conjuncture immediately opens two potential avenues for the future of Marxism: this tradition may withdraw into a scholastic habit of exegetical, ‘Marxological’ analysis or alternatively forswear its claim to a unique method and politics, surrendering itself to ‘post-modern’ eclecticism and its various derivations. For Gamble, the more fruitful prospect involves a ‘return to that original critique of political economy’, because although ‘the political horizon may have changed markedly since Marx was writing Capital, but the social and economic system which he described...is still recognisably the same system in its core features today’ (p. 7).

It is this tension between the continuing reality (indeed triumphant reassertion) of capitalist exploitation, alienation and oppression across the world on the one hand, and the historical collapse of the alternatives informed by Marxism on the other, which underpins much of the discussion in this volume. Thus, what the contributing authors contend—with different degrees of emphasis—is not so much that Marxism was right all along, but rather that so long as capitalism remains the dominant system of social relations, the insights of Marxism continue to compete with other traditions of modern social theory in the explanation and transformation of the contemporary world.

A case for such an argument is made in an opening section of ‘critical engagements’, which considers the relation between, and relative merits of Marxism and feminism, regulation theory, postmodernity, New Right theory and social science. All five essays in this section offer balanced, clear and succinct accounts of the debates within and among Marxism and its theoretical competitors in these areas. Some readers will plainly be disappointed at the selection: historical sociology, rational choice theory (including so-called ‘Analytical Marxism’), social constructivism and post-colonial theory are all absent from the discussion. The omission of latter in particular betrays the volume’s insensitivity toward the important contributions to Marxism and social science from outside Europe and North America. These by no means inconsiderable silences aside, the first part of the book nonetheless serves both as a lucid survey of the two-way traffic of ideas between Marxism and alternative theories, and how the former continues to offer a unique perspective into these fields of study.

The second part of the book (which takes up two-thirds of its content) offers a number of engaging, informed and comprehensive assessments of the interaction between Marxism and various ‘substantive issues’ ranging from ‘social class’ to ‘culture’, ‘ecology’ and ‘democracy’. Once again, the inclusion of ‘history’, ‘war’, ‘economics’ or ‘social movements’ may have completed the list. The important thing is that the existing contributions amply fulfil the objective of providing an accessible, critical introduction to each of the themes; an achievement which will be especially welcome by students and teachers interested in these areas. Colin Hay’s text on ‘Marxism and the State’, Trevor Purvis’s essay on ‘Marxism and
Nationalism’ and Simon Bromley’s contribution on ‘Marxism and Globalisation’ will be of particular value to those concerned with IR, as they demonstrate how, despite its marginalisation within IR theory, the language of Marxism is capable of addressing some of the central concerns of our discipline in an open, sophisticated and interdisciplinary fashion. Thus, for example, the seemingly contradictory relationship between state sovereignty and the processes of globalisation which has exercised many social scientists both within and outside the field, can be fruitfully addressed with reference to the peculiar separation that obtains under capitalism between the public, political authority of the state and a private market mechanisms which govern the production, appropriation and consumption of wealth. As Bromley indicates, ‘precisely because of this redefinition of the forms of economic and political power, the birth of the national market was coincident with the potential internationalisation of capital’ (p. 287). It is these kinds of insights, which will hopefully encourage both defenders and detractors of Marxism to use this text as a touchstone in the debate over the continuing relevance of this tradition in social science after the collapse of historical communism.

ALEJANDRO COLÁS

Alejandro Colás teaches International Relations in the School of African and Asian Studies at the University of Sussex


How can and should progressive politics be pursued following the rise of neoliberalism and the demise of old-style socialism? Arguably this is the policy question for the twenty-first century. Fortunately a leading social theorist, concurrently the director of a leading institution of social research, has made this challenge his top priority. Following The Third Way (1998) and The Third Way and Its Critics (2000), Anthony Giddens has compiled this hefty reader with twenty-eight selections that in a variety of ways support the prescription of updated social democracy as the best response to the main societal changes of our time.

The Global Third Way Debate is organised into five sections. The first, an editor’s introduction, provides Giddens’s compact account of definitional debates concerning ‘the third way’, the social transformations that compel us to rethink progressive politics, and eleven core points of reform that characterise third way
agendas. Next, a section on ‘One or More Third Ways?’ assembles commentaries concerning general policy orientations from Australia, Britain, Germany, New Zealand and the US. Thereafter the longest section of the book examines third way social policies, addressing subjects such as ageing, criminal justice, employment, equality, the family, and social protection. A more diffuse section follows under the heading of ‘Government, Democracy and Economic Power’, including discussions of trust, civil society, stakeholder governance, social capital, and labour law. Finally, six selections on ‘A Global Third Way’ relate renovated social democracy to the world context, with issues regarding development, the environment, and the democratic regulation of global capital.

In a word, this book covers a lot. The third way encompasses a very broad agenda, and countless authors have handled the subject. The editor faced no easy task in deciding what and who to include, even with 400 pages at his disposal. The outcome is excellent in terms of presenting key extracts from key statements of third way politics. Giddens has mined the richest corners of the fullest lodes. No collection is better illustrative of third way arguments. The selections articulate clear cases for turning to a third way and specify in considerable detail what its policy content should be.

Nonetheless, the volume is rather one-sided. Giddens has deliberately excluded critiques of third way politics (p. 21). As a consequence, the book is rather an orchestral manifesto with everyone in tune. Sympathetic readers—including this reviewer—will find much helpful elaboration and defence of third way positions, and the editor can argue that his previous volume dealt extensively with criticisms. However, the term ‘debate’ is perhaps misplaced on this cover.

The book may also not be as ‘global’ as its title suggests. Giddens has provided great inspiration to academic studies of globalisation, and he once again highlights this development as one of three key principal transformations that have propelled the turn to third way politics (p. 3). Moreover, ‘globalisation’ ranks as the third longest heading in the index for the entire book.

Yet the collection as a whole tends to retain a state-centric conception of governance. For example, there is no explicit discussion of global social policy (as distinct from comparisons of national measures); nor does the volume incorporate recent discussions of so-called ‘global public goods’. Suprastate institutions (both regional and transworld in scope) receive only passing attention in most of the book, and the growth of substate micro-regionalism is overlooked altogether, as is the recent privatisation of various regulatory processes. To be sure, states remain crucial in contemporary policymaking, but third way strategies arguably need to engage a context of multilayered and diffuse governance more than this book generally suggests.

Another imbalance in the volume is its Westo-centric character. Giddens is keenly aware of this problem, emphasising that the third way must be more than an Anglo-American project (p. 2) and urging that ‘third way politics must have global reach’ (p. 17). Yet this important aim would not seem to be advanced by the absence from this anthology of voices from Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern
Europe, and (with the exception of one contributor from Brazil) Latin America. Indeed, 25 of the 28 selections have come from Western Europe and the US, and the top two index entries (ahead of ‘globalisation’) are the ‘USA’ and ‘Britain’.

A key challenge for third way politics is to recast its development as a process of inclusive transworld dialogue. The ‘new’ approach should not become another unidirectional global export of the North. As such, the third way would lack democratic credibility and readily fall prey to charges of imperialism. In the current transition to more global politics, a major progressive move would be to break long-standing patterns of constructing ideological frameworks in the West and then promoting their applicability elsewhere.

So, as Giddens himself stresses, the third way is not a finished philosophy (p. 23). The Global Third Way Debate is a premier state-of-the-art volume, an indispensable reference for students and citizens. Looking ahead, updated conceptions of governance and new modes of intercultural negotiation could help to take the project further forward.

JAN AART SCHOLTE

Jan Aart Scholte is Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick


This book’s core purpose is to assess whether the widespread presence in government of parties of the Left at the turn of the century can make any real difference to economic policy. The country and comparative chapters that provide the meat of the book are sandwiched between an introductory overview by Andrew Glyn and a more theoretical analysis by Adam Przeworski. Both are convinced that the constraints on national political and economic choices have been grossly exaggerated, and that social democracy remains as relevant to the new century as it was to the twentieth.

This view, which is carefully advanced and explained, suggests that the biggest problem facing social democratic parties is their lack of courage in proposing and actively pursuing alternatives to neoliberalism. Przeworski not only argues that globalisation ‘appears to be mostly a smokescreen’ (p. 331) but also that the
constraints and dilemmas often seen as strangling social democracy are more correctly considered excuses for political passivity and acquiescence. This conclusion clearly contrasts with the emphasis of the ‘globalist’ strain in IPE on the decline of the nation-state and the rise of neo-liberal hegemony. Glyn regrets in his introduction that it also seems to conflict with the opinion of the majority of his contributors; that governments are succumbing to remorseless external pressure to accept orthodox (neoliberal) policies.

Glyn is almost certainly too pessimistic on this count. For only Lordon gives real comfort to the ‘globalists’ in his presentation of the French U-turn of 1982-3 as a submission ‘to the challenges of the world economy and to its neo-liberal requirements’ (p. 118) and of EMU as neoliberal conspiracy. But while Glyn and Przeworski are clearly right to play down the role of ‘globalisation’ and play up the possibility of politics, they perhaps give too little attention to the evidence in this book that national context matters greatly. The clear message that comes from a close reading is that the fate of social democratic parties and policies depends much on the depth of the social democratic tradition and economic vulnerability of any given country.

While the Swedish and Austrian social democrats (discussed, respectively, by Vartiainen and Guger) have successfully adjusted their strong social democratic political systems and economies, constructed over decades, to new challenges, their Greek and Spanish counterparts have had to rely on relatively weak political movements and contend with troubled transitions to democracy. The outcomes, in terms of equality and solidarity, have been predictably poor. Meanwhile, the Labour Parties of Australia and New Zealand (discussed as part of a broader comparison by Huber and Stephens) have had to cope with the demise of their particular ‘production regime’ based on rents transferred from the primary sector to protected manufacturing. This made dealing with shifts in the international economy after the mid-1970s particularly problematic. But in all these cases, domestic constraints outweigh any ‘global’ imperative in defining the social democratic ‘opportunity structure’. Somewhat surprisingly in this context, Glyn and Wood make little of the inheritance of a ‘Thatcherised’ economy in shaping New Labour’s ‘Third Way’; and betray some naivety in suggesting a return to corporatist wage bargaining in an industrial relations system even more decentralised now than in the 1970s.

But as Przeworski argues, agency does count and the history of social democracy, in its many varieties, is littered with strategic errors and political mistakes, as well as often active complicity in the pursuit of neoliberal policies. There is nothing inevitable, or structurally determined about these choices. The Scandinavians have done well. The Swedish social democrats pushed certain projects—radical wage policy and wage earner funds—much too far in the 1970s, and in prioritising those options they failed. That mistakes notwithstanding, they have successfully moulded the preferences of the electorate and left a lasting mark on society. According to Iverson they still face a trilemma (one that Przeworski, however, dismisses) in which their traditional goals of earnings equality and full
employment hit up against a new concern with budgetary restraint. But for Huber and Stephens, the problem is transient, not structural: welfare retrenchment in the 1980s was generated by rising deficits linked to high rates of unemployment—and both of these problems are now in the past. The social democratic welfare states remain highly distributive and solidaristic; and with recent reforms they are also more sustainable than hitherto.

By contrast, the southern European’s and others performed—or rather chose—badly. Tsakalatos presents the failure of PASOK in Greece as having nothing to do with external pressures but everything to do with domestic conditions and strategic errors. Recio and Roca show how weakly committed were Spanish Socialist leaders to the values of solidarity and how their welfare and labour market choices—unsurprisingly—created new inequalities. In a fascinating study, Kowalk presents Polish political elites (including the leaders of Solidarity) as actively seeking to create one of the world’s most *laissez-faire* economies. This has contributed to one of the highest rates of unemployment, poverty and income inequality in Central Europe. Quiggen fiercely rebukes the Australian and New Zealand Labour leaders for not just imitating but extolling the virtues of their right-wing opponents’ liberal market policies; ultimately at the deserved expense of their own credibility and electoral standing. Likewise, the Blair government has actively pursued a ‘post-Thatcherite’ privatisation of British public services, while also rejecting in principle any redistribution of income. Whether this will deliver continued political success remains to be seen; but it is almost certain that a diminished role for the state will do nothing to tackle the scourge of British poverty and inequality.

Przeworski characterises such choices in terms of a shift to resignation—an undesirable and, for him at least, far from inevitable third stage in social democracy’s century-long transition from reformism to remedialism. As he correctly argues, such choices can be refuted and others engaged upon: ‘the quality of ideas, and the courage to pursue them, matter’ (p. 333). But the ‘possibility of politics’ should not be exaggerated. For if social democracy varies as a movement, not just historically, but from one country to another, when it comes to the possibility of politics—and of policy—it also faces different sets of opportunity and constraint. This book shows how much easier it is to pursue solidarity and equality in Stockholm than in Athens, London or Madrid—because of the past, because political systems differ and because (following Huber and Stephens) of the links between welfare states and ‘production regimes’. The latter, in turn, respond quite differently to changes in the international system. All of this makes the room for political manoeuvre—and especially the option of improving social solidarity—contingent on particular political economies. Choice is not thereby removed; but the scope for social democratic progress is clearly bounded, albeit differentially, from one ‘regime’ to another.

Despite the diversity of opinion within it, the clear lesson of this book is that, despite much contemporary pessimism to the contrary, social democratic agency remains possible in capitalist societies. Historically it has always been
‘constrained’ and has always embodied a compromise. The extent to which it is constrained today has more to do with domestic political and economic factors than with globalisation; at least if understood as some kind of international neoliberal *zeitgeist*. If IPE, with its focus on the ‘global’ and neglect of the ‘national’ has failed to understand this, then as this book shows, comparative political economists have been much more successful in confronting the issue head on. In particular, this book should be required reading for those social scientists and economists who predict global convergence on ‘efficient’, market-conforming institutions and policies.

**MARTIN RHODES**

*Martin Rhodes is Professor of European Public Policy at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy*

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Forecasting financial crises is a difficult task for academics, financial market participants and policymakers; not so it seems, for authors Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart. Recent events, such as the Asian financial crisis and the 1999 devaluation of the Brazilian Real, have highlighted the importance of improving upon an early warning system for assessing financial vulnerability in emerging markets.

How can one anticipate such crises? The answer lies in analysing the antecedents of financial crises by means of an early warning system, as proposed by the authors. This early warning system also makes it possible to identify countries that are vulnerable to potential crises, although they are not in crisis at the moment. Both diachronic and synchronic in nature, this study identifies the most useful and valid indicators of financial crises, and a systemic pattern of amalgamated abnormalities and irregularities that point toward possible currency and/or banking crises.

This brings us to one of the key issues addressed in the book, which is ‘whether there are other early warning indicators that would do a better job and if so, what they might be’ (p. 8). No less than twenty-five indicators are operationalised by the
authors. Of course, one can ask why it does not suffice to merely use credit ratings such as those by the Institutional Investor index and Moody’s Investor services. Such credit rating agencies were not inclined to downgrade those countries that suffered eventual crises. These ratings should rather be viewed as a gauge of market climate in various countries at the present time.

The authors rightly challenge the notion that credit ratings should be utilised as an indicator of financial crises. Judgements by bankers are also occasionally to blame, and data used by credit rating agencies is often aged. Credit ratings are a good indicator of sovereign default, but not of forecasting currency and banking crises. Many developing economies have had default episodes that preceded banking and/or currency crises, and the authors explain that markets react to changes in credit ratings, but that ratings react, in turn, to market sentiment. This leaves one with a chicken-and-egg situation, and lesser authors scrambling for an explanation.

The authors use indicators sourced from monthly data in their test cases, as opposed to other studies that use bi-annual or even quarterly data. Of course, various types of indicators can only be measured in such intervals, but studies or assessments that use outdated statistics are neither trustworthy nor credible.

In addition to macro indicators, micro indicators can greatly contribute to the suggested early warning system. Despite the thirty-two test results of a broad range of indicators, only macro indicators were tested. Granted, this is the way the early warning system is designed, but micro indicators of financial risk should be incorporated to some extent. Still, the indicators are ranked in their own right based on their ‘predictive power’ (p. 34) and weighted as such, contributing to indicator reliability and applicability. These warning signals go off twenty-four months in advance. The authors propose that the Asian crisis could have been anticipated roughly two years before the market crashed, had their early warning system been in place.

Due to the exclusive use of macroeconomic indicators and the neglect of the spillover effect, all the Southeast Asian countries showed a severe state of distress with Indonesia being the only exception. Microeconomic or political risk indicators should be used in cases where macroeconomic indicators cannot pick up warning signals. Even the authors themselves state ‘it appears that, to improve upon the ability to predict banking crises, we may need to look beyond macroeconomic indicators…’ (p. 37, own italics). The indicators used in the study are indeed comprehensive, but by no means exhaustive.

The sample of twenty-five countries does not appear very large; but the data generated by researching and examining these countries does amount to quite a justifiable foundation on which the authors base their empirical evidence. What is also striking about the book, is that the guidelines and remedies proposed here are not patronising in any way.

With regards to the policy implications of this study, the authors emphasise the need to be careful not to overinterpret their results, as alternative explanations of crises often yield observationally equivalent implications. The limitations of the
study are recognised by the authors, despite their obvious contribution to assessing financial vulnerability by improving upon early warning systems for emerging markets. This study is most certainly justified and necessary. In the authors’ own words: ‘The more costly it is to clean up after a financial crisis, the greater the returns to designing a well-functioning early warning system’ (p. 3). The empirical evidence suggested by the authors should facilitate the moulding of pre-emptive policy actions that would prevent such crises from taking place.

In summary, this is an exceptional book on assessing looming crises and financial vulnerability in emerging markets by improving on an early warning system. Similar publications on the subject fail to achieve the validity and depth of the analyses presented here. This book is valuable to readers with an interest in risk forecasting and crisis management, and a recommended source of information for those finding their feet in market environments.

CHARLOTTE BRINK

Charlotte Brink teaches Political Risk Analysis and Comparative Politics at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa


Without concealing the American jubilation over its unipolar moment with a booming economy, President Clinton announced ‘a new dawn for America’ in Congress at the beginning of 1999. But the same year closed with an embarrassing turbulence at the WTO conference in Seattle, which dealt a serious blow to the optimism of the American government and international business community. Guyatt’s latest book is one of the first post-Seattle publications that offer a comprehensive evaluation of the US relationship with the rest of the world in the recent past and offer penetrating insights into the problems of the new century haunted by the fin-de-siècle episode.

In his analysis of American foreign conducts after the Cold War, Guyatt makes the Clinton administration the major target of his biting criticism. He discloses how the refurbished Wilsonianism of the first Democratic government after the Cold War ended up in the dogged pursuit of American self-interest in disregard of the suffering of people in other nations. US-led neoliberal economic reform has encouraged a widening gap between rich and poor in many societies from African countries to Russia. The Clinton team quickly lost its initial eagerness to work in tandem with the United Nations, as exemplified by the scandalous inaction in the
face of the genocide in Rwanda. American sporadic resort to massive military force in conflict-stricken areas including Kosovo has often failed to address the source of the problems and furthered the pain of local people.

US policymakers are the main villains in the author’s story. They readily shy their eyes away from the disastrous consequences of American foreign policy under the delusive Wilsonian assumption that the United States is doing the rest of the world a big favour. They are vulnerable to pressures from corporate interests especially in issue areas like military spending or economic policy toward developing nations. Guyatt’s scathing indictment is also directed against foreign policy pundits outside the government. Current academic debates over the American role in the world stay within a narrow spectrum of arguments, falling far short of any fundamental appraisal of the rationale and effects of American missions abroad. Congress and the media are both growingly involved in a business-friendly culture and have lost much of their critical edge toward government decisions.

Another American Century? is a welcome corrective to the intoxicating optimism that has characterised the days of American predominance. Guyatt succeeds in shedding light on the problematic side of US foreign policy with his crisp narrative, covering an entire range of foreign policy topics in the past decade. At the same time this is only the latest example of critiques of American imperialistic arrogance. The revisionist view of US foreign relations has a long tradition, almost as old as US practices of open door expansionism. The frame of analysis the author employs is, if updated, noticeably reminiscent of this literature, and it is in this regard that his argument shows weaknesses inherited from its predecessors.

First, for all his efforts to deliver nuanced factual accounts without falling into simplistic generalisations, Guyatt’s recurrent reference to the cosy relationship among political, business, and academic circles as a major problem is evident to the readers’ eyes. The foreign policy elites are, in his view, the privileged few from the similar background, who ‘simply talk amongst themselves about the direction of US foreign policy’ (p. 198). The assumption of politico-business congruence is typically an analytical soft spot of a revisionist historian. Elites do not have to conspire together to ignore the fate of citizens of less wealthy countries, and policies are in most cases an outcome of intricate interactions among parties with different interests.

The Gulf War is a relevant case in point. The author’s explanation for this event is not conventional: he presumes that the US failure to topple Saddam Hussein from power was actually a result intended by the Bush administration. To suggest with little hard evidence that Washington had a grand design to bolster Saddam is to overrate the capacity of the American government to act as a consistent practitioner of realpolitik with a long-term understanding of its self-interest.

Furthermore, there is another, more conceptual, problem. If the only surviving superpower is responsible for the mess around the world, what has to be done? Though Guyatt is uncertain about the way out of the bleak prospect, he hints that
his hope lies with the American public. In this picture the possible transformation of world order without US initiatives is curiously absent. In the end his primary concern is how to direct ‘US power towards social and economic change around the globe, rather than the narrow pursuit of American interests’ (p. 245), in short, how to materialise American lofty ideals. To make a case for an America as a benevolent world reformer while rejecting the danger of American missionary thinking is a theoretically difficult task, which probably requires another book-length treatment.

Despite these limitations, this is a provocative book that provides an illuminating point of departure for future discussions about how to make the world more just and equitable and what responsibilities the United States should assume in such efforts.

HIKARU TAJIMA

Hikaru Tajima is a Research Student in the Graduate School of Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo, Japan


In this new collection of essays and lectures, Habermas reviews the work of a number of thinkers of the twentieth century. Even though the book shows the author’s great ability to critically assess the work of other thinkers and demonstrate how their findings and ideas are of contemporary importance, this also is the book’s greatest shortcoming. Written between 1990-1995, the essays and lectures presented do not do full justice to its title. This is a pity, for an in-depth analysis of the social power of symbols would be useful for students of international relations, historical sociology, and political science. The intention of the book is less ambitious. As the author asserts in the preface, the main objective is to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of the works of Ernst Cassirer and Karl Jaspers (p. vi). Accordingly, Habermas realises the importance of this theme and challenges students interested in this subject to review the publications of these theorists.

The volume also includes a number of essays on the works of: Gershom Scholem; Johann Baptist Metz; Karl-Otto Apel; Michael Theunissen; Georg Henrik von Wright; and the film-maker, Alexander Kluge. It is important to
mention that Habermas’ reviews of these theoretical projects are not supposed to provide an introduction to how symbols can serve as instrument of human emancipation. He includes them to show the similarities between their work and his own politico-philosophical project, which argues that unhindered forms of communication can establish procedures whereby peoples of different cultural backgrounds can come together to address issues of mutual concern, without having to sacrifice who they are as individuals.

Even though each essay is thought provoking in its own right, the essays on Cassirer’s and Jaspers’s philosophical projects are probably the most interesting. Specifically, the essay on Cassirer (pp. 1-29) explains how symbols are important instruments of socialisation. In this way, symbols do not only give meaning to human existence, but they also serve to shape individuals’ views of the world. This last point captures the significance of Cassirer’s research, which is the dialectical nature of the process of symbolisation. Habermas argues that the negative aspect of this process was captured in Cassirer’s last book, *The Myth of the State*, which explains how the Nazis used technology and symbolisation to create a series of political myths that mobilised the German nation behind their socio-political and economic projects (p. 25). Thus, the importance of Cassirer’s work is that it reveals that the process of symbolisation can thwart individuals from participating in communication processes, where they can meet to re-establish the legitimacy of existing symbols or re-negotiate existing definitions of the social world.

Is it possible to break with established myths and enable communication across seemingly irreconcilable cultures to take place? Cassirer’s research programme offers no clear answer. For this reason, Habermas turns to Jaspers’s work on ‘the conflict of beliefs’ for answers to this question (pp. 30-45). An aspect of Jaspers’s existentialist philosophy attempted to explain how individuals from ‘all the various religious traditions could encounter each other in a meaningful way across the entire world, ready to re-appropriate, purify and transform their own historical traditions, but not to abandon them’ (cited on p. 30). Throughout this essay, Habermas evaluates Jaspers’s project, showing its contemporary significance. But this assessment is a critical one, showing the weaknesses of his work, which must be resolved if a meaningful exchange between individuals of different cultures is to take place. For instance, Habermas argues that ‘as a philosopher of existence, Jaspers was so obsessed with ethical self-understanding with “communication in the domain of unconditional truths” that he failed to exploit the normative resources of communicative reason in the domains of morality, law, and politics’ (p. 44). While Habermas’s critique raises important questions, it is also necessary to keep in mind that this concern with political and legal issues is the focus of Habermas’s current politico-philosophical project. In some ways, this criticism implicitly asserts that his work might provide what is missing in Jaspers’s philosophical undertaking.

This book is a must read for students interested in the power of symbols and how these can serve as mechanisms of suppression and emancipation. This is also a good book for those interested in the development of Habermas’ ideas, as many of
the essays and lectures illustrate how he builds and validates his arguments. As stated above, the only shortcoming is that the book’s contents do not do full justice to its title.

CARLOS L. YORDÁN

Carlos L. Yordán is Visiting Instructor in the Government Department at Hamilton College, Clinton, USA


The release of collections of British official documents is nothing new; witness the additions to the Documents on British Policy Overseas series in recent years. What makes this book rather unique is its origin as a single document, as opposed to an edited collection.

This book is, in fact, the final report prepared for the Heath government in 1972 charting the successful conclusion to Britain’s tortuous odyssey towards European Economic Community (EEC) membership (stretching back to 1961 and Harold Macmillan’s Grand Design). Indeed, this document would, ordinarily, enter the public domain via the 30-year release policy of the Public Record Office at Kew in 2003. So why publish it? Well, this at least brings the perspective of policy makers of the crucial years in Britain’s approach to EEC membership to a wider audience. That is the audience that would never consider the public records a relevant source for their studies; including many political scientists and contemporary EU specialists for instance. The on-going debate within the United Kingdom over matters such as the single currency are obvious pointers as to why this particular document was selected. The book itself will be entirely familiar to any student acquainted with the writing style of senior Foreign and Commonwealth Office figures. Even amongst such distinguished figures, Sir Con O’Neill, the head of the British team negotiating entry into the EEC, had an impressive pedigree (pp. xix-xxii). This paints a useful picture of the man and we learn, for instance, that, stationed in Berlin before the war, O’Neill was alone in the diplomatic service in resigning in disgust over Munich (p. xix).
O’Neill’s report is set in context wonderfully by the introduction of the editor (and former British Permanent Representative to the EEC), Sir David Hannay, himself a distinguished ex-colleague of O’Neill (pages ix-xv). The book itself is a methodical, detailed, candid and entirely comprehensive report of the negotiations between Britain and ‘the Six’ prior to the agreement for British accession in January 1972. The report was originally presented by O’Neill to the then Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, in July 1972 and is as weighty as one might reasonably expect of anything detailing such a fundamental step. The difficulties in this process are presented frankly—as one might expect in a confidential report—and all the technical nuances so beloved of Eurosceptics ever since are abundant (see, for instance, the talks over sugar beet on pages 103-7). In absorbing such a large body of information the reader is, however, aided by an excellent glossary and chronology, as well as the kind of useful annexes associated with such Foreign Office documentation.

The book (as with the original report; of which the format is retained) is divided into four sections. These sections are further sub-divided, and make using the book, despite its comprehensive nature, very useful as a research tool. This, of course, is understandable given it was initially prepared for busy politicians. Part four of the book is fascinating, especially the final section (‘Did We Get a Good Bargain?’ pp. 355-60) when O’Neill ends on a typically pragmatic note: ‘if we fail to make a success of our new position as a member of the enlarged Community, then we would probably fail even more disastrously were we condemned to remain outside it’ (p. 360). Such a comment is notable for it synthesises the regret historically expressed by British pro-European policy makers (personified by Sir Roy Denman in his book on Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century, Missed Chances).

The level of analysis is high and it is to be recommended to all students of European integration and British foreign policy since 1945. With typical modesty, O’Neill presented the report to the Foreign Secretary with the words ‘my Report is too narrowly based on my experience and my own view of the course of events to deserve the name of history’ (p. 3). In the foreword, Hannay recalls feeling regret that, having read the report himself in 1972, relatively few people would get to read it and that, as O’Neill himself stated, ‘the only people able to read it will lack the time to do so’ (p. ix). If O’Neill did not write history, he made a significant contribution to it in this report. It could only benefit our understanding of Britain’s place in Europe if a significant number of scholars and policy makers were to make the time to read this book now.

GERRY HUGHES

Gerry Hughes is Research Assistant in the Department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth
**Millennium**

**Birthe Hansen, *Unipolarity and the Middle East* (Richmond: Curzon, 2000, 245 pp., £15.39 pbk.).**

Birthe Hansen’s work demonstrates how the Middle East was transformed in the years between 1989 and 1998 by using a new neorealist model of unipolarity. Despite Randall Schweller’s, William Wohlforth’s and Charles Kupchan’s useful contributions to the concept of unipolarity, a neorealist model has not yet been constructed in IR literature. In this regard, Hansen’s attempt is noteworthy and welcome.

The first chapters of the book focus on general concepts of neorealist theory and the author’s new model; they also include a brief history of the Middle East after the Second World War. According to the author, neorealism does not necessarily exclude a unipolar variation of the international system; rather, it needs to be incorporated within unipolar systems to become a general and comprehensive theory. Hansen rejects Kenneth Waltz’s idea that unipolarity is necessarily unstable and is only a transition period that does not deserve attention (p. 50).

The author claims that the post-Cold War era is clearly a unipolar one, which has lasted over a decade. He argues that ‘a period of minimum ten years in international politics should not be left unattended’ and for sure ‘the first ten years in question were clearly not ten quiet years’ (p. 50). In his analysis, Hansen contends that the other states have a ‘single option’, i.e. ‘to obtain effective security guarantees or not to be worse off than their symmetrical adversaries’ which is ‘to flock around the unipole’ (p. 213, 81). Unlike bipolarity in which there is a symmetrical balance of great powers, in unipolarity balancing occurs ‘among all powers and it functions as issue-related balancing of the unipole’ (p. 80). Consequently, it is ‘the unipole’s own balancing of its resources’ (p. 80). Since the superpower tries to avoid the risk of exhaustion because of its managerial tasks in the system, it would choose ‘to share these burdens with others, primarily regional partners’ (p. 81). Therefore, regional involvement will be high and this can include cooperation as well as conflict, as we see in the Middle East after the Cold War. The author concludes that ‘unipolarity is a robust, but not necessarily durable variation of polarity’ (p. 80).

However, several neorealist questions arise: How can a unipolar system be robust? How can flocking (unipolarisation) behaviour be the most attractive option in an anarchical type of system? According to Waltz, two great powers are the minimum requirement for the balance of power under anarchy. Hansen responds to these challenges by arguing that ‘the other states’ balancing of a great power will differ from great power balancing’, and, therefore, claiming that ‘the external commitment is balanced and a balancing of different capabilities by different other states may take place’ (p. 54-55). Also, he contends that unipolar structures do not necessarily resemble a hierarchical order and one superpower can enjoy extreme capabilities under anarchy. This is why neorealism should be supplemented by additional models of unipolarity. Although Hansen addresses these theoretical problems, his arguments may not be entirely satisfactory.
In chapter five, Hansen examines the US World Order and specifically its policy towards the Middle East. He argues that the new policy of the US focuses on ‘enhancement of regional security in order to facilitate the pursuit of the US interests’ (p. 88). To reach this goal, the US needs to maintain some of its alignments and cancel others. Therefore, this new regional approach aims to create stable pro-US spheres to deter the free riding of expansionist powers. This policy also enables a decentralised world order in which the US avoids direct interventions in every case in order to prevent US exhaustion. To see the new agenda of the US, he argues that it is beneficial to look at US strategy towards Middle East, which is ‘interpreted to be essentially about the creation of regional cores’ (p. 92).

The topics covered in the book include the unification of Yemen, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the formation of the international coalition against Iraq, the end of the Lebanese civil war, Operation Desert Storm, the Western Saharan cease-fire, the Gaza-Jericho accords, the Arab-Israeli peace process and general strategies of regional powers after the Cold War. The author asserts that these post-Cold War events met the expectations of effects caused by the termination of bipolarity. He claims that his analysis of the unipolar model is successful in explaining these patterns. For example, the Economic Cooperation Council’s revitalisation, the formation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone and the Caspian Sea Organisation and also increased cooperation among the members of the Union of Arab Maghreb indicate that ‘geographically centered groups’ and ‘symmetrical political and economical cooperation’ are emerging and this ‘regrouping also reflects flocking in security matters’ (p. 202).

For instance, Hansen predicts that the unipole’s interests will clash with some states and, in time, their number would increase and threaten unipolarity. However, in a system where flocking behaviour is dominant and there is no great power balancing, how will this tendency lead to substantial threats that terminate unipolarity? Hansen fails to explain clearly why the unipolar period is not a period of transition. However, his book deserves to be studied carefully. It is the first attempt to develop a neorealist unipolar model of international politics and a worthy contribution to recent theoretical debates.

MUSTAFA GURBUZ

Mustafa Gurbuz is a Research Student in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

Through the biographical method, this book traces the personal histories of numerous well known political activists of the Chilean left. Hite is concerned with political identity, its sources and formation. She argues that the primary influences on political identity come into play long before any real political consciousness is developed; amongst family, friends, neighbourhood, church or, later, university groups. Yet these individuals, when asked, they repeatedly point to the 1973 coup as the single most influential event vis-à-vis their political development.

The double traumas of the Allende period and the ensuing dictatorship have been studied countless times; yet students of Chilean politics continue to learn new things about their full impact in a number of arenas. Mostly the approach has been institutional, as has been the case in late twentieth century political science. This book marks a sort of return to traditional Marxist examinations of class, socialisation and political actors.

The true focus of this study, then, is on the effect of the trauma on these actors—specifically on the left—and much attention is given to the theme of exile, examining the impact of exile on identity. Hite claims that despite the tremendously testing conditions that the individuals in her sample have undergone, core political values have changed little. Those who were negotiators by nature, willing to switch parties or create new ones, were best able to function in the new institutional set-up. Those who remained fiercely loyal (or static, depending on one’s view) to their ideologies found post-authoritarian politics difficult to navigate.

This is uncovered via the creation of a typology of cognitive orientations: political party loyalist, personal loyalist, political thinker and political entrepreneur. The book is organised into a chapter on each of these themes. Some of the extensively quoted interviews contain real gems, such as Patricio Rivas’s impassioned apologia of ‘why am I still a leftist?’ (p. 97). Readers wishing to understand contemporary Chilean politics, however, will find the last two categories most relevant, as they are the ‘winners’, the ones who went on to assert influence on the New Left. These are the individuals who in different ways represent the current left-wing political elite.

Hite’s is a useful, if not definitive typology. One could also devise a comparative analysis of those who went into exile, and those who stayed behind for any substantial period of time, or, amongst the exiles, between those who sought refuge in the East and those who experienced western working social democracies. Hite recognises this fact when discussing the most important exile centres of Rome, East Berlin and Mexico City, each with their particular exile communities and institutions, which served to further political identities and education. ‘There isn’t a doubt that those Chileans who have assumed more liberal visions are those who were in European countries’, she quotes one of her interviewees saying (p. 133).
Similar comments are heard from other sources, including from those not necessarily classified as ‘thinkers’.

At least three things are made clear in the narrative. First, that the Chilean socialist experience is, in its way, a struggle of modernity. The party and personal loyalist categories tend to rely more on tradition, family links, education; social linkages which have been eroded all over the world, to be replaced by consumerism, the continual search for the new. This applies as much to material goods as it does to ideas and ideologies. When Isabel Allende laments the loss of community, she describes something certainly not exclusive to her individual experience.

Second, one is struck how cannily the right has taken a page from their opponents’ book. The most successful party of the right, the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI), has generated its success, which almost won it the presidency in the 1999/2000 elections, on the same sense of community organisation, party loyalty, and personal hero worship (to its assassinated founder Jaime Guzmán) that has been identified in this book. Yet these party activists would do well to read this book, to discover that while such a political strategy may work for a time, those who tend to be most successful (i.e., come to power) are those who generate ideas, are less ideological, and who think independently.

Which brings me to the third point: transitions to democracy are often dominated by elites. In highlighting the willingness of some and not others to bend, negotiate, rationalise and develop intellectually, Hite goes some way towards explaining why this is the case. For better or worse, not everyone—and few among the grassroots—will be as prepared to do these things, particularly at the early stages when the outcome is far from secure. The impact of these four ideal types on regime type, or transition type, is a question waiting to be answered.

ROBERT FUNK

Robert Funk is a Research Student in the Government Department at the London School of Economics and Political Science


At the intersection of the old Cold War world and a possibly emerging new global order, the book World Disorders is meant ‘to make sense of an international
system in which forces contained or repressed during the Cold War are asserting (or, like nationalism, reasserting) themselves’ (p. viii). Published as a collection of essays, it offers various insights in a whole host of different aspects of international relations and world politics. Stanley Hoffmann’s profound knowledge and longstanding experience let him go through the range of substantive issues he deems to be of importance to the construction of a sensible and desirable world order.

The introduction presents a promising and suggestive framework. The author not only provides a brief sketch of the developments since 1914, the major characteristics of the present international system, and possible future trends, but also introduces the reader to his way of approaching international relations. The existing conceptual tool kit, Hoffmann argues, is insufficient for the analysis of world affairs upset by the drawbacks of the cold-war system, a weakened state sovereignty, and a troubled world governance. Neither the political philosophies that have taken account of international affairs—in Hoffmann’s view these are Marxism, realism and liberalism—nor prophetic hypotheses à la Huntington or Fukuyama have much to contribute to the analysis and improvement of current international affairs. The same holds true for the procrustean bed of scientific approaches with their abstract quest for general laws loosing sight of the essential questions and looking for a far greater degree of precision than the field of international relations allows. Hence, Hoffmann suggests shifting the emphasis of research from the search for general predictions to the provision of possible scenarios and a listing of respective conditions for their realisation.

With a review of Hedley Bull’s works as a prelude, Hoffmann then continues with a critique of Rawls’s social contract theory as a basis of international society. The discussion of Rawls’s contribution, with the communitarian vs. universalist debate as its focal point, helps to bring about Hoffmann’s own philosophical position, which builds upon a mixture of Kantian ideas and Judith Shklar’s ‘liberalism of fear’, a liberal philosophy of the ‘ultimate evil’. In the international, as opposed to the domestic domain, human rights are supposed to reconcile individual needs with state conduct. Human rights as the qualifying principle for the other three dominant features of the international system—state sovereignty, democracy, self-determination—not only lead to the rejection of Realism and liberal Idealism (as well as new forms of this debate in their scientific degeneration), but also enable the re-establishment of a liberal internationalist approach which is meant to overcome the flaws of former liberal theories.

The rest of the book is deeply driven by this concern with human rights. The whole range of issues, from humanitarian intervention, regional or international collective security to nationalism, world order or the future American role in the world, are in the end brought back to the clash of the four principles or norms and its resolution by giving priority to human rights.

With this move, the author tries to defend his liberal framework against the objection of inconsistency liberal positions had to struggle with all the time. The implicit assumption of liberalism that ‘all good things come together’ and its
criticism seem to be abandoned by Hoffmann’s superordination of human rights to state sovereignty, democracy and self-determination. Hoffmann wants us to believe that the clash of these competing principles can be solved by giving primacy to human rights. But, even though this may improve the coherence of the liberal stance and avoid some of the internal inconsistencies liberalism is coming up with, the conflict of values is only shifted by this move to the competition of different human rights with each other and the burden of deciding between different rights and their relative weight.

By stressing the importance and priority of human rights, some problems of world order may be dampened. At the same time, though, many new clashes, conflicts, and injustices are produced, if the concept of human rights is left as unspecified as in Hoffmann’s account. No differentiation of the various kinds of human rights is given beyond the crude classification provided by the international covenants, no threshold of human rights violations offers a guideline when to intervene or when to limit the external sovereignty of the violator, no procedure for resolution in case of conflicting norms inside the human rights regime can be found. The simple ‘appeal’ (p. 253) of human rights beyond western societies is not enough to burden the concept of human rights in the way Hoffmann does. Human rights are a contested concept and therefore are not self-evident in their substantive content and open to political argument. The missing qualifications to the central concept in Hoffmann’s argumentation leave the reader with the impression that the whole analysis is more suggestive than systematic.

KONRAD SPAETH

Konrad Spaeth is a Research Student in the Chair of International Politics at the University of Munich, Germany

Martha Honey and Tom Barry (eds.), Global Focus: US Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium (London: Macmillan, 2000, 340 pp., £47.50 hbk.).


Written by the former editor of Foreign Affairs, William Hyland's assessment of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy provides an adequate description of six and a half of Clinton’s eight year presidency. However, those seeking revelations into the inner workings of government (from the ultimate insider that Hyland is) will be
disappointed. This book is a collection of articles (15 in all), based loosely on case studies and historical periods. These are primarily descriptive, not analytical, giving the how and when of Clinton’s foreign policy decisions—but rarely the why. Moreover, most of Hyland’s information does not come from books or journals—but from *Time*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*. Some 90 per cent of these sources were written before 1995, making much of this information extremely dated. Strangely, Hyland speaks in the past tense about Clinton’s presidency, at a time when he had well over a year left in his mandate.

While Hyland promotes his study as both ‘comprehensive and balanced’, much of this work is an unbalanced critique of the Clinton years, with a lenient view of George Bush’s legacy. While Bush is criticised for his naïveté and isolationism, in Haiti and Yugoslavia, he is generally presented as a more capable leader and statesman. Hyland presents Clinton as a reluctant waffler, a President with an excellent education, but a poor grasp of international affairs; a man interested in domestic, rather than external issues. Clinton’s reluctance and indecision to intervene globally is most obvious in the cases of Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti. Hyland provides concise, well summarised histories of these three cases, as well as excellent contextualisation of events. In these cases, Hyland rightly concludes, Clinton pursued quick-fix, temporary solutions to complex long-term problems.

Sadly however, his discussion of the Yugoslav conflict reveals no new information or insight. Hyland avoids discussing many of the key behind-the-scenes aspects of American foreign policy. For example, there is no mention of America’s Structural Adjustment Policies in the late 1980s, which so devastated that country. This book is also dated, since it does not feature discussion of the Rambouillet negotiations, or the 1999 NATO air strikes. There is also no consideration for the Croatian cleansing of Serbs in the Krajina in 1995, thanks to the generous intelligence assessments of the American military. While even the most naïve student understands that American foreign policy is a mixture of the overt and covert, Hyland focuses primarily on what can be gained from the popular press.

Hyland’s chapter on Central and South America misses much. ‘South of the Border’ focuses primarily on NAFTA, the Mexican peso crisis, and America’s subsequent bail-out programme. There is little discussion of SAFTA, or the economics of hemispheric integration; key Bush and Clinton priorities. Latin American politics is also scrupulously avoided, as are any discussions of Clinton’s ‘war on drugs’, the Certification process, or any aspect of the drug trade in Panama, Colombia, Peru or elsewhere. US economic, political or military influence in the region also appears to be a taboo subject. It is as if anything south of Mexico does not exist.

While Hyland has already published two books on Russia, his chapter on this country is poorly organised. There are no sources here after 1994. The reader must wait until the next chapter (‘European Security’) for any discussion of contemporary Russian issues; such as NATO enlargement, nuclear disarmament, or Russia’s domestic instability. ‘European Security’ does provide some analysis
of these issues, as well as the continued geostrategic importance of Eastern Europe. However, startlingly, there is no discussion of the Washington Consensus, which dominated Western thinking on Eastern Europe; and led to so many disastrous results. This is a surprising omission. Further, Western European politics has been completely ignored, perhaps the first time a discussion on Europe has excluded its western half.

Two chapters on Asia allow Hyland to continue his central thesis; that Clinton was simply too indecisive and waffling to make good foreign policy decisions. The conflict between trade and human rights in China is painfully dissected; and we are treated to all the minutiae of Clinton’s negotiating efforts. The same holds true of Japan, where trade issues from a variety of old sources (all before 1996) fail to tantalise the reader. One is forced to wait for three chapters before the Asian crisis is discussed at all.

In his chapter on Iraq, Hyland perpetuates that excruciatingly inane and childish American habit of referring to Iraqi president Hussein as ‘Saddam’. Fortunately perhaps, the likes of ‘Adolf’, ‘Benito’, and ‘Joseph’ are spared that indignity. Once again, Clinton’s legacy is one of reluctance and indecision; whether or not to depose Hussein, whether or not to press for UN monitors, whether or not to order air-strikes, etc. A later chapter on the Arab-Israeli peace process proceeds in a similar vein.

Throughout, Hyland avoids any moral or ethical questions, as to whether or not America, or the world is in better or worse shape because of Clinton’s policies. However, he does tell us that by 1999, ‘Clinton…was a badly crippled lame duck, and the opportunity to mold a new international order had closed’ (p. 204). Has US foreign policy benefited other states after the Cold War? Can lessons be learned from Clinton’s successes or failures? How could Clinton have done better? What should be have done? Sadly, questions such as these are not answered.

By contrast, Martha Honey and Tom Barry’s book is detailed, rigorous, critical, prescriptive, and thoroughly fascinating. This is an extremely large collection of very short essays, some 35 in total, but somehow, the editors manage to pull it off. These essays compliment and contrast very well with each other, and almost every aspect of foreign policy in the 1990s is debated and analysed. There are five themed sections, with essays on the military-industrial complex, US economic leadership and dominance, US military interventionism, global environmental protection, and a seven regional case study sections on every part of the world.

Like Hyland, the authors criticise Clinton’s foreign policy agenda, which they feel ‘lacks a cohesive global affairs agenda’, as well as lacking a ‘key sense of purpose’. They do, however, argue that his views on global governance are clear, in that he has advanced ‘an aggressive free trade agenda’ (p. xvii). Another general theme concerns the increasing use of the United Nations in conflict resolution. Clinton is criticised for using the UN when it is convenient, and ignoring its prescription when they conflict with US policy. The increasing use of NATO air-strikes is a clear example of American disregard for world opinion. Moreover, Clinton’s ‘humanitarian’ intervention is attacked for its selectivity; countries like
Rwanda are ignored, while Yugoslavia takes centre stage. Implicit here is a critique of American human rights policies. Clinton is also attacked for his inability to curb excessive military waste and overspending. The annual $290 billion defence budget is blamed for inhibiting domestic health and educational reform. There are also questions raised about NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe, America’s continued reliance on nuclear weapons, and its rather simplistic policies on ‘Rogue States’, particularly Cuba and Iraq.

Environmental issues are also keenly analysed, in particular the American reluctance to implement any of the recommendations of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. A lack of political will is cited for America’s inability to curb fossil fuel emissions in line with the Kyoto Protocol. Here, a large variety of policy prescriptions are advanced to help the United States reform its shameful environmental legacies.

The case studies in this work are excellent. There is a reasoned discussion of US policy in Latin America, including such issues as the war on drugs, the kidnapping of Manuel Noriega, the dangers of anti-narcotic militia groups, and the extreme poverty, unemployment and unequal income levels in these countries. The World Trade Organisation and its negative influence in Western and Eastern Europe is also discussed. The International Monetary Fund and their Structural Adjustment Policies are specifically accused of destroying social programmes and welfare states, while creating enormous multilateral debts for poor states that are unable to pay them back. There are also detailed discussions of the US role in the Asian crisis, and how IMF prescriptions failed to deal with the specifics of Asian economies.

My primary criticism of the Honey and Barry text is its repetitiveness. Many of the 35 sections repeat the same facts over and over again; and often from the same perspective. Without difficulty, much of this redundancy could have been removed from the finished product. Nevertheless, Honey and Barry’s work is a fresh, critical, and thought-provoking work. It analyses and proposes; and many of the proposals are well reasoned and realistic. While Hyland’s work focuses on the past, Honey and Barry very much look to the future. I recommend both works, but get your Hyland from the library; not the bookstore.

DAVID B. MACDONALD

David B. MacDonald is Assistant Visiting Professor in the Département de Sciences Juridiques, Économiques, et Sociales at the Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Paris, France.


The Gramscian ‘turn’ in International relations (IR) can be said to derive primarily from the work of Robert Cox, whose revival of an apparently moribund discipline during the 1980s simultaneously helped to reinvigorate the quasi-autonomous area of inquiry known as political economy. The latter’s diffuse plurality of approaches and subject matter renders it difficult to define its core subject area with the precision normally characteristic of a ‘proper’ academic disciplines. Yet its very lack of self-defined orthodoxy enables it to escape the all-or-nothing competition of paradigms for disciplinary supremacy. In this respect, international relations shares with economics an unhealthy obsession with labels and associated conceptual baggage, when a greater willingness to acknowledge complementarity and tolerate eclecticism would yield better results.

It is a measure of the relative poverty of IR debates that the Gramscian ‘turn’ should have been so revelatory. Yet, equally, it is a measure of the sway realist thinking still has over the discipline that hegemonic relationships between states should have appeared so novel, theoretically speaking. Both Ankie Hoogvelt and Rhiannon Vickers use Gramscian theory as the point of departure for their respective inquiries. For Hoogvelt, Cox’s work has been a welcome shot in the arm: she calls him ‘the founding father of a new international political economy’ (p. 10). This anchors her discussion of a vast swathe of literature on ‘globalisation’. Vickers, meanwhile, takes the Gramscians to task for an overly simplistic unidirectional conception of hegemony, arguing, with reference to Britain’s reception of the Marshall Plan, that hegemons are susceptible to manipulation by those whom they appear to dominate.

Hoogvelt begins by charting a brief intellectual history of IR, delineating the development of realist, liberal and Marxist theories. Her subsequent outline of Cox’s contribution emphasises the break with structuralism and historical determinism, and presage her concluding chapters’ preoccupation with poststructuralist theoretical developments and their implications for praxis. This latter aspect is highlighted with reference to recent Latin American history, and the growth of grassroots movements that do not conform to traditional conceptions of party organisation. Having explained the rise and fall of Fordism and its corresponding theoretical explanations (modernisation and dependency theories), the evolution of the colonial system through neocolonialism to the present day ‘postcolonial’ era, and the shift from international core-periphery relationships towards a current global inside/outside reordering, Hoogvelt provides case studies of specific regional developments (in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and East Asia) to amplify her theoretical case.
Globalization and the Postcolonial World is a very sociological book in terms of its selection and treatment of theoretical debates. As such, it concentrates on structural developments, leaning upon authors such as Manuel Castells, David Harvey and Anthony Giddens for conceptual support. Thus, it ends up exemplifying Martin Shaw’s complaint regarding the neglect of the state in contemporary Marxian/Gramscian thought. Cox’s idea of the state as ‘a vehicle for transmitting the global market discipline to the domestic economy’ (p. 148) is cited approvingly. However, to proceed, in the same chapter, with some sharply observed comments about US power only to suggest in closing that US hegemony is ‘a moot point’ for now (p. 162) is, to say the least, unsatisfactory. And this, after having refuted Andrew Gamble’s argument that, with globalisation, there can be no imperialism (p. 160).

Gamble writes a brief introduction to Vickers’s book, highlighting Antonio Gramsci’s subtle conception of hegemony as a reciprocal relationship, and extolling the virtues of Vickers’s study of Clement Attlee’s government, and how ‘domestic political forces were crucial in shaping the terms on which the post-war order was constructed’ (p. xiii). Vickers herself is concerned to expose the limitations of neo-Gramscian treatments that see ‘politics as the result of configurations of social forces and socially productive practices rather than of states or state systems’ (p. 9). Manipulating Hegemony ‘shows that we should not assume that international pressures steamroller over domestic ones’ (p. 132).

While the theoretical point being made is valid, it is hardly remarkable. Again, this is indicative of the problems inherent in orthodox approaches to international relations. But such attention to disciplinary debates distracts from the really valuable aspect of this book, which is Vickers’s reconstruction of Britain’s role in the development of the post-1945 international order. That is not to say that her account does not have its own weaknesses, but it is at least as valid to point out that, just as interstate relationships, however hegemonic, are reciprocal, so too are states themselves not uniform, monolithic entities, but comprise different and often contradictory elements that jockey for position. An international hegemon can privilege certain agendas or organs of its client state. But that hegemon is himself as prone to the same processes of intra-state rivalry. Thus the ‘liberal wing’ of the US Central Intelligence Agency cultivated relations with the wing of the British Labour Party led by Hugh Gaitskell, while conservatives like James Angleton could not countenance any socialist rhetoric, even if rhetoric was all it was. While Vickers does discuss divisions within the ruling Labour Party, she does not address divisions within the British state itself. The US state is similarly treated as homogenous.

Nevertheless, Vickers does show that, in the period preceding the pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine and the construction of the US national security state (i.e., prior to the full commencement of the Cold War), certain British actors were instrumental in influencing key US decisions that would have lasting impact. In the aftermath of the victory over the axis powers, many within the US leadership were ambivalent regarding the Soviet Union. It was British anti-
Soviet lobbying that paved the way for the fateful reception given to George Kennan’s famous Moscow telegram in February 1946. This encompassed former Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the British diplomatic corps and British intelligence. These establishment sources of anti-Soviet agitation were augmented by the considerable energy of Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and his right wing trade union allies, who, prior to the war, had cut their teeth fighting against communists and perceived fellow travellers in their own unions, and were committed to supporting the Labour government. These figures are the subject of Vickers’s study.

It is fair to say that as slim a volume as Vickers’s could have been expanded, with the incorporation of otherwise omitted material concerning divisions within the Labour government over trade with the Soviet bloc, for example. This was an issue that came back to haunt Harold Wilson much later, as he was persecuted by elements of the British and US intelligence services. But *Manipulating Hegemony* does focus on various important and under-researched aspects of British post-war development, and in so doing, unwittingly or otherwise, highlights strong continuities with current preoccupations regarding ‘modernisation’ and productivity.

Both books are very clearly written and copiously referenced. Hoogvelt’s is especially good as a comprehensive guide for senior undergraduate and postgraduate students. If nothing else, the Gramscian ‘turn’ has spawned a rewarding literature.

MICHAEL KEANEY

*Michael Keaney is Lecturer in Economics and Finance at Mercuria Business School, Vantaa, Finland*


The decade that followed the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991 has witnessed the multiplication of works on the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of European monetary unification. Common to most of those has been the emphasis placed on domestic politics, whether seen as sectoral or partisan interests, domestic institutions or changing policy ideas. If only for that reason, Matthias Kaelberer’s book is well worth reading, for while acknowledging the importance of domestic
variables in European monetary politics, he takes a rather unfashionable stance: structure matters, and so does power.

In a historical survey going back to the failed discussions around the European Commission’s Action Programme in the early 1960s, he shows that recurrent patterns can be identified in European monetary negotiations. These, he goes on to argue, are best understood by looking at the relative bargaining power of weak and strong currency countries. Two elements are deemed especially crucial: the relative payments position of EU member states (defined as a combination of inflation level, exchange rate strength and actual payments balance), and the role of leadership in monetary bargaining.

The former he sees as the primary indicator for the distribution of monetary power. Because they face no reserve constraint (i.e. they can finance their payments disequilibrium with no risk of exhausting their currency reserves), strong currency countries have greater scope for choosing how to adjust in situations of payments imbalance. Contrary to their weak currency partners, they can opt for unilateral solutions. At the same time their participation is required if the proposed exchange rate regime is to have credibility. Strong currency countries are therefore ‘endowed with a powerful exit threat, while weak currency countries do not have a correspondingly strong threat of exclusion’ (p. 49). This leverage translates into monetary regimes that do not restrict the domestic autonomy of the most powerful partners; whatever compromise is finally achieved can only revolved around secondary issues of external adjustment, financing and side payments. Looking back to the Maastricht negotiations on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Germany eventually came round to the idea of an automatic move to stage three and the creation of a cohesion fund, but it refused to bulge on the necessity of strong convergence criteria and central bank independence. The outcome was a set of rules clearly reflecting the strong currency country’s adjustment preferences.

For there can be no doubting Germany’s imprint on the course and content of European monetary cooperation, and its leadership is given an extensive treatment. In line with his general argument, Kaelberer insists that the influence yielded by German policy makers is primarily derived from the strength of their country’s currency, a dimension which accounts emphasising the role of the Bundesbank in European discussions often overlook. Germany’s power is therefore not based on resources or competitive edge, as in the case of US hegemony post-1945, but on a set of policies. Germany is best seen as a standard setter in the monetary field. Within the European Monetary System (EMS) Germany provided an anchor currency, a stable inflation performance around which the other member states could pursue their own policy priorities. It then served as a ‘constitutional architect’ for the design of the EMU (p. 66), most visibly through the establishment of a European central bank whose statute and policy tools imitate those of the Bundesbank, and the adoption of a ‘stability pact’ imposing sanctions on spendthrift governments after entry into the EMU. In good hegemonic tradition, Germany provided a set of rules around which actors’ expectations could converge,
thereby increasing the likelihood of an agreement. It also accepted a number of concessions and side-payments, most significantly on the issue of automaticity.

Some will find that the book’s argument about the dynamics of monetary cooperation rings too many bells: after all, the divide between the so-called ‘economists’ (strong currency countries) and ‘monetarists’ (weak currency ones) is well-known, and German leadership never disputed it. Nor is the debate about the primacy of domestic preferences over interstate bargaining likely to be settled here (or indeed elsewhere). Yet Kaelberer’s contribution is genuine enough. For one, he presents a solid discussion of European monetary bargaining since the 1960s. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, he brings much-needed analytical depth to the debate about Germany’s power in the EU, with intriguing insights into the future of European cooperation. Under the EMU, financing of regional payments imbalances becomes automatic, and the main bargaining asymmetry between weak and strong currency countries disappears. Moreover, once established the track record of the European Central Bank, the Bundesbank will lose most of its ‘aura’. Studying how the new symmetry affects Europe’s macroeconomic policy and how it feeds into other areas of EU policy-making should figure high on the agenda of EU watchers.

DAPHNE JOSSELIN

Daphné Josselin is Lecturer in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science


There are many ways to try to get to grips with such a sweeping and complex concept as globalisation. Most social scientists would either seek an empirical proxy measurement, usually based on economic data, and/or examine alternative analytical approaches and theoretical debates. Richard Langhorne, a diplomatic historian, does neither. Instead, he presents the reader with a compelling story and probes some its wider ramifications.

The story is essentially one of technological change. It is a familiar story, complex yet simple. The main dimension of technological change, which affects political and social life, lies in the way people are enabled to interact with each
other in different ways: this mainly involves communications, although not in the narrow sense of mere information; rather it concerns knowledge, mutual understandings, mobility of people, goods and capital, and the changing scales of interaction. Thus, Langhorne elaborates on the well known story of how the coming of the railways in the nineteenth century changed not only business, wider social structures and the state, but also the way ordinary people lived and the ways in which their world was transformed. A traditional example is how railway schedules and the timetable brought about modern timekeeping and changed the rhythm of everyone’s life. He expands this analysis by looking at more recent developments from space and weaponry to information technology, global culture and the like. I basically agree with this story in many ways and enjoyed reading this particular telling of it. It is presented clearly and in a way which might well appeal to undergraduate students.

The main integrating theme of the book, repeated frequently, is that whereas previous forms of technological change fed into and reinforced ‘vertical’ political, social, managerial and economic forms of structuring of people’s lives—leading to experiments with various forms of hierarchical organisation, especially through linkages between large-scale industry, mass politics and the nation-state—globalisation leads to an increasingly ‘horizontal’ social structuring. In other words, cross-cutting linkages are, if not exactly replacing hierarchies, at least competing with them and complicating them. The most important of these linkages are cross-border but they affect more and more varied aspects of life, especially the way people connect with a growing portion of their family, work, social, ethnic, religious and, of course, political lives at a distance, particularly through the electronic media. Different ways of connecting, in turn, make the focus of ordinary life increasingly individualising. Whereas previous forms of technology created pyramids of control, today’s technology generates more horizontal pluralism, partly at the level of social groups but increasingly at the level of individuals.

The preponderance of the book is an attempt to apply this theme to, firstly, the main categories of social institutions and processes—societies, governments and the global economy—and to what Langhorne calls ‘the mechanisms of global relationships’, ranging from states and private organisations through ‘new areas of activity without organisations’ to questions of war and peace. There is a great deal of common sense and historical knowledge encapsulated here. In particular, the author’s examination of the implications of globalisation in war and peace, based on his own expertise as a diplomatic historian, are very interesting if somewhat inconclusive. Unfortunately, the storytelling sometimes seems to drift away from the argument.

All in all, this book provides an interesting overview of globalisation from one particular perspective. I like it because I agree with much of what the author says at a common sense level. It will be a useful book because the story is one which, I think, will appeal and indeed ‘get through’ to undergraduates groping with the wide range of alternative paradigms, conflicting categories and ambiguous data which they are usually given in courses on globalisation. The drawback is that
while the theme is clear and useful, it is often underdeveloped and presented in an overly vague and repetitive fashion. For example, there is much more to ‘horizontal’ structuring than the author goes into here. The most empirically detailed sections, those on war and peace, are the ones most tenuously linked with the overall theme, although the author clearly considers them to be crucial to the longer-term consequences of globalisation. At certain points, furthermore, although the story is simple, the author assumes a higher level of prior historical knowledge, whether about the medieval and post-medieval periods or about nineteenth and twentieth century wars, than today’s undergraduates are likely to possess.

This is therefore a difficult book to figure out or evaluate. It does not examine any debates about globalisation and presents the author’s story as a given. It is frequently empirically superficial and repetitive; while in those sections where there is more empirical material, it is less tightly woven into the argument. The level is unclear: the book might well be useful for undergraduates but might also obscure alternative explanations and oft-aired objections to such a technology-driven interpretation. It is more like an extended traditional essay than an academic book. But it is not lightweight and it has some of the strengths of the former in that it presents a clear perspective in an occasionally elegant fashion, elucidating rather than obfuscating this crucial topic.

PHIL CERNY

*Phil Cerny is Professor of Government at the University of Manchester*


This is a volume devoted to the work and thought of late Professor Susan Strange. Strange’s conceptualisation of the International Political Economy (IPE) as an international social science has made a distinct contribution to the development of international studies, and this volume indeed manages to go through and reflect on Strange’s paths to ‘unorthodox’ IPE. ‘Unorthodox’ IPE, as it has been outlined through the work of scholars such as S. Strange, S. Gill, D. Law, C. Murphy and R. Tooze, goes ‘beyond the confines’ of mainstream IR theory, breaking down well-established artificial dichotomies (e.g. national/international) and disciplinary
boundaries (e.g. politics/economics); and Strange was a pioneer and a leading figure of this ‘unorthodox’ project.

The volume includes 21 chapters organised in seven parts, as well as a foreword by R. Keohane and an annotated bibliography of Strange’s academic publications (edited by C. May). The organisation of the volume is as follows. In the first part, aspects of Strange’s conceptualisation of the international political economy and international system are discussed (chapters by the editors, J. Story, L. Mytelka, T. Lawton and K. Michaels). The second part addresses the issue of the role of money and finance in the shaping of global economy (chapters by A. Verdun, B. Cohen, G. Underhill). Part three and six deal with ‘critical perspectives on IR’ (B. Verbeek, A.C. Cutler, R. Tooze), and ‘emerging agendas’ in IPE (G. Walzenbach, and T. Shaw, S. MacLean, M. Nzomo) respectively; while part four deals with ‘state power and global hegemony’ (R. Gilpin, S. Guzzini, E. Helleiner, J. Goldstein), and part five with regional issues (J. Pellegrin, J-P. Lehmann, A. Tovias, A. Leander). In the last part some reflections on Strange’s work and its critics are offered by the editors, D. Earnest and L. Pauly.

The number and the range of subject-diversity of the contributions constitute an important blend of current IPE theorising, which in many ways pushes the debate forward. For instance, R. Tooze offers an in-depth analysis of the relationships between, and interaction of, ideology, knowledge and power in IR/IPE. Thus, he underlines the social context of IR/IPE knowledge and he illustrates how the production of legitimate knowledge is itself a political process. He then uses this analysis to problematise the way in which the mainstream IR/IPE defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge within the discipline. B. Cohen focuses on Strange’s argument on the inseparability of money and politics, and attempts to develop a theory and praxis of monetary power in the international system. J. Goldstein contributes to the problematic of the domestic/international by studying the way in which the creation and evolution of GATT was related to the domestic US politics. An interesting debate also takes place on the ‘retreat of the state’ thesis. G. Underhill contends that if one reconceptualises states and markets as part of ‘the same essential ensemble of governance’, as a ‘condominium’, then there is no ‘retreat of the state’ but a changing balance of public and private authority within the state. On the other hand, R. Gilpin, along ‘realist’ lines, argues that states have not lost their economic autonomy, albeit the latter has been constrained by economic globalisation.

As a weakness of the volume one could register the repetition found among some chapters. But this is rather inevitable in a volume, tribute to a single scholar. On the whole, the volume can be considered an important contribution to the existing IPE literature, adding to both the theory and practice of international political economy, if such a distinction makes any sense.

Finally, a question might be asked. What difference does Strange make? Moreover, what does the volume tell us beyond the written contributions? In this respect, two things are indeed important. First, the issue of ‘what academia is about’. One of Strange’s characteristics was that she had a distinctive ability to
raise new questions. And to raise a question is to invent, to create a new path, to define a new reality, a new space that needs to be explored. Questions in their essence define frames of thinking about the social reality and the world. The power to raise or ‘hide’ questions is therefore the power to channel human imaginary, and Strange, as Cohen among others writes, ‘succeeded in raising more questions than she answered, at the level of both theory and praxis’ (p. 110). In this manner, it can be argued that Strange’s ‘unorthodox’ scholarship does make a difference.

The second issue refers to the conceptualisation of politics in terms of the allocation of values in a system. In an age where politics tends to be defined in managerial terms and the welfare European systems seem to fade away under ‘external’ pressures, Strange argued that the crafting of the nature of human societies ultimately remains in the hands of their citizens. Freedom, equality, security and justice constitute the core materials, the core values, to be used. None of them is in principle superior to the others. Whether economic efficiency should or will dominate over social equality or justice is not an issue external to society, rather the opposite. It lies in the heart of societal processes and defines the purpose of politics (in the volume see for instance, Story: p. 27, Cohen: p. 102-103, Earnest et. al: p. 414-416; see also chapter ten, by Tooze). In other words, politics is about constructing a society in which one wants to live, and not about managing the social adaptation to ‘external’ forces, defined as globalisation or otherwise. Along these lines Strange’s Power is both needed and welcomed.

ANDREAS ANTONIADES

Andreas Antoniades is a Research Student in the Department of International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science


Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is one of those research areas that currently suffer from a curious yet debilitating paradox: the more complex, ambiguous and ubiquitous it becomes, the less it is studied. Although eluding the question of why this is so, this accessible and insightful volume goes some way towards redressing the balance in the more circumscribed area of European Foreign Policy. As the initiated reader knows, the choice of focussing on how European Union Member
States develop, adapt and implement their foreign policies in relation to the European context could hardly be considered original; this has been the existential reason of already so many valuable contributions during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the volume does have a genuine ‘comparative advantage’, which can be identified in its distinctive analytical approach. As the spare and convincing introduction by the editors makes clear, the volume aims at generating an analytical framework of a comparative nature, able to give an account of how member states pursue their foreign policies in a ‘globalised, post-Cold War, post-EU ‘European condition’” (p. 243); with the warning that this passing profusion of ‘post’ should be taken as little more than a homage paid to ‘post-theories’, rather than a real commitment. After all, what the contributors engage in is not post-Foreign Policy Analysis, despite their winking at substantially ‘sanitised’ versions of discourse analysis and identity theory.

Yet, it is Analysis. For a discipline (FPA) that struggles to renew itself in the face of momentous transformations in the world ‘out there’, a contribution that tries to pave the way for a ‘transformational Foreign Policy Analysis’ (p. 12)—European, rather than American, in its academic lineage, pluralistic in its ontology, eclectic in its epistemological strategies—should be no doubt welcome.

With this peculiar manifesto in mind, in the 11 chapters that separate the editors’ precisely brief introduction and sober conclusions, the contributors try to dissect EU member states’ foreign policies according to a common analytical framework orbiting around three specific research questions: firstly, the question of foreign policy change through adaptation and socialisation brought about by EU membership; secondly, the foreign policy process itself in its domestic and bureaucratic dynamics; thirdly, the issue of how (rather than when and, most importantly, why) states’ foreign policy actions fall within or without the European context. By its own admission, the volume’s ambition is therefore to synthesise no less than three complementary (and traditionally believed to be self-sufficient) approaches to the explanation of foreign policy; an ambition that the volume succeeds to fulfil in some chapters (those by Rik Coolsaet and Ben Soetendorp, and by Ben Tonra), definitely better than in others. The overall project, despite a few internal disharmonies, such as the manifest imbalance between comparative exercise and case study analysis, results tight enough to be coherent and faithful to the analytical schemata set out in the introduction.

Further, the chapters on the ‘new’ Member States’ foreign policy are not only the first of their kind, but also, together with those on ‘smaller’ states, like Belgium, Denmark and Ireland, robust and inspiring; possibly the best in the volume. If one adds that the volume displays a rare sensitivity to contemporary bureaucratic dynamics inherent in today’s foreign policy process; and that it is keen on showing how institutions (such as the EU) are first and foremost social constructions (hence, the emphasis on elite socialisation and internalisation of norms), it is clear that this work will be a useful reading for those interested in the subject matter.

The only disappointments in which the reader might incur—since disappointments, alas!, there are—are likely to come not from the answers that the
volume fails to give, but from the questions it neglects to ask. Blandly informed by a version of ‘institutionalism’, the volume contents itself with depicting a benign view of institutions, and eventually the fog of an ‘ever growing’ interdependence, globalisation, and the like, pre-empts any rigorous analysis on how agency is really recast, i.e. how states act meaningfully, in such a context. Further, the ‘transformational FPA’ that the authors have in mind ends up taking too seriously the letter ‘A’ of the acronym, with the consequence of stopping—regrettably and too often—at the analytical level, falling short of any conceptualisation or explanation—let alone theorisation—of the subject matter. Moreover, their inclusive framework of analysis might well provide a very detailed context of action and encompass those ‘juxtaposed tendencies’ that seem to drive today’s foreign policy, but it does not give too much of a clue about the dynamics of this juxtaposition; except for a vague and less than original argument about the ‘binding’ effect of institutionalisation. This is particularly evident in the case of Member States’ foreign policy actions that fall ‘within or without the EU’: what the authors do tell us is that sometimes States behave in line with a European foreign policy, sometimes they do not. What they omit to tell us, however, is when they do what and, possibly, why; all of which could hardly be considered trivial questions.

ELISABETTA BRIGHI

*Elisabetta Brighi is a Research Student in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science*


This excellent collection of essays addresses the complex and yet undertheorised relationships between gender and globalisation. It aims to go beyond conventional representations of globalisation and to contribute to what the authors call the critical second wave of the globalisation literature. What sets the collection apart from the more mainstream theories, is the criticism directed at too a narrow focus on the economic sphere, and the attempt to stress the restructurings of social, cultural, racial, ethnic, gender, national and familial identities, roles and relations (p. 1).
Where the concept of globalisation is employed, it refers more to a discourse than to a reality. The editors advocate the use of a concept of global restructuring instead of globalisation, as the former is broader and opens up the possibilities to include a variety of phenomena ranging from the East European transformations to economic changes in Ecuador. Global restructuring explicitly refers to breaking down an older order and attempting to construct a new one (p. 7). This is extremely useful as it does not assume that the pressure for change comes from ‘outside’, from an inevitable process of globalisation.

The book operates on three levels: sightings, sites and resistances. ‘Sightings’ deal with theoretical issues; how feminists think about global restructuring. ‘Sites’ refer to the material structures and practices of global restructuring in specific places, while ‘resistances’ imply the concrete strategies and instances of opposition. This last aspect, in particular, should be interesting for scholars well beyond feminists as this dimension of globalisation remains undertheorised.

In the first part, the ‘sightings’, there is a most brilliant chapter on Filipino domestic workers in Hong Kong by Kimberley A. Chang and L. H. M. Ling. The authors critically discuss how the subaltern woman and other feminised subjects have no voice to express their subjectivities (p. 33). Filipino women form a highly sexualised and racialised labour force. They have been commodified as mail brides, domestic servants, prostitutes. The role of the state remains central in this process. ‘Sightings’ also involve explorations to the changing nature of masculinities. Charlotte Hooper identifies the rise of a new hegemonic masculinity: a jet-setting, post-industrial, post-modern global executive, for whom capital and information technology, not arms and machines, constitute the weapons. Jacqui True’s exploration of the Czech transition reveals what this has meant for the ‘Homo Sovieticus’, the socialist version of industrial man. Here it is worth noting how the collection is highly sensitive to western bias and recognises the challenges by non-western feminists to the Western constructs. Feminists writing about the post-communist transitions reveal this. For example, the concept of public and private have different meanings in ‘East’ and ‘West’. The private sphere has traditionally not been a prison for the Czech women, as many Western feminists would argue (p. 187).

The second part of the collection on the ‘sites’ of global restructuring points to its gendered effects in the workplace, in the state, at home, and in migration trends. Here Valentine Moghadam provides us with an interesting and rare focus on the Middle East. Her chapter shows changes in a place where they are often thought not to exist. What is original in her piece, is the argument that global restructuring is not only negative for women. In countries, such as Jordan, where women’s labour force participation is pathetically low, women are gaining increased access to the labour market. Such suggestions highlight the complex and contradictory nature of the processes. Yumiko Mikanagi’s chapter on Japan, in turn, is interesting because of its explicit argument about the role of the state in the rise and fall of equal opportunities legislation for women. This points to the role of political interventions at a time when the role of the state is seen to have declined.
The focus on ‘resistances’ in the final part of the book challenges the inevitability of globalisation and the victimisation of women. Resistance involves constant negotiation of the boundaries between the state and the market, public and private, local, national and international. Significantly, many of the processes prove not to be new phenomena. Amy Lind’s chapter on Ecuador demonstrates how women have resisted the structural adjustment packages from the 1980s onwards. Together, the chapters point to the multiple levels on which resistance is taking place: from the local to the national to the international to the global. Women are theorised as actors, not merely passive recipients of policies and changes. Sometimes the patriarchal discourse of the traditional gender roles is even being used for women’s own benefit.

In sum, I find the collection extremely useful and important. It is a fresh intervention to the ever-growing field of globalisation debates. The analyses of the theory, the ‘sightings’, is the most consistent part of the book. It breaks down somewhat towards the end of the collection, and some of the case studies employ a less sophisticated understanding of globalisation. However, even if the theoretical framework is not fully incorporated into the case studies, they remain extremely helpful and interesting illustrations of the way global restructuring is gendered.

JOHANNA KANTOLA

Johanna Kantola is a Research Student in the Department of Politics at the University of Bristol


This set of well written essays arises from a conference held in Vancouver, Canada, sponsored by; the units at Simon Fraser University and Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. The editors faced a daunting task in attempting to develop a coherent evaluation of what globalisation is and what its impacts are. They have largely opted to allow the authors to speak with their own voices rather than force them into an editorial procrustean bed. That was a prudent choice. The result is a set of somewhat conflicting but lively and vigorously (if not always rigorously) argued essays on selected aspects of globalisation.

Several shared, if contested, themes run though the essays. First, all agree that globalisation, viewed almost exclusively as an economic phenomenon of
worldwide markets, has done more harm than good. This largely unchallenged assumption is accepted on faith. There are several case studies, principally focused on Canada and Australia—home base for most of the participants—that actually do explore globalisation’s damaging effects. These are not extensively widened to include the developing world, where globalisation has had, arguably, the most disrupting effect.

Second, the participants share the view, developed more systematically by Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson in Globalisation in Question, that the process of globalisation is not inexorable or resistant to reform; even reversal. Like Hirst and Thompson, most of the contributors put their trust in a revitalised nation-state and local initiatives to discipline the process of economic globalisation to human purposes, however different and divided these may be across nations and cultures. Nandita Sharma defects from this group consensus. Her case study of Canadian immigration policy shows how globalisation overpowers states. Gary Temple’s opening essay provides the theoretical underpinning for Sharma’s policy argument in his sketch of capitalist logic that, indeed, portrays globalisation as an inexorable force, a view at odds with most of the contributors.

If the authors disagree on remedies for globalisation, they are of one mind that globalisation is not just an economic force; it is also a compelling ideology. Pushed by multinational corporations, banks, advertisers, lobbyists, and bureaucratic and political elites, the ideology of globalisation clears a path for its further expansion. Most of the essays debunk the claim of inevitability. The case studies and the concluding chapters attempt to identify alternatives to market control of national and local economic decision making.

The case studies are intriguing, but there over-all effect is, ironically, to offer unintended support for the inevitability thesis. The cases drawn from Australia and Canada depict determined efforts by local and national actors to withstand the pressures of market rules, but not with much success. Rob Watts, for example, recounts the determination of Australian Treasury Secretary John Stone to hold the line against market pressures. His heroic efforts, however, are eventually undone by cabinet opponents. Acceding to market constraints, they rejected his idea of a float of the Australian dollar with exchange controls still in place.

More work will be needed to establish the proposition that markets can be subordinated to economic and social values resistant to the interests of foreign investors’ expectations, multinational negotiating leverage, WTO trade rules, or IMF and World Bank strictures; all in the service of imposing global market rules on unruly world populations. Michael Webb’s essay offers a useful path to follow. He does a notably good job in showing that international tax competition has not had the expected effect of converging tax policies favouring global capitalist interests. However, the force of this finding is diluted by the fact that much of the explanation for differentiated tax treatment rests on the bargaining power of the most powerful nation-states with the largest markets. The US, the most ardent partisan of globalisation, can set higher tax rates for foreign companies than many
other states because its economy possesses competitive advantages outweighing the negative pull of taxation.

Relying on American power, the driving force of globalisation, is a weak reed to lean upon in resisting globalisation. Apart from Webb’s discussion, all the other chapters offer evidence of market hegemony over local and national efforts to contain it. This provides Sharma with ammunition to contest the nation-state solution to market excesses. Her alternative remedy of political opposition at a global level does not seem to offer much hope of success, either. It is not clear where effective countervailing power can be mobilised to tame market forces and to overcome nation-states supporting them. The final two chapters advance policy recommendations for change, emphasising local initiatives. Like the well-intentioned Sharma chapter, these are unhinged from the complex political factors and actors who would have to be mobilised to effectively combat market power.

This volume succeeds in making its point that globalisation, depicted as the coming of a borderless and integrated world economy, is more complex than globalisation boosters would have us believe. The process of globalisation, however, is even more complex than the volume presents. Not addressed, and admittedly this is asking a lot, is a clearer delineation of just how formidable economic globalisation is. There are powerful incentives, linked to the capacity of global markets to efficiently and effectively allocate scarce resources. There is no doubt that labour is being exploited by low wages and poor working conditions around the globe, but desperate people bound to unproductive farms need workable options, barring large economic aid from developed states to relieve their misery. That is just not going to happen in the present political climate, however lamentable that self-interested perspective of the rich North vs. the poor South. This volume takes a step forward in grappling with some of this complexity. It’s a right step in the right direction. The volume is a useful contribution to the growing tide of work being done—and more yet needed—to offer politically feasible and economically effective alternatives to the reign of market rules.

EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ

Edward A. Kolodziej is Research Professor in Political Science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA
Each year, the Norman Patterson School of International Affairs publishes *Canada Among Nations*, highlighting some important aspect of Canada’s role in world affairs. Last year’s issue on the vanishing border between Canada and the US was the sixteenth in this important annual series and was the first to focus so heavily in its content on Canada’s relationship with a single country. Upon reading this book, the reader will understand why the decision was made by the book’s editors to highlight this relationship at the close of the twentieth century.

Clearly, Canadian foreign policy, like that of all countries, has been affected since the late 1980s by systemic shifts in international politics. The end of the Cold War, the intensification of globalisation, and the concomitant emergence of new security and complex interdependence issues that called into question a state’s ability to manage its borders, symbolised these shifts. They demonstrate the extent to which the significance of the border between the two states has been reduced. *Canada Among Nations 2000: Vanishing Borders* captures this plight of the Canadian government and foreign policy establishment. Each chapter in the book details an aspect of the Canada-US relationship. Cooper explains how US policy is made in Canada while Sands captures the diffuse policy making process within the US with respect to Canada. Jockel’s chapter on US National Missile Defense shows the differences in policy making between the two countries as well as the extent to which both countries are locked into a defence/strategic relationship. Whether or not this entangled web in this issue area will persist is still a matter of conjecture because ‘geography no longer ties Canada and the US quite as closely together as in the past’ (p. 91).

Apart from the defence/strategic alliance, we note, as Bothwell does that the two countries share a common heritage and similarities in culture. The daily economic and social transactions between the them contribute to the integration and harmonisation which Riche and Baldwin acknowledge. Of course, the intensity of this relationship is bound to result in tension from time to time, as noticed recently in the softwood lumber and durum wheat disputes. For Hart, the forces of ‘deepening integration’ on the North American continent are responsible for most of this tension. However, Canada and the US have developed sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms to handle this and there is a sense of confidence, in both countries, in the binding dispute settlement procedures developed in the FTA, NAFTA, and WTO negotiations. Whether or not these mechanisms will be beneficial to Canada in its dealings with the lone remaining superpower is not a foregone conclusion because of the differences in the two countries’ political systems and forms of government.

The reader also gets the sense from chapters by Schwanen, Sharpe, Lee, Stevenson, Grenier, Dashwood, Knox, Curtis and Wolfe, and D’Aquino that popular images such as those of ‘the mouse sleeping next to the elephant’ or of
‘Canada catching a cold when the US sneezes’ are overly simplistic, in light of the current context. Yes, the asymmetry between the two countries is great and Canada hardly registers on the ‘radar screen’ in Washington. Yet, because both countries share the same contiguous landmass the relationship between them is filled with such complexity and subtlety that the partners know, even if it is not expressly acknowledged, that they are in the same boat together. In addition, this relationship is complicated by the fact that both countries are enmeshed in multilateral and regional networks.

The book as a whole makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the complexity, depth and challenges of the Canada-US relationship. Hampson and Molot place the analyses of this relationship in the proper context of structural and epiphenomenal changes taking place at both global and hemispheric levels during the immediate post-Cold War era. The backdrop for the discussion is the current period of intense economic liberalisation, the broadening of the international security agenda, and what can be described as ‘creeping integration’. The editors’ introduction to the book raises a number of key analytical questions that could provide the framework for future research on Canada-US relations. The main, implied in the chapter by Riche and Baldwin, asks whether the progressive economic integration on the North American continent will force Canada to adopt a social model similar to that of the US? If this happens, then the border between these two countries is likely to vanish indeed.

In a word, academics and practitioners are beginning to realise that sovereignty is not what it is cracked up to be and that the exercise of any degree of control over countries’ borders can only be accomplished through delicate management of relationships with other states. Vanishing Borders reminds us of this fact and as such is valuable reading for those interested in the positive and negative impacts of globalisation on states.

W. ANDY KNIGHT

W. Andy Knight is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta, Canada
Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović (ed.), Women, Violence and War: Wartime Victimization of Refugees in the Balkans (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000, 245 pp., £31.95 hbk., £16.37 pbk.). Considering both the immensity and importance of a subject such as the gender(ed) dimension of the recent Balkan wars, and the extent to which they are left dangerously underexplored by the specialised literature, Nikolić-Ristanović’s Women, Violence and War should be a valuable feminist contribution. However, despite the self-professed aim to present ‘a first-class intellectual and political challenge’ to the meta-narrative of the national project (p. x), there are three types of errors—errors of fact, errors of analysis and errors of judgement—that prevent this collection of essays from attaining such a far-fetched target.

A series of 11 chapters deals thematically with a wide spectrum of personal experiences by 70 women who found refuge in Serbia during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Here, four feminist authors (Vesna Nikolić-Ristanović, Nataša Mrvić-Petrović, Ivana Stevanović, and Slobodanka Konstantinović-Vilić) have attempted not only to record women’s stories but also to offer an analytical framework for wartime violence in general. They start this ambitious undertaking by analysing definitions of violence in war, as well as explaining the definition, method and sample used in their own study (chapters two and three). It is, however, extremely hard to situate contextually their somewhat superficial categorisation of different definitions of war-related violence within the actual research at hand, and ascertain how relevant it is for the subsequent analyses of various forms of violent practices experienced by their sample of women. The book is permeated with similar problems: the lack of coherence due to many discontinuities and confused breaks in the lines of argument, as well as the failure to establish connectedness or dialogue between the chapters.

For instance, in chapter four, we face yet another taxonomy of violence, this time relating to various patterns of war rape followed by some vivid accounts of sexual violence. However, the chapter falls short of a deeper critical analysis of gender(ed) violence inherent in state-building/breaking projects and fails to understand war as a crucial constitutive component of these projects. Undoubtedly, for high-quality journalism aiming to inform those unfamiliar with gender(ed) violence in war, it is extremely important to uncover the hidden picture of violent and exclusionary patriarchal matrices that went rampant in the Balkan wars. This book fulfils this task but clearly lacks a prerequisite necessary to give it more academic substance; a critical assessment of how this hidden picture of body politic was produced and silenced in the first place, in some specific locales of the former Yugoslavia.

A similar brief and superficial account is repeated in the chapter on the Hague Tribunal focusing on the problematic of rape and international law. Despite the wealth of analytical opportunities, the argument revolves largely around the relationship between ethnicity and gender in a very limited sense, as though this were solely a matter of choosing which of these analytical categories of
differentiation and exclusion should have a priority in feminist analysis. Surely, the right approach is not only to insist on the ‘invisibility of raped Serbian women’ (p. 83) but also to ask how both ethnic and gender cleavages of all sorts are produced, perpetuated and reified (for instance, the dichotomy between raped women of X-nationality and raped women of Y-nationality). A key constraint to the whole work can be traced in the authors’ difficulty in displacing the usual dichotomies (ethnic or gender ones) and naturalisations of difference, as one would expect from a more critical feminist approach.

Chapters six and seven are surely interesting to a reader wishing to familiarise herself/himself with a variety of violent practices women experience in war; not only physical violence and homicide, but also extremely varied forms of psychological violence and fear, as well as their consequences for women’s psychological health. The same informative value goes for the more sociological and/or social aspects of wartime violence; separation and dissolution of the family (chapter eight), life in refuge with its socioeconomic and familial consequences (chapter nine), and social acceptance and adaptation to a new environment (chapter ten). However, this rather descriptive approach to the social context within which women in refuge found themselves, does not amount to a work that could stand for an adequate sociological analysis of ‘wartime victimisation of refugees in the Balkans’ as the subtitle of this book promises. Indeed, a reader interested in the actual processes of desubjectivisation of refugees will struggle to find arguments to engage with it productively enough.

Much more promising is the strategy of feminist intervention employed by the authors during their interviews. By these, they actively encouraged and empowered their interviewees to support and help subjects of war violence. Such a subtle symbiosis of academic and civic work surely deserves more critical attention than relevant chapter allows.

In their conclusion (pp. 195-197), many errors of judgement and simplistic hypotheses become explicitly pronounced: firstly, the presumption that the state is an institution that protects women, which is paralysed during the war; secondly, women are explicitly turned into passive objects of suffering (due to their husband’s ethnic affiliation) and desubjectivised as political agents (no opportunity to decide about the war); thirdly, the implicit and uncritical premise (an error of judgement?) that the state and/or the international community are the providers of freedom and justice.

Especially poignant errors of fact dominate the rather short first chapter, which gives a brief history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Firstly, only a series of sound historicised sociopolitical analyses of the former Yugoslavia can clarify the context of wartime violence. Secondly, this chapter—quite appallingly—does not use a single bibliographical reference from a book (let alone academic or historical sources) or newspapers, but relies solely on the ‘everyday’ knowledge of the author. To do this, whilst trying to say something valid about the highly controversial periods of the Second World War and the recent conflict, is more than naïve. The chapter will mislead an uninformed reader, and make a specialist
in the region cringe at yet another example of the worst practice in academic dealings with ‘histories’ of ‘conflict areas’. Not a moment of feminist intervention informs this chapter, nor is it situated in any meaningful sense within the project of the book.

Although at moments it seems as though this group of Belgrade sociologists, victimologists and criminologists flirts with the premises of critical gender theories, the book fails to come close to an analysis which would, in the spirit of such theories, adequately and radically problematise (wartime) victimisation and desubjectivisation constituted along gender dichotomies. Rather than problematising victimhood, as ethico-political feminist projects demand, this book merely collectivises it in terms of gender rather than in terms of ethnicity, and tries to give it an individualised dimension by focusing on women’s stories. Thus, the book also acts in ways which depoliticise the instituted order with its ‘symptoms’; refugee situation, violence against women, and so forth. As such it is far removed from a reading which should be truly empowering for a civil society resisting exclusionary practices along gender, ethnic and other ‘fault-lines’, and which would significantly contribute to alternative and emancipatory ways of thinking and acting in the Balkans.

JASMINA HUSANOVIĆ

Jasmina Husanović is a Research Student in the Department of International Politics in the University of Wales, Aberystwyth


Environmental degradation is a complex and interesting problem for international relations (IR) theorists, posing as it does serious challenges to international structures of governance. It also offers, as Matthew Paterson demonstrates in *Understanding Global Environmental Politics*, an opportunity for IR theorists to reconsider the approaches taken within their discipline. Paterson undertakes such reconsideration by asking three questions: How are environmental problems produced? What are the differential effects of environmental problems on various categories, defined, for example, by class, nationality, race or gender? And, what are available or appropriate responses to these problems?
In order to begin to answer these questions, Paterson articulates a Green approach to IR theory. In contrast to liberal institutionalism, a Green approach does not assume that global environmental change is the result of the anarchic structure of interstate society; nor does it regard the causes of environmental degradation as accidental and *ad hoc* by-products of trends such as consumption patterns, technological change and population growth. Rather, environmental degradation is described as the product of systemic, integrated structures and practices. Paterson identifies four such structures: the state system, capitalism, structures for the production and distribution of knowledge, and patriarchy. This being the case, Paterson argues, the liberal institutionalist conception of global environmental change as a collective action problem requiring more and better collaboration among states must be set aside.

Calling on a global governance approach articulated by Ronnie Lipschutz, Paterson argues that a more appropriate and effective approach to global environmental change involves networks of governance that are not centrally or hierarchically organised. In this manner, resistance to the structures and practices that Paterson points at as responsible for global environmental degradation may take place.

Paterson’s concern to articulate a Green approach to IR theory reflects a desire to take seriously the challenges that environmental degradation poses to scholarship. For example, he observes a certain tension in Green scholarship that comes to the fore at the international level. On the one hand, it recognises that environmental problems must not be conceived of in isolation from one another or, for that matter, in isolation from structures and practices of the societies in which these problems originate. Thus, holistic approaches that are responsive to interconnections among ecosystems, human communities, issue areas, conceptual frameworks and so forth are to be favoured. On the other hand, Green political structures and processes are generally conceived of as being small in scale and local in scope. Holism might suggest that we seek definitions of problems and solutions that are global in scale or uniform across the world. However, the inherently political nature of environmental protection and the ever-present danger of reproducing or perpetuating structures that facilitate environmental degradation remind us that we must not approach the problem as though a technical solution were available and universally applicable.

Because of the myriad uncertainties that we face when grappling with environmental degradation, the issue of governance must, as Paterson suggests, be placed front and centre in discussions of global environmental politics. Solutions to global environmental degradation must be sought under conditions of uncertainty; about the effectiveness of the measures taken; about the consequences, direct and indirect, of those measures on various societies and groups; about our ability to identify, and in some cases our willingness to address, inequitable results of environmental policies, and so on. Paterson’s efforts to move beyond a critique of current approaches to governance, and to begin to imagine governance structures
that are consonant with basic principles and approaches within Green scholarship, are very timely.

One of the most significant contributions this book makes to the literature on global environmental politics is its attention to a question, which, after having read the book, appears as absolutely fundamental, namely what causes environmental degradation. This question has of course been asked by many IR scholars interested in global environmental protection. Furthermore, as Paterson notes, many attempts to answer it have been made. What I now find striking is the speed with which authors—and I include myself among them—proceed from the question of causes to the question of solutions. Even those who do not agree with Paterson’s diagnosis of the underlying causes of global environmental change will benefit immensely by taking the time to seriously reflect on this matter.

JAYE ELLIS

Jaye Ellis is Assistant Professor of Law in the Faculty of Law and the School of Environment at McGill University, Montreal, Canada

Leigh A. Payne. Uncivil Movements: The Armed Right Wing and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, 297 pp., $44.50 hbk.).

Henry Veltmeyer and Anthony O’Malley (eds.), Transcending Neoliberalism: Community-Based Development in Latin America (Bloomfield, CO: Kumarian Press, 2001, 247 pp., $59.00 hbk., $23.95 pbk.).

‘Movements’, ‘community’, ‘development’ and ‘neoliberalism’ are important codes and vehicles for both the advancement of a superstructural condition called globalisation, and the counter reaction against it. This is the context within which sub-state politics will be discussed in this review. Of course, the discursive conflict between the ‘below’ and the ‘above’ does not manifest neat frontlines. The ‘uncivil movements’ studied by Leigh Payne both engage with and violate the superstructure of democratic norms within the states they operate in. The political constituencies undergoing development examined in this book, similarly attempt to transcend neoliberalism administered by states but their indigenised relations of production and consumption still tend towards the market. It is also pointed out that autonomous community-based development still needs to define community for material purposes. Furthermore, it is appropriate that both books are
contextualised in Latin America, a region historically penetrated by global ideological trends.

Payne’s usage of the term ‘uncivil movements’ in the title conveniently invites negative comparisons with the civil and pluralist ideals, on democracy postulated by political theorists, like de Tocqueville, Laski and Dahl. While civil society activists work within and strengthen the parameters of procedural and substantive democracy using generally peaceful methods of lobbying, marches and public speaking, ‘uncivil movements’ aim to participate within and shape democracies through the threat or use of violence, and if necessary, even by threatening democracy’s survival. A certain Machiavellianism links their means and ends. The ends focus on defending elite interests, often at the expense of common good, and eliminating competition against such interests. On the surface, such movements are automatically delegitimised in the eyes of the governments they challenge as simply terrorist and outlaws. However the reality of their origins and political tenacity suggests complexity instead. Payne’s three case studies of the Argentine Carapintada, the Brazilian Rural Democratic Union (UDR) and the Nicaraguan Contras demonstrate that these uncivil movements are rooted in both historical and recurrent conflicts between pro- and anti-status quo forces, diminished and ascendant elites, or, as in the case of the UDR, an unrelenting class war lining domestic landowners against landless farmers newly allied to sustainable development discourses of the United Nations, World Bank and external development non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The uncivil movements draw inspiration from a ‘spiralling pattern’ of association with past violence: the Carapintada hark back to the patriotic, populist and modernising missions of past coup-installed military regimes in Argentina to justify themselves; the Contras invoke the heroic memory of historical peasant uprisings against oppressive and arbitrary rule; and the UDR call up a time honoured tradition of ‘protect[ing] private landholding in Brazil and the free-enterprise system throughout the world against leftist threats’ (p. 130).

In the 1990s although these movements risk being regarded as the dying embers of Cold War extremism given their position in the geopolitics of anti-communism, they have the ability to frame, cue and legitimate themselves through myth making. These are sophisticated means to appeal to peaceful electorates, frustrated ex-revolutionaries and disenfranchised sectors with a rhetoric emphasising that an ‘antipolitical’, catch-all, part-political party/part-insurrectionary movement is the route for meaningful redress of unjust policies.

The Carapintada, for instance, led four violent uprisings among high and low ranking soldiers after the termination of the military junta in 1983 to protest against official trials of the military for human rights violations during the junta. Not only did these actions put pressure on the civilian democratic government to finally introduce amnesty legislation for the military, but they also made the Carapintada realise that legitimisation as a political party was necessary to combat the negative public impact the continued use of violence would have on their cause. As a party called MODIN, or the Movement for Dignity and Independence, the Carapintada
Millennium

successfully became an umbrella for anti-neoliberalism, anti-corruption, a strong state, populism (Peronism) and iconoclastic agendas ignored by mainstream civilian parties in the 1990s. While this allowed inclusion of civilian support into its hitherto largely military base, MODIN as an institutionalised face of the Carapintada would increasingly undercut its hand of violence: the need to frame, cue and appeal to an electorate will invite close public scrutiny of its patriotic, popular and strong government manifesto and its association with the abuses and intolerance of past military actions and regimes. Payne’s statistics show that MODIN overtook several marginal civilian parties and came close to, but never breached, the ten per cent mark in electoral gains during the 1990s (p. 57); although one might say that Carapintada’s use of violence in the late 1980s had already garnered for its military members large areas of legislated immunity against prosecution for human rights violations.

The rainbow category of ‘community-based development’, as treated by Veltmeyer and O’Malley et al, shares a common characteristic with uncivil movements in defying autonomous state-administered realities. The discursive significance of this stems from a crisis in the Enlightenment belief in the inevitable progress towards the universal and rational organisation of human society, reconciling freedom with justice and equality in realising human potential. The empirical evidence proving the existence of a North-South gap, the widespread inequalities of market-led growth, and the awareness of ecological limits to industrialisation testify to this ‘crisis’. Community-based development is thus an alternative to previously state-led one-size-fits-all development in its ‘recognition and valorization of radical difference’ and in its acceptance ‘that people should construct their own development on the basis of autonomous action of community-based local or grassroots organisations’ (p. 5). This volume commendably takes upon itself a critical examination through case studies of what our ‘own development’ and ‘autonomous action’ can be when the state’s distributive capacity is affected by debt-servicing, budget deficits, the ‘burgeoning of an informal sector composed of microenterprises that were characterized by low productivity, the lack of capital’ (p. 25), the liberalisation of markets and the downsising of government. Additionally, with the state in retreat, the definition of ‘community based’ development is questioned.

Veltmeyer and Tellez’s study of the implications of democratic participation in development through administrative decentralisation in Bolivia point out that while authority and revenue control may be empowering for grassroots organisations (i.e. neighbourhood and agrarian associations) comprising ordinary people, the coexistent sharing of accountability and public service between municipal and national governments would undercut grassroots autonomy in practice. Aquevedo’s chapter on development in Chile’s Bio-Bio region echoes a similar problematic in that the relaxation of government targeting of development will not alleviate poverty but obscure it under temporary and low-remuneration employment if local universities, unions and companies are not stimulated to re-tool and train for cyclical private investment demands. International and national
NGOs in Costa Rica and El Salvador, as the contributions by Macdonald and Montoya point out, are vital in both engendering local workers’ cooperatives and employers groups’ awareness of the need for changing economic practices and in articulating inclusive participation within proximate locations. Yet despite these discussions of local initiative, the need to engage capitalism profitably and responsibly towards one’s needs is always in the background. O’Malley’s conclusion is that community-based development is concrete only when it means ‘the fostering of local initiatives undertaken by local people for local, socially created self-improvement’ (p. 216).

Both books make an insightful contribution to studies of counter trends from below against any presumption of the unfettered globalisation of democracy and free markets. The local, imbued with historical roots and yearnings for inclusion can be a serious braking factor against political uniformity and democracy’s illusions. However, both volumes could also have further interrogated the future of community under global trends: how far have nation-states come along Ferdinand Tönnies’s organic and contractual community continuum? Alternatively, why do uncivil and community-based movements equally challenge global convergence on democracy and neoliberalism in their respective states?

ALAN CHONG

Alan Chong is a Research Student in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science


Despite the large and continuously expanding body of literature on globalisation, key questions about its origins, nature and implications remain unanswered. What is globalisation and what drives it? Is it the outcome of technological innovations or changes in production; the ‘logic’ of markets or of international capital? Does it represent a radical rupture with the past? Is it inevitable? Irreversible? Does it describe a current reality, or only prescribes a future one?

This volume does not engage or concern itself with any of these questions: it assumes that we are headed towards a global future, and takes as its aim the development of proposals for ‘shaping’ it. For readers wearied by the morass of intractable debates and increasingly abstract conceptualisations that seem more and
more to characterise the burgeoning literature on globalisation, this project will have particular appeal. However, as this varied and interesting set of papers shows, it is difficult to formulate concrete proposals for shaping globalisation without addressing fundamental questions about its origins and nature. Without some conception of the forces driving globalisation, how can we know what opportunities and constraints may facilitate or thwart efforts to shape or oppose it? And, without such an understanding, how can we propose, and assess the plausibility of schemes to influence its development?

If the volume fails to demonstrate the efficacy of its assumptions and the viability of its proposals, it nonetheless offers some intriguing perspectives on globalisation and, particularly in the introduction to the volume and the first chapter, which are both written by Jan Nederveen Pieterse, valuable insights into how to study it. As the introduction explains, its purpose is ‘to set forth desirable and plausible proposals for global conditions in 2020’ (p. xviii). The overall ambition is to promote the ‘democratisation of futures’ by encouraging greater participation in their design and planning. The way to achieve this, he argues, is through a ‘scenario politics’, one which combines a ‘big-picture approach to development questions’ with ‘critical holism’, and which ‘brings us, to a degree at least, into the stream of reality’. The first chapter, also written by Nederveen Pieterse, discusses the relevance, goals, and types of thinking about the future. The twelve chapters that follow, written mostly by academics and researchers who in many cases are active in government and international and nongovernmental organisations, present proposals for shaping globalisation.

The first section of the volume addresses the question of ‘global reform’ with papers by Richard Falk, Jan Pronk, Louis Emmerij, Hazel Henderson, and Howard M. Wachtel. Together, these present an extensive inventory both of global challenges and of how to meet them through reform of international institutions and the regulation of international finance. The final paper in this section, by Sakamoto Yoshikazu, provides a welcome counterpoint to the previous ones by focussing on how capital might eventually be forced to reform itself as a result of the contradictions of ‘global marketisation’.

The second section is entitled ‘Collective Action and Development’. The first two papers, by Fantu Cheru and Michael Watts, are among the best in the volume; both offer critical and historically grounded perspectives on forces and possibilities of resistance to globalisation. Joan Martinez-Alier focuses on ecological distribution conflicts and the environmental movements that they sometimes engender. Azza Karam, moreover, elaborates a feminist agenda for the future.

The last section, on cultural dynamics, presents three intriguing and thought-provoking perspectives on the future: Keith Griffin elaborates a vision of states reconstituted on a multicultural foundation; Mike Featherstone explains how new technologies may provide the conditions for the development of global citizenship; and Anthony D. King forecasts a future in which human societies are organised in cities, national identity being replaced by urban identity, and city and inter-city
organisations providing the basis for eradicating poverty and environmental degradation.

These papers address a diverse set of topics and utilise a variety of perspectives. But they share a number of weaknesses. None of the proposals really engages in ‘the design and planning of alternative futures’ and, as Nederveen Pieterse himself points out, few of the authors ‘go deeply into the specifics’ of how their proposals might be implemented (p. xx). Most do not assess the successes or failures of previous attempts to reform international structures (i.e., those of the Third World Coalition), or what constraints might operate with respect to the goals and policy instruments that are the focus of their proposals.

Despite the diversity of focus and perspective, common to all these papers is the key assumption that underpins the very notion of ‘shaping globalisation’: the inevitability of globalisation and of a global future. Thus, few of the authors heed the editor’s caution against ‘global glibness’ or consider his suggestion that remedies to current problems may be local, rather than global. And while the issues that the authors address are wide-ranging, curiously, the futures they envision are not (Featherstone and King are exceptions). Whatever else it represents, globalisation clearly involves concerted political action by transnational corporations and intergovernmental agencies to get states to deregulate industry and markets, privatise their assets, and curtail their welfare functions. Many people are engaged in a battle to prevent this and, for them, the battle has not yet been conceded. For them, the assumption that globalisation is something that is not just envisioned, but has already been or must inevitably be achieved, is a dangerous one. It contributes to the pervasive and powerful discourse through which proponents of globalisation seek to fulfil its prescriptions and, as some of the papers in this volume show, may limit our ability even to envision a different future.

SANDRA HALPERIN

Sandra Halperin is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex
This *Peace Process* is the revised edition of a volume first published in 1993. The author added two chapters on President Clinton’s input in the peace process. The chapters of the earlier edition dealing with Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter have been condensed and revised in light of newly available information. A valuable innovation is the collection of basic documents, which have been put on the website of the Brookings Institution.

The book starts with the crisis that led to the Six-Day War in June 1967, as this war set the stage for the contemporary peace process. 1967 also marks the beginning of a shift of emphasis in American diplomacy ‘from the spelling out of the ingredients of “peace” to the “process” of getting there’ (p. 1). This procedural bias may be traced back to a deeply rooted pragmatism of American policymakers. However, Quandt warns against the peace process becoming ‘a slogan used to mask the marking of time’ (p. 1) because it would be an illusion to believe that ‘time is on the side of peace’ (p. 395).

In view of the positive and negative developments since the Oslo agreements a new edition of *Peace Process* is more than justified. At a time when the return to violence and hatred in the Arab-Israeli relationship leaves not only the author discouraged, one hopes for guidance when trying to confront questions such as the following: Why did President Clinton, who at the end of his second term invested more than any of his predecessors in the resolution of the conflict, pass on to his successor ‘a region filled with explosive potential’ (p. 372)? What can a powerful third party achieve and what are its limits in convincing the parties to the conflict that reason suggests a return to the negotiating table?

Whatever reason may be suggested, Quandt shows that the parties have proven incapable of moving forward without the help of the US in some of the many roles it has played in the past: ‘catalyst, energizer, friend, nag, technician, architect’ (p. 384).

There has been no other regional conflict settlement since 1967 where the United States invested so much as here: time, energy, imagination, money, military equipment. Its own national interests are best served by the prospects of peace; not addressing grievances in time, or allowing stalemates to continue can lead to war; still a possible scenario in this volatile region.

However, the management of any crisis and negotiation is subjected to a number of constraints. Top of the list are domestic ones. The same, of course, holds for Israel. This makes timing all the more important. ‘On the whole’, Quandt notes, ‘the United States has done best when it has tried hardest’ (p. 380). Presidents Carter and Clinton both tried hard indeed. Why was in the latter case the effort not enough? Amongst the ‘ingredients of success’ (pp. 383-386) two seemed to be missing: Quandt’s account suggests that the president who tried so hard in Camp David in July 2000 tried too late. Since Oslo the issues to be dealt with in the final
stage negotiations have been nobody’s secret. However, nothing like pre-negotiations seem to have taken place, and the ability and willingness of the parties to the conflict to reach creative compromises on some of the most difficult issues (such as the status of Jerusalem) have not been tested. Instead, the Israeli governments allowed the number of settlers in the occupied territories to double without any resistance by the US, despite agreement of all American presidents since Johnson that the settlements were a major obstacle to peace. Quandt notes that Clinton was over-hesitant when, at a time that conditions were most propitious, the tempo of the peace process should have been accelerated. He was not assertive enough either, when the parties did not live up to their commitments, and pressure might have been appropriate.

Besides pointing at character as one reason for Clinton’s reluctance, Quandt also links it to the approach his advisers took, namely long-serving Dennis Ross and Martin Indyk. Both were proponents of the ‘ripeness’ theory and opposed to the United States wanting peace more than the parties did. They might have made Clinton believe for too long ‘that the United States could do little to accelerate the ripening process by adding to the calculus of gains and losses of the parties to the conflict’ (p. 375).

This comprehensive and balanced ‘first draft’ (p. x) of the history of Clinton’s commitment to promoting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours is substantiated by the author’s first hand knowledge of the workings of the American policy making process. His conclusions should serve as a reminder of what it takes to serve American interests by helping to advance the peace process in the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and that presidents run the risk of jeopardising American interests when they allow the term ‘peace process’ to become an excuse for doing too little or acting too late.

MARGRET JOHANNSEN

Margret Johannsen is Senior Research Fellow in the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg, Germany


Shirin Rai’s edited volume is an important contribution to the growing literature on women’s roles in democratisation processes. Rai assembles case studies from the
developed and developing world, as well as from non-democracies, transitional democracies, and well established democracies. Democratisation is conceived ‘as a process of exploring, insisting upon and institutionalising democratic practice’ (p. 1). This conception, and the inclusion of chapters from established democracies, indicate that democratisation is a continuous process and that women’s activism both shapes and is shaped by changes in political institutions.

Rai’s useful theoretical introduction emphasises the conceptual and practical difficulties created for women in liberal democracy: the division between public and private and a universalist model of citizenship that often excludes difference. The remaining nine chapters are case studies addressing women’s activism in social movements in civil society (and their importance in democratising both formal political practices and the politics of daily life), and women’s struggles to improve their access to formal political arenas.

Cathy Blacklock and Laura Macdonald show how women’s gender-based citizenship demands emerged out of broader struggles for human rights in Guatemala and Mexico. In the crises produced by repressive or exclusionary states, or, as Shaheen Sardar Ali’s chapter on Pakistan demonstrates, in military regimes that seek legitimacy by manipulating Islam, women’s movements often encounter opportunities to politicise gender issues and link them to broader struggles for democracy. In so doing, women contribute to a discourse of citizenship that is potentially inclusive of not just women, but also of other excluded groups; the poor and indigenous people. In discussing current feminist practice in Pakistan, Ali notes that while the negative impact of traditional Islamic laws falls mainly on poor women, it is largely through the activism of upper-class and educated women (through NGOs) that these issues are publicised and challenged.

Barbara Einhorn’s wide ranging chapter illustrates the precarious nature of women’s citizenship in East Central Europe in the contemporary context of constructing both democracy and market societies. The author raises the problem of the ‘civil society trap’ which ‘perpetuates the undervaluing of women’s political involvement, demeaning it as “mere” humanitarian activity conducted within the terms of the nurturing and caring roles often deemed “natural” for women’ (p. 118). Because there are too few links between civil society organisations and political institutions (which determine the content of citizenship entitlements), celebrating women’s activism in civil society risks further rendering them invisible as political citizens.

Some of the book’s best chapters address this very important aspect of women’s citizenship. Access to arenas of power and the capacity to promote gender equality within them are addressed with respect to both transitional democracies (South Africa) and the established democracies of India, the United Kingdom, and Australia. These chapters are valuable for what we learn about the importance of historical context for shaping strategies to improve women’s political access. Shirin Rai and Kumud Sharma’s chapter on India highlights the way the recent quota strategy for women in politics was shaped by the historical legacy of reserving seats in parliament for minority groups. Lindiwe Zulu’s discussion of the
South African case shows that women’s crucial role in the African National Congress eventually gave them the necessary leverage to achieve a quota of 33 per cent, leading to women currently holding 27 per cent of the seats in South Africa’s three tiers of government.

Joanna Liddle and Elisabeth Michielsens address an under-researched problem; the lack of women seeking entry into politics. Based on interviews with both male and female parliamentarians in the United Kingdom, they find that women do not possess the same ‘sense of entitlement’ to political power as do men, for whom seeking power is more ‘natural’. Women, in contrast, need to construct ‘narratives of entitlement’ in order to overcome their ‘gendered authority deficits’. Most importantly, the authors further show that the capacity to construct narratives of entitlement is linked to class, thus opening space for women of ‘privileged’ class positions while continuing to exclude poor and working-class women.

Carol Johnson’s chapter is aptly placed at the end of the volume, standing as it does as a warning that even when feminist goals are achieved, women’s movements must be vigilant in guarding them. Johnson’s chapter describes the Australian case where, after decades of feminist successes, women now confront a conservative government seeking to delegitimise feminists and roll back some of their advances by converting them into a ‘special interest’.

While much of the existing literature on women and democratisation is based on regional comparisons, the strength of this volume lies in its expansive focus, including new and established democracies from both developed and developing countries. The volume would have been further strengthened by a chapter addressing the transnational arena where global women’s movements provide important resources and contacts to smaller women’s movements in developing countries. While many of the individual chapters mention this, readers would have benefited from a more extended treatment of the importance of women’s organising beyond national borders.

SUSAN FRANCESCHET

Susan Franceschet is a Research Student in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

At its 2002 Prague summit, NATO is set to decide on its second round of enlargement. The merits and problems of the nine aspirant states, which include Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia and Albania, has been, and will continue to be, controversially discussed. While the Baltic states are closest to meeting NATO military and political standards, the South-Eastern European candidates appear to have most to gain from NATO membership in terms of stability for the Balkans and encouraging political and economic reforms. However, most scholars accept that who will be invited will essentially be a political question. It will not depend on the ability of the candidates to fulfil the military and political criteria which were set out in NATO’s Membership Action Plan in April 1999, but on the outcome of political deliberations within the Atlantic Alliance.

*Explaining NATO Enlargement* is of interest to students of European security, not only because of its attempt to illustrate the dynamics which influenced the NATO accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, but also because it might help us understand the decisions which will be made in Prague next year. Moreover, the volume aims to go beyond other studies by offering a theoretically guided analysis of why the Atlantic Alliance has survived and expanded after the end of the Cold War. Specifically, the authors locate their explanations within the frameworks of neorealism, neo-institutionalism, organisation theory, constructivism and foreign policy analysis.

Accordingly, the volume is structured in five parts. The first chapter provides a brief overview over the questions raised in the book and introduces the five theoretical approaches. The second part, ‘Power and Preferences’, provides with Kenneth N. Waltz and Beverley Crawford, neorealist and neo-institutionalist perspectives to NATO expansion. The third part, ‘Institutions and Choice’, turns with essays by Vinod B. Aggarwal, Ernest B. Haas, Steven Weber and Gale A. Mattox to the organisational questions of NATO enlargement. In the fourth part ‘Domestic Politics and National Interests’, Charles A. Kupchan and Ronald J. Bee examine the influence of domestic and state actors in the US and Europe which contributed to the making of the alliance decision. And in the final part, Robert W. Rauchhaus draws out more explicitly the theoretical presumptions which underlie the preceding essays and examines how their findings can be combined within a framework of levels of analysis.

Specifically, Rauchhaus points out that most authors agree on the central role of the US in pushing for NATO enlargement. In addition, the majority of the essays concur on the necessity to examine how relations with Russia influenced this decision. However, the interpretations of the empirical data are sufficiently diverse to highlight the differences in perspectives offered by the selected theoretical frameworks. Thus, the driving force behind the first round of NATO enlargement is variously identified as an attempt by the US to exploit its dominant position in a
unipolar international system (Waltz), the continued demand for NATO’s organisational services (Weber), and the advocacy of NATO enlargement by the US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and President Clinton (Kupchan). The relations between the Alliance and Russia are either interpreted as competitive or cooperative. Notably, Crawford suggests that the first round of NATO enlargement was designed to cement the exclusion of Russia from a central European security architecture (p. 52), whereas the essays by Aggarwal and Bee illustrate the multifaceted attempts to include Russia by means of the Partnership for Peace, the Founding Act on Relations between NATO and Russia, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and its successor the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

A key asset of the book is that it presents a systematic and comprehensive overview over the various arguments and perspectives in the analysis of NATO enlargement. However, for advanced students and academics, the views presented will be hardly new. A reason for this is that the original aim of the volume, namely to apply international relations theory to an issue which has been dominated by ‘*ad hoc* explanations’ (p. 9), is soon modified as to be able to understand NATO expansion. Instead of engaging in a rigorous test of different IR theories, the essays combine theoretically-informed analyses with additional explanations and personal views in a way which is not entirely different from other studies of NATO enlargement. In an implicit recognition, the book is pitched as a textbook for undergraduate classes concerned with the transformation of NATO rather than a scholarly volume, and it fares well in doing so. The exceptionally well crafted introductory and concluding chapters are designed to help students to identify the premises which underpin the alternative theoretical perspectives used throughout the book, whereas the separate essays encourage discussion with their partly conflicting and partly complementary assessment of NATO enlargement.

ELKE KRAHMANN

*Elke Krahmann is Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in the ESRC project ‘Security Governance in the New Europe’ at the University of Birmingham*
The unprecedented economic, ecological, and technological interdependence that underlies contemporary world politics challenges individual states as well as the international community as a whole to find new ways to realise peace and security and improve human welfare. Fiona Robinson’s discerning study of international ethics suggests that achieving these goals will require a theoretical reconceptualisation of the proper role of morality in international relations. According to Robinson, ethical arguments in international relations are infused with Western traditions of rationalism, liberalism, and contractarianism. She argues that the consequent elevation of autonomy and independence over relatedness and interdependence, and non-intervention and self-determination over a positive involvement in others’ lives have perpetuated a global culture of neglect. Robinson’s antidote to this disturbing circumstance is a critical ethics of care, which recognises that ‘people live and perceive in a world of relationships, which are both a source of moral motivation and moral responsiveness and a basis for the construction and expression of power and knowledge’ (p. 2). Her argument in favour of this alternative moral basis for world politics makes an invaluable contribution to normative international relations.

Robinson first explores the development of the feminist ethics of care, which she describes as a ‘value and a practice which informs our daily lives, with the capacity to transform our understanding of both morality and politics and…the relationship between them’ (p. 2). According to Robinson, this approach to care transgresses the bounds typically associated with this alternative ethical program; i.e., feminist essentialism, universal justice, and parochialism. It forces us to think about the everyday needs of actual people and to contemplate how those needs will be met; it catapults fundamental questions of values into the public sphere, domestically and internationally. Thus establishing philosophical grounds for an international ethics of care, Robinson provides a detailed argument for a critical, politicised ethics of care that charges individuals and states to attend to, take responsibility for, and respond positively to a world characterised by unmatched interrelatedness and profound social and economic differences. She explains that ‘those who are powerful have a responsibility to approach moral problems by looking carefully at when, why, and how structures of existing social and personal relations have led to exclusion and marginalization’ (p. 46). Robinson’s charge serves as a timely ‘starting point’ (p. 48) for revolutionary change in international values and practices.

Robinson curiously follows this fervent call for moral transformation in international relations with an examination of traditional contractarian and rights-based ethics. Her central points that both cosmopolitan and communitarian ethics reduce our ‘complex world…of overlapping networks of personal and social relations to a world made up only of ‘men’ and ‘citizens’,’ and that these
perspectives ‘cannot go very far towards helping us to understand the suffering or the needs of real persons in moral crises’ (p. 55) is well taken, though.

Robinson then returns to her central argument that any ‘useful’ international ethics must address the structural and institutional obstacles to caring, and the extent to which all social relations are ‘infused with power and contain...the potential for exploitation and domination’ (p. 54). She argues that a critical ethics of care is consistent with a social relations approach to understanding the power-driven patterns of exclusion that exist within and among nation-states. This more general analytical approach requires a ‘focus on the relationships within which we notice and draw distinctions’ (p. 112), rather than on the distinctions that exist between individuals and societies themselves. Robinson refines and substantiates her argument by justifying humanitarian intervention and proposing strategies for eradicating poverty that recognize the importance of interpersonal and social relationships. She argues, for example, that grass-roots efforts to reduce poverty among women, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India, illustrate the significance of care for making progress in important areas of economic development. These institutions are ‘based on close, face-to-face interaction between organizations and their constituencies so that ideas and policies are shaped in the crucible of everyday practice rather than in the upper echelons of remote and rule-bound bureaucracies’ (p. 160).

The Grameen bank, in particular, provides credit to women and others who are poor and unable to receive credit elsewhere. Its success relies on groups of borrowers who make decisions about lending and serve as a basis for establishing social and professional reputations.

Robinson concludes her model application of the care ethic to international relations by reiterating that the critical ethics of care ‘demands an awareness of social relations as a starting point for ethical inquiry and a commitment to using those relationships as a critical tool for uncovering, and beginning to address, the relations of oppression and subordination which exist at the global level’ (p. 165). This is a tall order. Yet Robinson’s discussion of the Grameen bank, SEWA, and other instances of care in action attest that it is within our grasp.

JULIANN EMMONS ALLISON

Juliann Emmons Allison is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside, USA

While the English literature on Japanese politics continues to burgeon, this book is a welcome addition which outlines the recent domestic developments up to 2000. In particular, it is useful to grasp an overall picture of the transitory period following the interruption of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s post-war dominance in 1993. Still, the book in a comprehensive manner traces the turbulent transformation of modern Japan since 1868. It thus serves a wide audience, primarily students of Japanese history and domestic politics. The volume is also a handy reference for those who specialise in Japan’s international relations and the general reader.

Chapter one explains the causes and features of the Meiji Renovation (conventionally termed Restoration), the establishment of the Meiji government and the acceleration of modernisation in Japan. The consolidation of the new state and the growth of political opposition in the late nineteenth century are the main themes of chapter two. Along with the introduction of a German-style constitution, the next chapter accounts for the beginning of parliamentary politics and the formation of political parties at the turn of the century. In chapter four, the author explores the further development of political parties, the emergence of new forces and a political crisis which followed in line with the broadening of political activities in the Taisho period.

Chapter five offers a detailed explanation of the critical period (the 1920s and early 1930s) leading to the Great Depression and the Mukden Incident, bringing into focus difficulties which each cabinet faced (the Hara, Kato, Wakatsuki, Tanaka and Inukai Cabinets), as well as the new social movements and the weakness of political parties. Chapter six looks at the domestic political scene during the pre-war/wartime period (1932-45), thereby analysing the emergence of fundamentalist nationalism and explaining the divisions within Japanese ultranationalism, the increase in military influence on the government and the masculamation of the new political structure.

The last three chapters deal with the post-war period, respectively the occupation by the United States, i.e. the initial radical constitutional and institutional reforms Japan underwent and the US policy change at the later stage (1945-52); the so-called ‘1955 system’ in which the ruling LDP stayed in power and the domestic political struggle behind the major foreign policy issues such as the revision of the US-Japanese security treaty, the return of Okinawa, the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations and the Gulf Crisis (1952-93); and the post-Hosokawa period as mentioned above (1993-2000).

On the whole, the author provides a balanced view of Japanese *domestic* politics since the opening of the country to the world in a consistent manner and carefully sheds light on Kaleidoscopic Japan rather than its often-mentioned homogeneous appearance. In fact, the author points to Japan’s political stability, liberal and democratic trends and popular participation in politics on the one hand, and the
virulent form of nationalism, localism, factional conflict and anti-Establishment forces on the other.

However, the relatively detailed attention to intra-party antagonism and party politics may run the risk of losing sight of foreign policy issues. For example, with regard to the period between 1932 and 1945, when Japan undoubtedly challenged international order and security, the global-domestic connections could be analysed in more detail with reference to Japan’s overseas military conduct, since the author does scrutinise the nature of ultranationalism and military influence. The explanation of Japan’s relations with foreign powers in this period is confined to those with Washington; not much mention is made of China or Korea, or any other aspects of regional relations. The same can be said of the last chapter dealing with the post-Cold War period, when the Tokyo government was forced to adjust both the domestic and foreign policy stances to international concerns over (and expectations towards) the country on many fronts, whether Peace Keeping Operations, the structural reform of its economy or environmental issues.

Another feature of the book is that it gives more priority to the pre-1945 period as is obvious in terms of the space used. The analysis of the post-war situation is rather selective, although the author offers insightful accounts of the conservative revival in the 1980s and the LDP’s long dominance. For example, chapter eight covers four decades under the broad headline of ‘the 1955 system’; yet it is arguable that separate sections are necessary for the 1970s (when the Left generally regained strength) and the 1980s (when the conservative camp resurfaced and the middle-class consciousness of the population grew). The chapter only makes rather cursory references to important policy issues such as US-Japanese security dialogue, Sino-Japanese relations and diplomatic overtures to the ASEAN countries.

Finally, despite the title of the book, the definition of ‘political’ is not necessarily clear-cut. The reader may ask whether it means whatever issues politicians and the government are involved in, from pork-barrel politics and bribery scandals to specific issues of tax, public finance and budgets, while substantive policy issues are rather left hanging in the air. Certainly, this to a considerable extent reflects the nature of Japanese politics itself, which is, unfortunately, more often than not characterised by factional rivalry and political manoeuvring between bureaucrats, politicians and various pressure groups.

The book gives the reader the opportunity to rethink the meaning of ‘political’ in the Japanese context, when the ruling LDP began to indicate, at least, signs of change again with the arrival of the Koizumi government.

MUTSUMI HIRANO

Mutsumi Hirano is a Research Student in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science

One of the central premises of the literature concerning the role of intervention in US foreign policy is that the American public has a weak stomach for bearing casualties to solve other peoples’ problems halfway around the globe. This premise, which finds its origins both in the so-called Vietnam syndrome and in the alleged isolationist tendencies of the American public, has acquired such a currency through repetition that few commentators on international affairs bother to test its validity. In this important and well-researched new volume, Harvard political scientist Richard Sobel calls this premise into question by taking a close look at the historical record to determine how public opinion affected the US interventions in Vietnam, Bosnia, the Gulf War and Nicaragua. The importance of his analysis lies not only in its ability to challenge the predominant assumptions about America’s tolerance for paying the price of interventions but also in its ability to speak to the age-old question of whether policymakers should follow or lead public opinion.

Fortunately, Sobel, who is the Senior Research Associate at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, is well aware of the methodological difficulties implicit in studying public opinion and its effects. It is one thing to demonstrate that shifts in public mood correlated with policy shifts in the Johnson, Nixon, Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations. It is an entirely different (and far more challenging) task to prove that public opinion had a tangible impact upon policy. For this reason, Sobel rejects the anecdotal evidence used typically to assess the influence of public opinion in favour of a more systematic approach which involves extensive interviews with many surviving members of the administrations and a thorough re-examination of public statements made at the time.

Because this blend of polling data and historical evidence, Sobel’s careful research gives a far a better indication of how aware and sensitive each administration was to public opinion than most diplomatic histories or empirical analyses do. Moreover, by choosing a series of benchmark incidents (essentially decision points) within each case, Sobel effectively reduces the gap between awareness of a particular public mood and a specific decision to escalate US involvement. This allows him to better isolate the actual ‘effect’ public opinion has on specific decisions. While this approach is admittedly imperfect, it comes far closer to approximating the influence of public opinion on policy making than most works in this field of study.

If there is any fault to this methodology, it lies in Sobel’s decision to focus only on the traditional architects of American foreign policy: the president, secretary of state and secretary of defence and, in the case of aid to the contras in Nicaragua and the Congress. While this approach proves itself to be appropriate for understanding the Vietnam War, it fails to account for the shift in the balance of
power in Washington which gave greater voice to the National Security Council in the late 1980s and 1990s. For example, in the Bosnia case, Sobel does not examine the crucial role that NSA Anthony Lake played in convincing President Clinton to increase America’s involvement in Bosnia. Lake, who was acutely aware of the role of public opinion and the impact of the Bosnia decisions on the president’s re-election prospects, would probably have been a more interesting decision maker to examine in depth than Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, or Secretary of Defence, William Perry, in this instance.

But this is a minor quibble compared to Sobel’s thorough and fair assessment of the awareness and sensitivity of each administration to public opinion. Sobel is remarkably successful at wading through the rhetoric in the decision maker’s public statements and determining when they were actually responsive to public opinion and when they employed it just to back up their pre-existing policy preferences. Because his analysis is conducted with a sceptic’s eye, it manages to go beyond the prima facie and show how each administration felt constrained by the polls in different ways. His subtle treatment of the views of the Johnson and Nixon administrations during the Vietnam war illuminates how different people within the same administration could view their mandate from the public in radically different ways. Moreover, his treatment of the Bosnian crisis reveals how the Bush administration interpreted public opinion polls supporting US involvement in Bosnia in a way which almost dismissed the idea of intervention altogether.

Overall, Sobel’s central conclusion that policymakers were constrained in the timing, extent and direction of their actions by public opinion is only a modest step forward from V.O. Key’s ‘system of dikes’ theory, which held that public opinion sets limits on policymakers’ discretion. But his contribution represents a major step forward for research on public opinion in American foreign policy because of its methodological rigor and good judgment. While it does not fully refute the premise that the American public never supports interventionist foreign policies, it does provide the historical evidence needed to advance the debate. Moreover, as Sobel notes, placing these decisions in context appears to confirm that ‘there are times when leaders should heed opinion, times when they should lead opinion, and times when they should proceed despite opinion’ (p. 240). While this book does not settle the question of how a policymaker should relate to public opinion, it provides considerable insight into an understanding of how past policymakers formulated—and in some cases, regretted—their response.

MICHAEL J. BOYLE

Michael J. Boyle is a Research Student at Wolfson College, Cambridge, USA
Dave Toke, *Green Politics and Neo-Liberalism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, 213 pp., £42.50 hbk.).

Dave Toke has embarked upon a highly ambitious project. He attempts in this book to do two things that at first sight seem largely disconnected. His aim is to show how Foucauldian-inspired discourse analysis can offer more persuasive explanations and analyses of the emergence of various environmental policies, and at the same time to demonstrate how green politics is now the main alternative political project to neoliberalism, offering a powerful critique of contemporary capitalism and a means of dealing with its negative consequences.

It would be possible for an attempt to integrate these two sets of concerns to fall apart at the seams. For purists (of various sorts), the depth of the analysis will be regarded to suffer as a result. For example, the work could certainly be criticised as being a sort of ‘Foucault-lite’, in the way that the notion of discourse and conceptions of power/knowledge relations are deployed. But this sort of critique would seem to me churlish. For me, any such lack of depth in some elements of the analysis is compensated more than adequately by the brave attempt to bring these elements together in one place. And by and large, Toke manages this difficult task admirably.

The argument for connecting these two separate streams is that if we want to show the limitations of rational choice theory in explaining environmental policy, then it makes sense from a Foucauldian point of view not simply to analyse in rationalistic terms the weaknesses of rational choice approaches, but to show historically and politically the connections between rational choice theory as a ‘scientific’ project, and the explicit political projects with which it is associated. As Toke shows, the clearest connections here are between the public choice variant of rational choice theory and neoliberal politics. Thus, to reject rational choice theory as an analytical approach is simultaneously to raise questions about neoliberal politics. And conversely, to reject the damaging consequences of neoliberalism should also lead to a questioning of the main explanatory framework within which neoliberalism makes sense.

Toke therefore operates over a broad range of empirical material. He questions conventional territory in discussions of environmental policy, for example policies around energy, transport, ozone depletion, global warming, and whaling. His focus here, in the early part of the book, is to show how a discourse-analytic approach is more fruitful than rational choice approaches in explaining these policy shifts.

He then makes his crucial theoretical move, which is to connect rational choice theory to neoliberalism. This enables him to broaden out the empirical terrain significantly. Having stated (rather than really demonstrated) that green politics is the most prominent alternative to neoliberalism in the contemporary political arena, he moves on to show how a critical green discourse can be used to critique current developments and provide the foundation for alternative forms of social development. His focus here is to move away from environmental policy. He focuses in this section of the book on health (chapter five) and on performance
related pay, particularly in education (chapter six). In both, he contrasts the competition-oriented politics of neoliberalism with its associated negative effects, with a co-operative set of approaches advocated by the Greens, which both respond to current concerns in many societies and provide a normative framework for addressing these concerns.

Apart from concerns about the way Toke uses Foucault or makes the connection between rational choice theory and neoliberalism, I suspect the main criticism which will come from many is why green politics is stated to be the main alternative to neoliberalism. Toke’s argument is premised largely on an (unexplored) assumption: that traditional social democracy is now more or less finished. Its politicians have for the most part accepted the basic frameworks of neoliberalism, or become highly marginal in political terms. Some will suggest that significant elements of social democracy remain in projects like New Labour, or that if they are not, this does not mean that a revitalisation of traditional social democratic or socialist politics is still possible. While personally I share Toke’s assumptions, some will find them highly contentious.

Toke’s book is thus worth a read for any on those left, thinking about alternatives to neoliberalism. It will stimulate a critical debate about what those alternatives might look like, and in particular how green politics shows new ways of thinking about older problems such as inequality. It is also worth a read by Greens wanting to deepen their understanding of the broader political context within which they operate and how to engage with mainstream debates. For teaching purposes, it will be useful in advanced undergraduate classes and Masters classes on environmental policy and environmental politics, as well as on political economy courses focusing on responses to problems in contemporary capitalism. Its appeal might be limited by the fact that is being published only in hardback, but hopefully the publishers will remedy this shortly.

MATTHEW PATERSON

Matthew Paterson is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University
Aristotle Tziampiris pursues a dual task in this book: first, to present and explain the record of Greece’s foreign policy towards the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) against the backdrop of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) involvement in the Yugoslav crisis; and, second, to test the relevance of the theory of institutionalism against this factual evidence.

In the introductory chapter, Tziampiris revises different definitions provided by the theorists of international regimes, and assesses the purported affinity of institutionalism to liberal theories. However, by accepting the central role of the state, the anarchical nature of international ‘society’, the primacy of national interest, and the neglect of domestic politics—a point central to Tziampiris’s subsequent critique—institutionalism seems to owe more to the realist tradition than to liberal theories of international relations. Furthermore intergovernmental organisations, international institutions depend largely on the action of states as regards to both their making and function. To this extent, the identification of institutions as an ‘independent variable’ needs further explanation, in conjunction with the systemic dimension of institutionalism. Moreover, statements such as ‘the presence of at least one institution is essential for the application of institutionalism’ (p. 12) do not really go beyond a tautological level. It is also hard to imagine how two or more actors, international or otherwise, would take the trouble to curtail their freedom of action and undertake commitments, unless they perceived mutual interests. Once again, institutionalism appears too strongly grounded on realist concepts to claim a novel approach to international phenomena.

For purposes of analysis, EPC is isolated here from the wider European Community regime, of which it constituted one of the least institutionalised sectors. Tziampiris conscientiously establishes the ‘regime EPC’ as a framework for organising his study. By identifying the principles, norms, rules, decision making procedures as well as the scope and organisational form of this process, the author maps the area in which Greek foreign policy operated, at least in part, during the period covered in this book.

The five chapters that follow constitute already an important contribution to the historiography of the subject. Firstly, the author provides due background information with a significant section on the mutual interests existing between Athens and Skopje. Yet, contrary to his claim (p. 3), these common interests can hardly serve an institutionalist approach, since Greece did belong to the EPC regime where as FYROM did not.

The following four chapters contain useful and interesting information and insights into a problem, which severely tested Greece’s relations with her European partners, threw the country’s foreign policy off balance and reintroduced nationalism as a potent element of domestic political discourse. Tziampiris gained access to some previously unpublished official documents, which are reproduced.
in the appendices section of his book. A number of previous studies on the same subject—some authored by former decision makers or their associates—have also made extensive use of official material.

In his narrative exposition of the subject, Tziampiris displays a keen researcher’s eye and sound judgement coupled with a lucid style and sense of proportion. He does not probe too deep into issues of domestic politics—in particular, the question of nationalism—and tends to take categories such as ‘identity’, ‘public opinion’ and ‘popular passions’ too much for granted. The ‘conflation’ of foreign and domestic issues in Greek politics, to which Tziampiris refers, was indeed a constant feature until 1922, and was revived on account of the Cyprus question after the Second World War and during the recent revival of the Macedonian controversy. This phenomenon is central to understanding the Greek policy of confrontation and its divergence from the principles, norms and rules of the EPC regime. More than anything, it is the introduction of foreign policy matters as ‘national issues’ in the arena of partisan politics that renders policy makers hostages of the perceived public feelings which they did little to mould according to their best judgement. Then, of course, Tziampiris’ is a study primarily concerned with the external behaviour of states and, therefore, he uses the domestic dimension in order to point out a major shortcoming of the institutionalist approach. He mounts his critique ably and persuasively in the extensive conclusions.

As regards to the hermeneutic value of institutionalist theory, a single passage quoted in this book is quite illustrative. Faced with the increasing tendency of Greece’s partners towards recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, the Greek President and architect of the country’s association with European integration, Constantine Karamanlis, felt constrained to warn his counterparts: ‘in order to protect its security and national dignity [Greece would be forced to] close its borders [with FYROM] with painful results for Skopje and unpleasant [ones] for Greece and the Community’. Institutionalism may never explain what leads a country to shoot itself on the foot.

IOANNIS D. STEFANIDIS

Ioannis D. Stefanidis is a Visiting Fellow of the Hellenic Observatory in the European Institute at the London School of Economics and Political Science
Millennium

Thanos Veremis and Daniel Daianu (eds.), Balkan Reconstruction (London: Frank Cass, 2001, 270 pp., £17.50 pbk., £45.00 hbk.).

There are two prominent features in the current literature on the Balkans. The first is that the debate on the state of the Balkans has been almost exclusively security oriented, concentrating on the nature and impact of ethnic conflicts. The notions of democratisation and economic growth have been completely subordinated to the discussion on nation building and security. The second is that most studies have been dominated by a western perspective, with an outsider’s and, at times, patronising point of view.

The book Balkan Reconstruction aims to fill these gaps and for that it is an invaluable addition to the literature on the Balkans. It concentrates on the nature of the political economy, the relationship between politics and economics and the relevance of the international factor. It is a comparative study exploring both regional and country specific issues. The first part of the volume addresses some common regional features, and the second one offers separate country profiles of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FR Yugoslavia, FYR Macedonia and Romania. Finally, it is a book written by local scholars with an insightful approach to the region’s problems and prospects.

Veremis and Daianu in their introduction claim that ‘reform and reconstruction in Southeast Europe must cope with domestic hindrances and external developments’ (p. 8). These domestic hindrances are accurately presented by Marta Muco in her analysis on the weak nature of states and institutions with a low capacity to adopt and implement reforms and to enforce the rule of law. As a result, the growth of the informal sector and the criminalisation of the economy have become inherent features common to all Southeast European countries. Another domestic barrier is the increase in poverty as the main generator of instability and a result of the transition process itself, a point well presented by Ivo Bicanic. Furthermore, the latter argues that there is a disappointing growth performance, which has resulted into deteriorating poverty levels. Daianu’s discussion on the transition failures in Southeast Europe raises some very relevant questions regarding the suitability of the conventional models of transition in conflict-ridden societies, war economies and weak states. Under such circumstances, Kekic is being highly critical of Western aid in the Balkans and argues that despite its voluminous size it has not contributed to long-term development and sustainable growth. Instead, it has generated a syndrome of aid addiction and has totally stripped the countries of the notion of sovereignty. The most important international context of aid has been arguably the Stability Pact but this too has an inherent ambiguity according to Vladimir Gligorov: its ambitious nature, at a rhetorical level, versus its long term developmental sustainability at the regional level. It is interesting, however, that in the current circumstances of open market economics and a plethora of regional initiatives, the actual economic cooperation among the countries of the region, according to Milica Uvalic has been diminishing during the post-1989 period. Having said that, the author insists on the
importance of regional co-operation since, to a large degree, problems are regional and they need regional solutions.

The presentation of the country profiles in the second part of the volume raises the important issue of diversity and differentiation among the particular case studies. In fact the link between the national and the regional, the bilateral and the multilateral, is one of the most problematic issues facing the international community in its strategy towards the Balkans. All country profiles are analysed in terms of initial conditions, economic reforms, the role of external shocks and the macro-economic performance. The countries of former Yugoslavia, for instance, started from a better off position than all the other socialist countries in terms of readiness for transition. At the other extreme Albania, an overcentralised autarchic and isolated economy was by far the worst off. Common to all the countries is the unsustainable and precarious character of economic performance. The reasons for this are again diverse in each of the countries: the lack of the rule of law and extended corruption in Albania; the lack of constitutional reform and the nature of international assistance in Bosnia; the absence of governmental commitment to reform in Bulgaria; wrong transition choices and war in Croatia; the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, wars and sanctions, and the retrograde economic policies in FR Yugoslavia; high degree of vulnerability related to regional instability and the predominance of black economy in FYR Macedonia; insufficient restructuring and fragile institutions in Romania.

Faced with all these national, regional and international constraints, all the scholars in this volume tend to react to the use of conventional transition approaches and emphasise the need for investment and development, institution building and the elimination of unemployment and poverty, as the common prerequisites for the reconstruction of the Balkan region.

OTHON ANASTASAKIS

Othon Anastasakis is Research Officer in the Hellenic Observatory of the European Institute at the London School of Economics and Political Science
In *Globalization and the European Political Economy*, Steven Weber and his colleagues focus on a simple question: ‘what kind of politics does globalization engender in Europe?’ (p. 3). Taking changing governance structures as a dependent variable would by itself be nothing new, as the large literature on governance shows. However, their explicit focus on the regional level provides a promising alternative to explanations which either focus on efficiency arguments or argue that the nation state and its domestic structure are the most important. The volume analyses Europe because it constitutes a microcosm of the globalisation process due to its high level of integration of capital, labour and product markets. Furthermore, there is a parallel process of political integration under way. Europe could, thus, play the role of a ‘control variable’ for arguments on globalisation: ‘how Europe responds to globalization may foreshadow some of the pressures, dilemmas, and possibilities that other regions face over the next decades’ (p. 4).

The book stresses the fundamental importance of actors, as ‘neither markets nor prices nor any other economic variable by itself can cause institutions to change; it is political actors perceiving and responding to economic variables that is the cause’ (p. 274). This starting point allows Weber to identify three mechanisms of change, which relate actors’ motivations to political outcomes. First, there is competitive selection, which is based on efficiency criteria and represents the standard but very crude story of globalisation. Second, there is mimesis, which is about ‘institutions responding to complexity and uncertainty by copying things that seem to work’ (p. 20) and which introduces variables such as perception and legitimacy. Mimesis is seen as the most important mechanism in most contributions. Coercion is the third mechanism, and its analysis focuses on questions of power in bargaining processes. As power is never conceived as being multi-dimensional and happening already at the stage of agenda setting, it is no surprise that it is seen as playing the smallest role.

Weber formulates three hypotheses regarding the possible role of Europe as a causal variable. First, Europe might be an ‘autonomous force’ that has significant impact even in the absence of globalisation. Such a view goes contrary to most globalisation debates as they see politics as being only an intervening variable. Second, the EU might be a ‘strategic environment’, which acts as a filter and a playing field for various state and non-state actors trying to push their interests. Third, Europe might simply be an ‘empty level’ and a ‘pipeline’ that transmits global causes to states and firms (p. 18). Each chapter is supposed to contrast the influence of the EU to the ‘Political Economy Null Hypothesis’ of the book, which holds that mobility of capital, people and ideas is the driving force that—through converging prices and increased competition—leads to the adaptation of institutions (p. 17).

Surprisingly, one result of the volume is that in most cases the EU as a political space did not play a very significant role. For example, one chapter focuses on the
relation two different European regions—Tuscany and North Rhine Westphalia—have with the EU. In both cases it is evident that the relationship with the national government and the tradition of federalism in the German case, as well as central decision making in Italy have a far stronger impact on regional development than the EU.

The chapter focusing on corporate governance in Germany is interesting, as it constitutes a field in which the discourse of competitive selection is extremely strong. The argument follows the developing mainstream that corporate governance is strongly influenced by domestic variables. The author shows the importance of transnational alliances for the various market actors in Germany, but he does not consider any distinctive European coalition, probably because there is really none. However, this poses the question of how the chapter relates to the rest of the book.

In the chapter on macroeconomic adjustments in Eastern Europe, the European institutions are not really considered at all, but only global institutions, especially the IMF. Without criticising the catalytic role that domestic structures played in the pressure put upon these transition economies, it is unfortunate that the original framework and the research question were again not really considered.

The discussion of the financial markets shows that Europe’s institutions actually proved to be of causal importance in the creation of EASDAQ, the first pan-European ‘new’ market for the shares of start-ups. The authors convincingly argue the counterfactual that EASDAQ would not have been created through market pressure alone, because the market actors within the EU did not have much interest in it. The weakness of this chapter is, however, that it offers no data to prove that EASDAQ was of any importance to the market at all.

Of special interest is the analysis of the Europeanisation of values and beliefs. It shows how pressure emanating from the EU has generated domestic support in critical moments, where strong domestic opposition was eventually overcome.

Overall, the introduction promises a very sophisticated framework and gives an excellent background. Similarly, the conclusion does an excellent job. Not only does it summarise the individual chapters, but it also connects the sometimes very different issues covered by the book. However, the individual chapters follow too much their own drums, and the individual authors should have focused more on the framework laid down by Weber. The book is a good starting point to introduce the regional level into the globalisation discussion and more sophisticated in its overall outlook than usual work in the field.

MARKUS LEDERER and OLIVER KESSLER

Markus Lederer and Oliver Kessler are Research Students at the University of Munich, Germany
Millennium


Never before has globalisation—and institutions of global governance—been more at the centre of public attention as in recent times. Since the Seattle ‘Millennium Round’ in 1999, every gathering of world leaders to discuss the process of globalisation has prompted strong feelings and even ignited mayhem, as it happened recently in Genoa. Regardless of what one may think of the ‘Seattle people’ and their reasons for—and forms of—protesting against globalisation, little doubt may be cast on the importance that such a process and its implications have on contemporary society. Free trade, capital movements, migration and labour standards catalyse not only the intellectual debate among scholars and statesmen, but also daily conversations of the layman the world over. Although public awareness is the sign of a mature civil society, misinterpretations and chauvinism may cloud an already complicated picture. In such cases, further clarification and analysis are healthy and recommendable practices.

In this respect, Rorden Wilkinson’s *Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation* is a book of burning actuality and valuable insights. By analysing the laborious process that led to the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Wilkinson clarifies the motivations behind one of the most debated institutions of international capitalism. Besides tracing the historical background of the institution—from its origins in the Havana Chart, through the early attempts of the International Trade Organisation and the GATT, to the completion of the Uruguay Round and the recent events of Seattle—the purpose of the book is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the legal framework of the WTO and the practices it embodies. It is the author’s intention to ultimately address the evolving institutional framework of global governance.

The book argues that the establishment of the WTO represents a qualitative shift in the nature of international trade regulation. Never before have attempts to create a multilateral institution for liberal trade been more successful. In terms of the comprehensiveness of its competencies, the authority of its decisions, and the extent of its membership, the WTO represents the culminating point of the political process for a liberal trade regime. However, Wilkinson cautions that the free trade endorsed by such institution does not necessarily translate into fair trade. By employing the concept of multilateralism, he contends that the WTO’s legal framework embeds a series of discriminatory practices that ultimately disadvantage small, developing and transitioning countries. In his conclusions, Wilkinson agrees with Cox’s remark that ‘while appearing non-hierarchical, multilateralism in fact hides dominant subordinate relationships’ (p. 138).

Although not new, Wilkinson’s points are interesting and well structured. That the establishment of the WTO epitomises a qualitative shift in the regulation of international trade is incontrovertible. Identifying non-discrimination, reciprocity and dispute settlement as the fundamental principles of the WTO and indeed of a liberal trade regime is similarly not disputable. Moreover, the hypothesis of
recurrent malpractice in the implementation of such principles is a legitimate and plausible one. Less convincing, however, seems to be Wilkinson’s position on multilateralism. By employing multilateralism to qualify WTO’s discriminatory behaviour, the author in fact questions the viability of such an organisational practice for regulating international economic relations. The flaw in Wilkinson’s argument is to confuse principles with their implementation, by conveying the view that a multilateral process for the regulation of international trade is meant for the benefit of few powerful countries to the disadvantage of others. While thorough and comprehensive in its descriptive scope, the investigation of the WTO’s legal framework does not provide sufficient analytical evidence for such a claim. The flaws identified in the organisational and regulatory forms of the WTO in chapters four through six discuss system failures that call for improving the framework rather than questioning it altogether. As for its methodology, the study could have overcome its anecdotal nature with a more rigorous test of its hypotheses, as done in other pieces supporting the same argument. Eric Reinhardt, for example, in his 2000 Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948-1998 (mimeo, Emory University, Atlanta) uses empirical tools such as multivariate regression models.

Above all, Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation falls short of addressing the more interesting aspect of the evolution of institutions of global governance. Besides suggesting that the concerns of the civil society and the broader issue of development ‘pose the most significant barrier to the future extension of trade regulation’ (p. 140), little is said about what viable alternatives there are to explore. In that sense, the contribution to the global governance literature is somehow limited. However, in the account of the institution’s history and the description of its functioning, the careful reader will find suggestions to where improvements to the free trade system are not only desirable, but also possible. Such an improved system would still be based on David Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage, and each nation would still profit from non-coercive free trade, pace the Seattle people.

JOE E. COLOMBANO

Joe E. Colombano is Research Associate for the Human Development Economics Sector of the World Bank

For those still trying to resolve the current crisis in Macedonia, this book comes none too soon. The only former Yugoslav republic to peacefully secede in 1991, Macedonia until recently escaped the fate of its more unfortunate neighbours and managed to keep ethnic war at bay. This was not incidental as is widely believed, argues Abiodun Williams, but due to a series of preventive efforts on the part of a number of indigenous and international actors, including the United Nations, whose preventive mission provides the focus of this book. While Williams, a former political affairs officer with UNPREDEP (the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia), is careful not to persuade the reader that the prevention of violent conflict can solely be attributed to the UN’s preventive engagement, he nevertheless makes a convincing argument that UNPREDEP was crucial for Macedonia’s stability and security between 1992 to 1999.

Williams begins by emphasising that the significance of UNPREDEP was unprecedented, albeit a mission that received relatively little attention from the media and the international community. Created to prevent the spill-over of violent conflict from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, UNPREDEP’s mandate was unique—deployment prior to the outbreak of massive violence rather than following a cease-fire—although its implementation rested largely on more traditional peacekeeping practices. Conceived much in the spirit of former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace*, which emphasised the need for preventive diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, the UN’s first preventive deployment mission came as the result of a request by Macedonia’s President Kiro Gligorov in 1992. Williams’s discussion on how the preventive mission was deployed in a relatively short period of time should be of interest to anyone who in the past has lamented over the UN’s weakness to respond to conflicts more rapidly. In fact, Williams concludes from his discussion that one of the operational lessons to be drawn from the UNPREDEP experience is that timely deployment and the mustering of political will in a speedy fashion is critical to the success of a preventive mission. It is in this chapter, however, that the reader also yearns for a more detailed, or perhaps ‘insider’ account of how such timely UN decision making was possible in an institution that is renowned for its sluggishness. Which member states were most influential in supporting Macedonia’s request? How was it possible to overcome those obstacles that often prevent the deployment of peacekeepers because of lack of political will? What factors were crucial in mustering the political will? How exactly was a Security Council consensus reached leading to the deployment of a UN preventive mission in less than three months? And can any lessons be learnt from this particularly decision making experience that can be applied to other conflict situations?

While the author leaves those kinds of questions unaddressed, readers are rewarded in the subsequent two chapters with a rather well-documented account of
how UNPREDEP implemented its mandate in Macedonia. That UNPREDEP not only performed a military role of some sort but also a political and humanitarian one might come as a surprise to some who may think of preventive deployment in a strictly military sense. Williams’s description of the many incidences in which UNPREDEP’s various chief of missions exercised ‘good offices’ or actively facilitated social and developmental projects therefore is fascinating to read and provides us with a unique insight and first-hand analysis of the varied tasks performed by the UN preventive mission.

In his conclusions, Williams faces some of the same obstacles experienced by most conflict prevention scholars: the question of causation—how to account for success—and what lessons can be learnt from the UNPREDEP experience. The author takes a cautious approach here, maintaining that while it is not possible to quantitatively measure success, UNPREDEP ‘had a crucial impact on Macedonia,’ (p. 180) indicative in that it fulfilled the objectives of its mandate; violent conflict did not spill-over and the country’s stability and integrity were preserved. Certain key factors also account for the mission’s success, according to Williams, including the political will by member states to take preventive action, timely decision-making and deployment, the consent and support of the host country, a limited mandate, the ideal composition of UNPREDEP’s force in terms of its inclusion of several nationalities, and adequate resources to fulfil the military dimension of the mandate. What limited the success of UNPREDEP’s civilian mandate was insufficient resources to implement humanitarian and developmental projects on a much larger scale, and the UN’s inability to provide for more adequate economic support for Macedonia.

Overall, this book is worthwhile reading because of Williams’s convincing argument that a UN preventive mission did make a difference in a region steeped in armed conflict. What is perhaps missing at the end of the book is some speculation as to why the United Nations took so little political capital out of this preventive mission, and why we have not seen it repeated elsewhere.

ALICE ACKERMANN

Alice Ackermann is Professor of Security and Conflict Studies at the George C. Marshall Center, Garmisch, Germany
While critical theory became fashionable for International Relations (IR) theorists in the 1980s, the strains that have evolved over time overlap at some points but diverge at others, and these tendencies need illuminating in a comprehensive format. Wyn Jones first distinguishes in the introduction the strains within IR critical theory in order to begin to calm the confusion that is evident within the discipline. Starting with the decline of positivism, Wyn Jones marks the development of a need for a new epistemology to study world politics. The two major proponents of critical IR theory have been, first, the Frankfurt School, and, second, the work of Antonio Gramsci, but rarely do theorists from these two bodies of thought cross paths. However, the approaches are linked in that they all address issues of the process of emancipation (p. 9), a demanding but worthy challenge.

The book is sectioned into four parts. The first, ‘The Contours of Critical International Relations Theory’, places critical theory in the larger framework of IR theory, with chapters by Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox, and Craig N. Murphy, who are the three leaders in critical IR theory discourse of late. Linklater sets the stage by outlining a process of thought from Kant to postmodernism, highlighting the ambiguities of Western modernity that have divided and destroyed nations, states, and groups within territorial boundaries to an extent previously unseen, in a very tangible way, at the global level. Cox, who is the father of the neo-Gramscian literature in IR, addresses the ontological shift that has invited critical IR theory to fill the dialogic phase after neorealism. His notion of the contemporary ‘real world’, which has stimulated this shift, is formulated by the following: ‘(1) the social structure of the world as it is being reshaped by economic globalisation (2) the pattern of change in states and the state system (3) humanity in the biosphere (4) the subjective (or better, intersubjective) aspects of world order, or the different understandings that different categories of people have about the nature of world order’ (p. 47). With such a blueprint of the world, Craig N. Murphy goes on to discuss the legacy of Hobson, which he believes has been continued by the impulse of democratic ideology manifest in Western critical theory.

In the next section, ‘Critique in Critical International Relations Theory’, Kimberly Hutchings deciphers the nature of theories used in the critical IR literature, detailing their inter-distinctions and likewise their flight from orthodox IR, simultaneously questioning the extent of the capability of the strain to stretch the limits. Next, N. J. Rengger separates regard for the states system in critical IR theory as coming from an optimistic perspective on the concept(s) of emancipation originating from the Frankfurt school on the one hand, and from the shadowy depths of Adorno’s writings, a pessimistic approach, on the other. This dichotomy in the discourse produces what Rengger calls a negative dialectic on how to address emancipation without lapsing into ambiguity. Jeffrey Harrod reminds the reader about power relations in any IR study, and advocates the use of global
realism to illuminate those. Mark Neufeld questions what is critical about critical IR theory, recognising in particular Wendt, Rosenberg and Weber as three writers who aptly answer this.

The third section, ‘The Practice and Praxis of Critical International Relations Theory’, balances the book with some theoretical application including an analysis of peace-keeping from a feminist perspective by Sandra Whitworth and Kenneth Baynes on ‘Deliberative politics, the public sphere and global democracy’, and a discussion by Deiniol Lloyd Jones of cosmopolitan power and mediation in the context of the Oslo accords and attempted conflict resolution between Israel and Palestine. Part four provides two commentaries: first, Chris Brown discerns various influences from classic social science, concluding that critical IR theory has predominantly emerged from the Frankfurt school, and concludes by asking the soul-searching question of what it even means to be scientific. Alexander Wendt, heralded as perhaps the most innovative of young IR theorists finally looks at the binary of positivism and critical theory, making his somewhat controversial claim that they are ‘peas in the same pod’. It is a fitting ending to the book as it opens the floor to further dialogue on the way forward for critical IR theory.

The strength of the book is the pool of authorship and the nature of its comprehensiveness. After identifying the problems, not just with the literature, but with the behaviour of theorists themselves, the book itself begins to actively overcome those weaknesses. For example, Wyn Jones laments the lack of communication between authors in the broader camps emerging in critical IR theory. The pages of this book however are filled with comments and references to other authors’ work that read in a very personal and non-confrontational way: a definite change from Marx’s personal style of character assassination through textual critique. Since the tendency of the camps has been exclusion, little has been done by a single author to explain both sides and their possible crossovers or reasons for the lack thereof. This tradition is broken in the book and truly fills a gap in the literature for researchers and pioneers in the ever-changing IR field.

PHOEBE MOORE

Phoebe Moore is a Postgraduate Student in International Relations at Nottingham Trent University

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Zevelev’s book, written under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace, offers a Russian view on the thorny question of the Russian diaspora living in the states which gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Zevelev shows how the role of the diaspora is closely entwined with the process of nation-state building within Russia itself.

After a review of the Western literature in chapter one, chapter two surveys the shifting content of Russian identity over the past 150 years. Chapter three presents a crisp typology of the contending approaches to national identity within the domestic political system: state builders (both Yeltsin and Putin), ethnonationalists, restorationists, hegemonists (who want Russia to dominate the former Soviet states), and integrationists.

Zevelev homes in on a fundamental contradiction in the way most Western observers view the situation. While non-Russians were encouraged to exercise their ethnic self-determination, Russians themselves were denied this right. The 25 million Russians living outside the boundaries of the Federation were expected to assimilate if they were to enjoy full political rights in the new state. And there were expectations in the west that the Russian Federation itself will deny its Russianness and adopt an ethnically-neutral civic identity; lest it slip back into its imperialist ways. This leaves Russia as an ‘incomplete nation’ (p. 51), forced as it were to deny its identity as punishment for its past.

After 1991 the West helped and encouraged the post-Soviet states to build themselves up as nation-states in the traditional mode: sovereign entities built around a core ethnic group. It was considered appropriate and even desirable for Latvia to be ruled by Latvians, for Ukraine to make Ukrainian the main official language, and so on. In order to enjoy full political rights, the Russian diaspora would have to learn new languages and take on new ethnic identities. Russian imperialism was seen as a threat to the stability of the post-Soviet region, so the strengthening of independent nation-states was necessary to prevent a return to Russian hegemony.

Zevelev notes that Russian debates are still heavily influenced by the primordialism of Soviet ethnography, and he argues that language and culture may be more important to the self-identification of Russians than perceptions of bloodlines and shared historical destiny (p. 61). Zevelev implies that as a cultural-linguistic community the diaspora is still a meaningful entity. For novices it would have been useful to explain at an early stage the crucial terms russkii, rossiiskii and rossiyan, which are introduced piecemeal (p. 61, 65).

Zevelev cautions that the West was naïve in believing that new nation-states could be built overnight without triggering any of the phenomena which had accompanied the rise of the European nation-state over the previous centuries;
particularly, inter-state warfare and the promotion of hostility towards internal and external ethnic enemies (p. 14).

Despite Zelevlev’s well-reasoned critique, the fact remains that the nation-building strategy seems to have worked. Ten years on, the newly independent states are still there, and no inter-state wars have broken out, apart from the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh (which began before the Soviet collapse). One of the reasons why is has worked is, as Zelevlev notes, that the Russian diaspora has not behaved like a traditional diaspora (like the Jews, Greeks, Armenians, or overseas Chinese). They have not organised to defend their interests, pooled resources, and thrown up leaders. Only in Crimea and Transdniester have there been any such self-organisation by the diaspora (p. 115). A major reason for their inaction was that many of them clung to Soviet ideology, which promulgated a multinational outlook (especially for Russians) rather than ethnic self-assertion (p. 127). Instead of collective action, the diaspora turned to an individual response; emigration to Russia, which averaged more than one million per year in the first half of the 1990s, falling below 500,000 in 1997 (p. 118). One third of the migrants were forced out by conflict, and overall one half cited ethnic tensions as a reason for their departure. (The data are not entirely clear: a single table showing how many people migrated from each country each year would have helped).

Given the lack of collective action by the diaspora, state policy was the key variable in triggering (or failing to trigger) ethnic mobilisation. Russian state policy was driven by fear of a mass influx of migrants; and this point is made in chapter five, ‘The Policy of the Russian Federation Toward the Russian Diasporas’. Rather than trying to mobilise the diaspora, Moscow sought to persuade neighbouring governments to improve conditions so as to dissuade Russians from emigrating. Their failure to persuade other governments to accept dual citizenship (only Turkmenistan and Tajikistan agreed) ‘signified the practical collapse of Russia’s strategy’ (p. 137). Russia switched to a policy of encouraging de facto dual citizenship by freely issuing passports to Russians residing abroad. Moscow focused on state-building at home, limiting itself to vague expressions of concern over the rights of ‘compatriots’ living abroad. Chapter five would have benefited from a fuller discussion of Russian efforts (albeit unsuccessful) to influence language and citizenship policies in the Baltics, and its extensive economic activities in all the post-Soviet states.

In his final chapter, Zelevlev suggests that rather than revert to Wilsonian nation-building, the West should have encouraged the region to promote more transnational cooperation, a process of integration rather than division in which the Russian diaspora could have played a benign, rather than malign, role. In advancing this argument Zelevlev underestimates the extent to which Russia is still seen as a potential threat by its neighbours (p. 167). One can cite the exemplary role of Chechnya in this context.

The book draws upon a broad range of Russian sources and relates this material to the burgeoning Western debates about the nature of national identity. It is a
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thorough and insightful account, which will inform both specialist readers and those new to the topic.

PETER RUTLAND

Peter Rutland is Professor of Government at Wesleyan University, Middletown, USA