Probably Good Diagrams for Learning: Representational Epistemic Recodification of Probability Theory

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Abstract

The representational epistemic approach to the design of visual displays and notation systems advocates encoding the fundamental conceptual structure of a knowledge domain directly in the structure of a representational system. It is claimed that representations so designed will benefit from greater semantic transparency, which enhances comprehension and ease of learning, and plastic generativity, which makes the meaningful manipulation of the representation easier and less error prone. Epistemic principles for encoding fundamental conceptual structures directly in representational schemes are described. The diagrammatic recodification of probability theory is undertaken to demonstrate how the fundamental conceptual structure of a knowledge domain can be analyzed, how the identified conceptual structure may be encoded in a representational system, and the cognitive benefits that follow. An experiment shows the new probability space diagrams are superior to the conventional approach for learning this conceptually challenging topic.

Keywords: Diagrams; Representation; Learning; Problem solving; Probability

1. Introduction

The representational epistemic (REEP) approach is being developed as a method for the analysis and design of complex representations and visual displays. It has been used to design novel diagrams to support demanding task domains involving large quantities of information, including examination timetabling (Cheng, Barone, Cowling, & Ahmadi, 2002), personnel rostering (Cheng & Barone, 2004), and manufacturing production and scheduling (Cheng & Barone, 2007). Novel diagrammatic systems for learning in conceptually challenging topics in science have also been invented, including electricity (Cheng,

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2002) and kinematics (Cheng, 1999). The cognitive benefits of the novel representations have been successfully demonstrated in the laboratory (Cheng, 2002) and authentic instructional contexts (Cheng & Shipstone, 2003). For example, after 120 min of instruction with the AVOW diagrams for electricity young adult participants with little prior knowledge were able to solve problems that are challenging for students who have completed conventional courses of instruction on the topic (Cheng, 2002).

Generalizing over these studies, the central tenet of the REEP approach is that the *fundamental conceptual structure* of a target knowledge domain should be directly encoded in the structure of the representational system. Fundamental conceptual structure refers to the principal invariants, regularities, symmetries, constraints, and laws that essentially make the domain what it is, rather than some other domain. It is claimed that when the fundamental conceptual structure of a domain is directly encoded, the representational system is likely to have *semantic transparency* and *plastic generativity* (Cheng, 2002; Cheng et al., 2002). Semantic transparency concerns the availability of the conceptual content of the domain; how easily concepts can be accessed through the representational system. Plastic generativity concerns the ease of manipulating the components of a representational system to generate meaningful expressions during reasoning and problem solving. Obviously, a representation that enables its users to readily comprehend the meaning of its expressions is a desirable goal for design, as is a representation that allows meaningful statements, and only meaningful statements, to be simply and quickly derived without error. The REEP approach proposes four different design principles (Cheng & Barone, 2007), which will be enumerated and discussed in the third section of the paper. These *epistemic* principles consider how the fundamental sets of concepts that constitute a domain should each be encoded in different representational schemes and how those schemes should be coherently interrelated. Representational schemes are things such as coordinate systems, hierarchical trees, syntactic notations, spatial configurations, and geometric relations.

The primary goal of this paper is to provide further support for the claim that encoding the fundamental conceptual structure of a domain directly in the structure of the design of a representational system will yield an effective representation with semantic transparency and plastic generativity. The REEP approach is used to recodify the conceptually challenging domain of probability theory with the design of a novel diagrammatic system—probability space (PS) diagrams. The creation of PS diagrams demonstrates how to analyze the fundamental conceptual structure of a domain and how the epistemic design principles may be applied. An experiment is also reported to evaluate the relative benefits of PS diagrams and the conventional approach to learning about probability.

The REEP approach differs from other techniques in terms of its assumption about what should be the basis for analysis and design. Various approaches consider that the structure of task activities should be the focus (e.g., Endsley, Bolté, & Jones, 2003; Vincente, 1996). They provide methods for identifying the hierarchy of goals for particular classes of tasks and give guidelines for the design of displays that make information needed to support those goals readily apparent. In contrast, the REEP approach concentrates on the fundamental conceptual structure of the target domain and claims that representations design on this ''higher'' level may support a range of tasks in a domain, although not necessary as well as

a bespoke display specially created for a particular problem. Many approaches focus on the information dimensions of the target domain and attempt to map those types of information identified to visual properties or representational formats (e.g., Card, MacKinlay, & Shneiderman, 1999; Engelhardt, 2002; Zhang, 1996). In the REEP approach, matching surface-level informational dimensions to graphical properties is a secondary concern, because the larger scale representational structures that it creates to directly encode fundamental conceptual structures provides stringent constraints on permissible lower level mappings of types of information to graphical properties.

Probability theory provides an interesting test case for the REEP approach for five reasons. (a) It has a rich conceptual structure with a variety of underpinning laws that are applied to diverse situations. (b) It combines two domains of knowledge: (i) set theory and combinatorics; (ii) the theory of chance or stochastics. (c) There are alternative Bayesian and Frequentist interpretations of probability, and alternative measures of quantities of chance in terms of probabilities and odds. (d) It is imaginable that the conventional representations for the topic constitute an effective encoding of the domain, because eminent mathematicians have worked on the notations for over three centuries. Hence, creating a better representation will be an achievement for the REEP approach. (e) The counterintuitive and paradoxical nature of the domain has been well documented in the literature (e.g., Austin, 1974; Falk,1992; Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Garfield & Ahlgren, 1988; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Shafir, 1994; Shaughnessy, 1992; Shimojo & Ichikawa, 1989), and approaches to support reasoning and instruction, including innovations with visual models, are yet to make an impact on the majority students (Armstrong, 1981; Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Dahlke & Fakler, 1981; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Ichikawa, 1989; Shaughnessy, 1992).

The first of the following five sections will examine the conceptual structure of the domain as commonly portrayed in current courses on probability. The second section considers the design of PS diagrams by initially analyzing the conceptual structure of the domain and specifies how the conceptual structure is encoded in the new representation using the epistemic design principles. The third section is a theoretical comparison of the conventional approach and probability space (PS) diagrams in terms of their semantic transparency and plastic generativity. An experiment is then presented that demonstrates some of the advantages of the PS diagrams. The final discussion section draws out some of the wider implications of the central thesis that effective representations should encode fundamental conceptual structures.

2. Extant codification

The analysis of the existing codification in the conventional approach involves elaborating the conceptual content of the topic, the representational schemes used to encode that knowledge, and the procedures for problem solving. This analysis is intended to be a general characterization of how probability theory is taught to students up to an intermediate level in the latter years of high school or early in undergraduate studies in science and engineering. The sources sampled included a range of textbooks and websites that use a

variety of different instructional strategies (e.g., Ball & Buckwell, 1986; Belsom, Dolan, & Glickman, 1991; Booth, 1993; Greer, 1992; Kent, Pledger, Medlow, Woodward, & Killick, 1996; McColl, 1995; Poskitt, 2001).

2.1. Conceptual content

One difficulty faced in the analysis was to make sense of the overall shape of the conceptual landscape presented. All the sources present groups of ideas in relative isolation from each other in a sequential fashion and do not give an explicit conceptual overview of the whole topic.

The topic involves both set theory and the domain of chance. The more elementary courses rely upon students' intuitive understanding of sets and use informal expressions for set relations or they give Venn diagram examples. The advanced texts explicitly discuss set theory before considering probability theory per se.

A codification of a domain portrays a particular conceptual structure, implying that certain concepts are fundamental and providing key conceptual divisions among the ideas. Table 1 summarizes the overall structure of the conceptual content for intermediate-level courses. The organization of the table reflects the associations and categorizations that are found in the sources; in other words, Table 1 could be used a map of the concepts covered by many of the sources.

The entries in the table are laws or relations for particular classes of probabilistic situation. The top-level distinction is between single events and multiple events. The multiple events category constitutes the majority of Table 1 and is divided into subcategories that concern relations between pairs of events and relations over multiple equally probable events. A fundamental distinction is made between disjoint and joint events (mutually exclusive or not) and under joint events there are independent and dependent events. All the sources consider conjunctive and disjunctive relations under the subcategory of multiple events.

Although Table 1 captures the concepts that are essential to the domain, it is claimed that the structure is not a coherent codification of the conceptual structure of the domain. There are various manifestations of this. (a) By definition the axioms of probability theory (Equations T1, T2, and T9) are fundamental to the domain, but they do not appear to constrain the overall structure of Table 1. (b) It is not obvious why the main conceptual distinctions—columns and rows in Table 1—have this particular structure. Why should the overall structure not be symmetric? What about multiple events with unequal probabilities? In some sources the main distinctions are made informally by reference to simple situations. Other sources make the distinctions in a rather circular fashion by stating the Equations as definitions of the classes of relation and types of situation. (c) Conditional relations (T13–T15) appear to be a special class of relations occurring just in the context of multiple events. However, the probability of all events is always conditional on something: Even prior probabilities are conditionalized on the universe of interest. T4 is included in parentheses in Table 1 to highlight this point. It is claimed that this lack of coherence means that learners will acquire fragmented understanding that focuses on specific relations among events in particular types of situations rather than the underpinning concepts and large meaningful patterns.

Table 1
Conceptual structure of probability theory in the conventional approach

	Single events (A – event, U – universal set)			
	(T1[a]) P(U) = 1	(T2[a]) $0 \leq P(A) \leq 1$	(T3) P(A) = 1−P($\sim$A)	{(T4) P(A) = P(A|U)}[b]

	Multiple Events (A, B – events)		
		Joint	
Relations	Disjoint	Independent	Dependent
Conjunction	(T5) P(A and B) = 0	(T6) P(A and B) = P(A)P(B)	(T7) P(A and B) $\quad$ = P(A) + P(B)−P(A or B) (T8) P(A and B) = P(A|B)P(B)
Disjunction	(T9[a]) P(A or B) $\quad$ = P(A)+P(B)	(T10) P(A or B) $\quad$ = P(A) + P(B) − P(A and B) (T11) P(A or B) $\quad$ = 1 − P($\sim$A and $\sim$B)	(T12) P(A or B) $\quad$ = P(A) + P(B)−P(A and B)
Conditional	(T13) P(A|B) = 0, $\quad$ P(B|A) = 0	(T14) P(A|B) = P(A), $\quad$ P(B|A) = P(B)	(T15) P(A|B) $\quad$ = P(A and B)$/$P(B), $\quad$ P(B|A) = P(B and A)$/$P(A)
Complex	(T16) P(A|B) = P(B|A)P(A)/P(B)		
	Equi-probable multiple events (N, M – possible outcomes)		
	(T17) P(i) = 1/N, $\quad$ ΣP(i) = 1	(T18) P(i,j) = 1/(N.M), $\quad$ $\Sigma\Sigma$P(i,j) = 1	
Permutations[c]		(T19) No. of $\quad$ outcomes = n^k	(T20) No. of $\quad$ outcomes = $\frac{n!}{(n-k)!}$
Combination[c]		(T21) No. of $\quad$ outcomes = $\frac{(n + k-1)!}{k!(n-1)!}$	(T22) No. of $\quad$ outcomes = $\frac{n!}{k!(n-k)!}$

[a]Axioms of probability theory.
[b]Not normally stated explicitly.
[c]k selected objects from an initial set of *n* objects.

Two main notational systems are used: (i) set theory notation, or natural language as proxy at intermediate levels of instruction; (ii) algebra to relate quantities of probability. Set theory expressions are embedded within algebraic probability expressions; for example, Equations T1–T18. During problem solving, activity typically switches between them, but the sources provide little guidance for the coordinated manipulation of the notations. Other representations are also used, including informal lists of events; statements about particular relations or cases; outcome tables; contingency tables; Venn diagrams; and tree diagrams. One role of these supplementary representations is to disentangle reasoning about events in set theoretic terms from reasoning about probabilistic relations.

2.2. Conventional problem-solving procedure

The generic procedure for the conventional approach (see Table 2) was derived by examining problem solutions at various levels of difficulty in the instructional sources. The

Table 2
Generic problem-solution procedure for the conventional approach

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Analyze

A.1) If outcomes disjoint, then consider number of events:

    A.11) if a single event, then consider nature of the probabilities of the outcomes:

        A.111) if equal probabilities problem, then list items of interest:

        A.1111) if simple problem, then list all items and select target outcome.

        A.1112) if complex problem, then list relevant items and select the target outcome.

        A.112) if unequal probabilities problem, then consider individual probability values:

        A.1121) if simple problem, then list selected items with associated values and select target outcome.

        A.1122) if complex problem, then draw up a one-way outcome table and select target outcome(s).

    A.12) if multiple events, then consider nature of the probabilities of outcomes:

        A.121) if equal probabilities, then consider number of events:

        A.1211) if two events, then generate a systematic list or use a two-way outcome table and select target outcomes.

        A.1212) if many events, then use a recursive tree diagram to enumerate relevant outcomes and select target outcomes.

        A.122) if unequal probabilities, then list relevant outcomes with their probability values and select the target outcomes.

A.2) If events joint, address the relation between events:

    A.21) if events dependent, then consider number of events:

        A.211) if one event, then consider the nature of the probabilities of the outcomes:

        A.2111) if equal probabilities, then consider number of types of outcomes:

        A.21111) if one type of outcome, then use a Venn diagram.

        A.21112) if two types of outcomes, then use a two-way table.

        A.2112) if unequal probabilities, then use a Venn diagram to elaborate set relations and write target outcomes with probability values.

        A.212) if sequences of events, then use a tree diagram with dependent branches and values and select target outcomes.

    A.22) if outcomes independent, then use a tree diagram with repeated branches and values, or contingency table, to select the target outcomes.

Calculation

C.1) If events are disjoint, then:

    C.11) if equal probabilities, then count number of outcomes of interest and use T17 to find probability of each outcome.

    C.12) if unequal probabilities problem, then use T5, T9, or T13 depending on target relation.

C.2) If events are joint, then consider the number of events and outcomes:

    C.21) if the number of events and outcomes are small, then consider nature of the relations between events:

        C.211) if independent events, then consider nature of probabilities:

        C.2111) if outcomes are equi-probable, then compute number of outcomes of interest and use T18 to find probability of each outcome.

        C.2112) if unequal probabilities, then use T6, T10, T11, or T14 depending on target relation.

        C.212) if dependent outcomes, then consider complexity of dependencies:

        C.2121) if simple dependencies, then use T7, T8, T12, or T15 depending on target relations.

        C.2122) if complex interconnected dependencies, then use Bayes theorem, T16.

    C.22) if events and/or outcomes are numerous, then consider nature of probabilities:

        C.221) if equal probabilities, then use T19–T22 depending on the natures of dependencies and the target relations.

        C.222) if unequal probabilities, then use Bayes' theorem, T16.

procedure consists of rules in the form of a tree, with disjunctive alternatives at the same level (e.g., A.11 or A.12) and conjunctive sequences descending the levels (e.g., A.11 then A.111 then A.1111). There are two main branches. The first is the analysis of the class of the problem, which in effect involves finding the relevant section of Table 1, and the selection of an appropriate representation. The second stage is to find the appropriate law or relation to apply to the given information; finding a specific equation in Table 1. A solution may involve several passes through the procedure with different aspects of the given problem considered each time. This procedure is representative of the approaches in the instructional sources and no claim is made that it is optimal for the conventional approach.

Consider a typical UK high-school-level mathematics problem, which will serve as an ongoing example and is one of the test items used in the experiment below. *Biased die problem: A biased die is thrown once in which the chances of an odd number is twice that of an even number. What is a probability of getting a 4 or a 6?* Although seemingly straightforward it has the complication that the probabilities of the outcomes are given as a relation rather than as absolute magnitudes, which will test whether a student can apply the idea that all the disjoint probabilities of a trial must sum to unity. Applying the solution procedure gives this solution:

(1) The situation involves disjoint outcomes (A.1) for one event (A.11) with unequal probabilities (A.112). It is relatively complex (A.1122) so a one-way outcome table enumerates the possible outcomes; Fig. 1, top row.
(2) Relative magnitudes of the probabilities are given, so the outcome table lists the magnitudes using x as an unknown common factor. This is operation specific to this type of problem.
(3) As the events are disjoint (C.1) the probabilities must sum to unity (C.11), $9x = 1$, so the common factor is $x = 1/9$. (Equation T17 is used, with odd numbers doubled up.)
(4) Probabilities for each outcome are put in the third row of the table (C.11, equation T17 again).
(5) The focus now shifts to the outcomes of interest. The situation is now disjoint (A.1), with multiple (i.e., >1) events (A.12) of equal probability (A.121) and there are precisely two events (A.1211), so each target is highlighted in Fig. 1.
6) Finally, the probability for a pair of disjoint events is computed using Equation T9 or T17. The answer is 2/9.

Presented in this fashion the solution seems simple, but it is demanding for problem solvers who are uncertain of the many concepts and not in possession of Tables 1 and 2.

Number	1	2	3	4	5	6
	2x	x	2x	x	2x	x
Probability	2/9	1/9	2/9	<u>1/9</u>	2/9	<u>1/9</u>

Fig. 1. Outcome table for biased die problem.

Five passes through the procedure, one special operation, and 12 decision steps must all be executed correctly. See Cheng (2003) for the analysis of a more complex example.

3. Probability space diagrams

Fig. 2 shows a sample probability space (PS) diagram to give an initial sense of the general character of PS diagrams. It represents the situation of tossing a coin that is biased towards heads and then either the throwing of a fair die when a head appears or the tossing of a fair coin otherwise. The total length of the two thick line segments relative to the overall width of the diagram represents the probability of obtaining either a head and an even prime number or two tails.

This section begins with the analysis of the conceptual structure of the topic. The representational structure of PS diagrams is then described in relation to the REEP epistemic design principles. The generic problem solving procedure for PS diagrams then follows.

3.1. Analysis of conceptual structure

The process of discovering of the ''universals'' of a knowledge domain in the REEP approach focuses on the prevalence of concepts across the *conceptual dimensions* that may be manifest in a domain (Cheng & Barone, 2007). We propose seven classes of conceptual dimensions: entities; properties; time; structures; behaviors; functions; and formal laws.

The *entities* conceptual dimension is relevant here, because all considerations of the domain refer to entities, or objects, such as the face of a die, the outcome of a test, and a particular suit and number of a playing card. The *properties* conceptual dimension is pertinent as all entities have context specific attributes defined by the problem situation and all entities possess some magnitude of chance of occurring. There are relevant aspects of the *structural* conceptual dimension relating to notions of collections and associations, because target entities may be meaningful subgroups (e.g., 4 and 6) of parts of components (even numbers) of larger structures (die). The first axiom, Equation T1 (Table 1), highlights the central importance of the idea of subdivisions of a whole, with the given problem situation treated as a universe in itself. Conditional situations are also grounded in the same idea, with a portion of the universe of interest treated in relative isolation. As noted above, even prior probabilities are strictly speaking conditional probabilities. Conditional situations also invoke the *functional*


Fig. 2. Sample PS diagram.

conceptual dimension because they depend on the idea of contingency. In probability problems there is a sense of purposefully (functionally) doing something on the basis of something else being the case, or the deliberate organizing or differentiation of things. Aspects of the *formal laws* conceptual dimension are the underpinning role of set theoretic concepts and the mathematic definitions and relations that hold among quantities of probability.

In contrast to all the others, the *temporal* and *behavioral* conceptual dimensions are secondary. Some situations are described temporally, with things happening in sequence or simultaneously, but the full richness of the temporal concepts are not typically invoked (e.g., periods, absolute time). The *behavioral* conceptual dimension, which covers notions such as movement and change, occurs relatively rarely; for instance, with the notation of repetition in selection problems. As considerations of the domain almost always involve all but two of the conceptual dimensions, coordinating these related perspectives will be a challenge when dealing with the conceptual structure of probability theory.

This analysis draws out aspects of the domain that are not explicit in the conventional approach, including the following: (a) the underpinning idea of subdividing given situations into isolated packages for local consideration; (b) the existence of distinct functional relations and structural perspectives; and (c) the extent to which concepts from alternative conceptual dimensions mutually provide contexts for each others interpretation. Hence, the new codification adopts alternative sets of core ideas as the essential conceptual foundation of the new codification. These are as follows:

(1) *Probability space* captures the idea that situations in probability problems can be carved up into parts for separate examination and recombination as new patterns, by using the physical space of the representation as a medium for modeling.
(2) *Trials* and *outcomes* replace the more general concept of *event*. In modeling a probabilistic situation, a *trial* is one action, such as making a selection, conducting a test, or throwing or flipping something (die/coin). All the possible results of the action of a trial are the *possible outcomes* and one particular result of interest is a *target outcome*. Trials are separate things that can potentially happen at different times, whereas possible outcomes are potential alternatives that *might* occur at a particular instant.
(3) *Arrangements* are concerned with the fixed structural relations among the possible outcomes of a single trial, which in turn depends on the properties of objects that are deemed to be of interest by the given situation.
(4) *Linking* encompasses the functional relations that span multiple trials, which may associate particular outcomes and affect their probabilities, as defined by the given situation.

3.2. Epistemic design principles: Encoding conceptual structure

The purpose of the principles is to guide the creation of a new representation that will directly encode the core sets of fundamental concepts. To help explain them, Fig. 3 shows a PS diagram that models patients attending an imaginary heart clinic. The observation of

Fig. 3. PS diagrams. (A) Generic example with (B and C) superimposed schemes of core sets of concepts.

symptoms, S, and a blood test, T, are two trials. The possible outcomes of S are high blood pressure, H, low blood pressure, L, and irregular pulse, P. The possible outcomes of T are infections: viral, V; fungal, F; and bacterial, B. The region between the vertical bounding parallel lines defines the overall probability space for this situation. The possible outcomes of the second trial do not overlap (they are disjoint); as are H and L in the first trial. H and L are complements. P partially overlaps H and L. V always coincides with H, and F or B may be associated with L. If F is diagnosed, then L and P will be symptoms. For this example, letters also represent the properties, but PS diagrams may in general have separate property labels. The prior probability of an outcome is represented by the length of its line in proportion to the overall width of the space. H, P, L, and V are all equi-probable and both F and B are less likely but approximately equal to each other. The conditional probability of F given L is given by the ratio of the lengths of their respective line segments, which is greater than the prior probability of F, as it is conditionalized over the whole space. The conditional probability of H given V (or V given H) is unity. Fig. 4 illustrates more fully some of the situations that PS diagrams can model (rows) and how different relations among possible outcomes are encoded (columns). It will also now help to explain the principles.

(1) *For each set of core concepts, a different representational scheme should be used in order to differentiate the sets of concepts from each other.* In other words, concepts associated with different conceptual dimensions can naturally be distinguished by the different ways in which each representational scheme encodes information. Fig. 3B and C show schematically the schemes that are used to capture the different primary

Fig. 4. Models of probabilistic situations and relations. The thick black line in each PS diagram is the probability of the relation given at the head of the column.

sets of concepts. The spatial distribution of representing entities encodes the structural concepts, with horizontal and vertical space used for different classes of structures; as depicted in Fig. 3B and by the columns and two groups of rows in Fig. 4. Structural relations, including the identification of subspaces, are horizontal arrangements of subregions relative to each other or relative to the overall space. Specific set theoretic relations are represented by particular configurations of outcome segments, with the line segments on a trial line serving like a 1D Venn diagram (e.g., Fig. 4, columns 1 and 2; Fig. 3C, top). Entities that are possible outcomes are labeled line segments to which additional labels for specific properties may be added if required (Fig. 3C, left). The quantities of the domain, probabilities of outcomes, are encoded by the scheme that the length of each line segment for an outcome stands for its magnitude, in proportion to the whole space or a given subspace (Fig. 3B, bottom). Functional relations use the scheme of relative vertical alignment in order to encode linked outcomes across trials (Fig. 4, bottom half). The arithmetic and algebraic laws that relate quantities of probability are captured by geometric relations among the outcome segments within or between trial lines (e.g., Fig. 3C, left).

(2) *To coherently interrelate the different representational schemes that encode each set of core concepts, an overall global interpretive framework should be employed.* More

precisely, the representational schemes that encode sets of core concepts should themselves be related to each other at a higher level in a manner that captures the way that sets of concepts are related to each other in the domain. PS diagrams integrate the orthogonal representational schemes for the core concepts by sharing graphical objects but exploiting different graphical properties of those objects for each set of core concepts. For any line segment standing for a given outcome, all of these concepts are co-present and can be readily related to each other: information about the trial to which it belongs (vertical position); its specific properties (labels); its probability (relative horizontal length); its relation to other outcomes in the same trial (degree of overlap); and its relation to outcomes of other trials (vertical alignment). Thus, we see how multiple constraints interact to determine the magnitudes of probability, as illustrated by the intersection of columns and rows in Fig. 4. For instance, when there is no overlap in a single trial, then the probability of *A and B* and of *A given B* are both zero (row 1, column 1 and 3). In the case of multiple trials, the probability of the conjunction of A with B depends upon the nature of the linking (rows 4–6) and whether the relation is a simple *and* or an *and then* (columns 1 and 4, respectively).

The value of a thoroughgoing interpretive framework to coordinate the different schemes for sets of concepts can be seen in the way that it drives the generation of PS diagrams. For example, although we might at first attempt to draw the case of taking the sum of two identical dice thrown simultaneously as a single trial, the global framework tells us this will not work. Two trials are necessary for functional linking relations, that is, taking the sum. Of course, had the problem given all of the possible outcomes and their magnitudes, then one could treat this situation as a single trial.

(3) *The individual representational scheme for each set of core concepts should coherently encode the various levels or aspects of those concepts.* This principle concerns the encoding of one set of core concepts in one representational scheme: The different aspects of the concepts should be captured by the scheme in a way that consistently differentiates and yet coherently interrelates the concepts in the set. This parallels the previous principle but at a lower level. Consider how this principle applies to some of the sets of core concepts identified above. (a) A representational scheme based on the length of line segments and the width of spaces encodes the fundamental concepts associated with probability values. Within this scheme particular concepts relating to the alternative measures probability are interrelated and also differentiated. From the Bayesian perspective a magnitude in the range [0,1] is given by the length of the target outcome segment in proportion to the whole width of its space. Under a Frequentist reading the width of the space represents the total number of entities and the length of a segment gives the number of entities of its type. For Odds measures of probability, which range from 0 to ∞, a magnitude is given by the ratio of the length of the target outcome line segment to the length of its complement (e.g., H:L = 1:1 in Fig. 3A). All these alternative conceptions are related under the single scheme yet also differentiated through the alternative readings of the scheme. (b) The scheme for the structural set of concepts uses the distribution of elements in space and within it vertical and horizontal space, respectively, differentiate trials versus subspaces or

possible outcomes. In terms of Fig. 4, this distinction maps to (i) rows in the upper and lower halves versus (ii) the column headers. (c) The scheme for functional relations uses vertical alignment between trials and different concepts that constitute alternative types linking relations that have different alignment patterns: such as repeating situations (no linking); varying magnitudes of probability; and varying the possible set of outcomes (Fig. 4, bottom left).

(4) *Sets of concepts for secondary conceptual dimensions should be integrated within the global interpretive scheme.* The representational scheme for a secondary set of concepts should augment the representational schemes for the primary sets of concepts in a manner that encodes the relation between the primary and second sets of concepts. An example is temporal concepts in PS diagrams. The medical situation modeled in Fig. 3 did not specify whether S or T occurred first, but if it had the spatial representational scheme for trial structures could have been supplemented with a time dimension running from top to bottom (Fig. 3B, left), or vice versa depending on the order of the trials.

3.3. Solution procedure

The generic problem solution procedure for PS diagram is different to that of the conventional approach. Table 3 shows its three phases for modeling, interpretation, and calculation. The first stage involves drawing a PS diagram that models the outcomes on each trial. If there is more than one trial, care must be taken with the alignment and scaling of the outcomes across the trials in order to preserve the nature of the linking. The second phase involves selecting the outcomes of interest and the relations that hold over them, which may or may not take into account the order of occurrence of the trials. The final phase is the calculation of the required probability as the ratio of the length of the target line segment(s) to the overall width of the probability space or the relevant subspace.

Fig. 5 shows the PS diagram solution to the biased die problem. The three solution phases are as follows:

(1) Modeling: A trial line is drawn (M.1) by incrementally adding segments for each outcome (M.11) whose relative lengths are in proportion to the relative likelihood of the outcomes (procedure M.112, Table 3). The overall width of the probability space is found; for example, $2 + 1 + 2 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 9$ drawing units.
(2) Interpretation: The target outcomes are highlighted (I.a1, I.b2).
(3) Calculation: Their lengths are summed and compared with the overall length of the trial line (e.g., $[1 + 1]/9 = 2/9$) (C.1).

The solution to this problem is straightforward with just one pass through the solution procedure involving relatively few decision steps. See Cheng (2003) for a more complex example that also requires a single pass through the solution procedure. Some evidence of the efficacy of PS diagrams has been obtained by using them to provide solutions to infamous puzzles, such as Simpson's Paradox and the Monty Hall dilemma, that dissolve their apparent counterintuitiveness (Cheng & Pitt, 2003).

Table 3
Generic PS diagram problem solution procedure

Modeling situation
M.1) If single trial:
    M.11) identify all outcomes and construct line for the trial:
      M.111) if equal probabilities, then segments equal for outcomes.
      M.112) if unequal probabilities, then make segment proportional to their probabilities.
M.2) If multiple trials:
    M.2a) choose an order of trials and consider each trial in turn:
    M.2b) draw first trial using rule M.1
    M.2c) for second and subsequent trials:
      M.2c1) if trials unlinked, then repeat the trial drawn to scale under each outcome of previous trial.
      M.2c2) if trials linked, then draw the next trial under each outcome consistent with local problem constraints:
        M.2c2a) if outcomes are linked across trials, then change the possible set of outcomes.
        M.2c2b) if probabilities linked, then change relative length of outcomes.
Interpretation
I.a) Identify target outcome(s) or sequences of outcomes:
    I.a1) if single trial, then select target outcome.
    I.a2) if multiple trials, then consider nature of outcomes of interest:
      I.a21) if particular outcomes in some of the trials are of interest, then select those outcomes.
      I.a22) if outcomes across trials are of interest, then consider sequences down the diagram:
        I.a221) if permutations, then consider segments down diagram in order.
        I.a222) if combinations or conjunctions, then consider columns containing the target in any order.
I.b) Select outcome relation of interest:
    I.b1) if outcome/sequence or its complement, then it is the target.
    I.b2) if union, then the target encompasses outcomes/sequences of interest.
    I.b3) if intersection, then the target is the overlap of outcomes/sequences.
    I.b4) if conditional, then identify subspace for target segment.
    I.b5) if permutation, then the target is the desired sequence.
Calculation
C.1) Compute the probability by comparing the line segment length of the target in proportion to the width of
    the (sub)space.

4. Theoretical comparison

This section aims to theoretically demonstrate that PS diagrams have greater semantic transparency and plastic generativity than the conventional approach and that this is a consequence of directly encoding the fundamental conceptual structure of probability theory.

4.1. Semantic transparency

A representation has semantic transparency when the meanings of the contents of the domain are readily accessible from the representation.


Fig. 5. PS diagram solution to the biased die problem.

(1) One form of semantic transparency occurs when the terms used in the representation are unambiguous and coherent. Because PS diagrams directly encode the notations of *trials*, *outcomes*, *linking,* and *overlapping* using one-to-one mappings of the concepts to distinct types of graphical features, PS diagrams appear to have this form of semantic transparency. This is manifest in the way that every item of Fig. 4 clearly reflects the structure of the component diagrams and the verbal labels in the headers of its row and its column. The conventional approach appears to lack conceptual coherence. It uses technical terms to denote theoretically distinct concepts, but the terms also have everyday meanings that are similar (e.g., *joint*, *union*, *dependent*). Although the concepts of *trial* and *outcome* are sometimes used in the conventional approach, the definition of probability relations in terms of *events* predominates (i.e., Table 1). The relative absence of this form of semantic transparency is also revealed by the fact that the verbal labels in the column header of Table 1 seem arbitrarily related to the specific forms of the equations below.

(2) The size of the conceptual gulf between abstract general laws and specific concrete cases is another aspect of semantic transparency. The axioms and relations of probability theory are built into the fabric of PS diagrams, which means the conceptual gulf is small. For example, first and second axioms are always readily apparent, because the first relates to the overall width of the probability space and the second demands that any subspace or outcome must be located entirely within the overall space. In the conventional approach the supplementary representations, such as Venn and tree diagrams, are needed as bridges to span a conceptual gulf between the algebraic laws and the concrete details of a problem.

(3) Integrating different conceptual perspectives present in a domain is another aspect of semantic transparency. The prime example here is the relation between set theory and probability ontologies. Set theoretic expressions are simply nested within probability expressions in the conventional approach, but they do not mutually support each other's interpretation. Constraints external to the expressions must be imposed to ensure the association is valid. In contrast, PS diagrams integrate the perspectives by directly mapping the different ontologies to alternative graphical features of the same objects. Hence, any transformation of a PS diagram will simultaneously reveal changes to probability concepts and to set theoretic concepts. The simultaneous encoding of different measures of chance is also another example of this form of integration.

In a similar fashion it may be argued that PS diagrams have greater semantic transparency as they (4) integrate of the various scales of granularity that are present in the domain and (5) interrelate and distinguish prototypical, special, and extreme cases.

4.2. Plastic generativity

An effective representation should allow meaningful expressions that meet problem-solving goals to be readily generated but in a fashion that is constrained. It is claimed that a representation that directly encodes the fundamental conceptual structure of its domain is likely

to have plastic generativity. The comparison of PS diagrams and the conventional approach provides some support for the claim.

Probability space diagrams appear to have greater plastic generativity in various ways. (a) They require a small number of procedures for manipulating expressions; compare Tables 2 and 3. (b) PS diagrams yield a smaller and less complex problem state space for many tasks. The greater number of decision points and operations in the conventional approach increases the potential for selecting and pursuing unproductive solution paths. A single pass through the ideal PS diagram procedure is typically sufficient, but the conventional approach often applies the procedure recursively. (c) PS diagram solution procedures are more uniform than for conventional approach as they revolve around one representation. The diverse strategies of the conventional approach is a consequence of the need to navigate its complex conceptual structure and due to the requirements of managing the two primary notations and the supplementary representations. (d) The conventional approach often demands a well-formed overall strategy to be selected before beginning a solution attempt. In contrast, problem solving with PS diagrams can proceed through the gradual exploration of the structure of the problem with the incremental modeling of the given situation before any interpretation is needed in terms of potential target relations.

4.3. Limitations of PS diagrams

The complexity of the problems that PS diagrams can model in a single diagram is naturally limited to, say, no more than four trials with several independent outcomes, although particular strategies can be used to overcome this limitation in some cases, such as the grouping of combinations of outcomes. The generic procedure for PS diagrams works for simple quantitative problems. However, more advanced problems that involve the derivation of a relation among different quantities, or finding the maximum value of some parameter, may be easier to solve with the conventional approach, because full machinery of algebra and differential calculus can be brought to bear on the relations in Table 1.

5. Empirical evaluation

An experiment was conducted that involved teaching basic probability theory to naïve learners using either PS diagrams or the conventional approach: PSD and CON groups, respectively. It was predicted that the PSD group would acquire a better conceptual understanding of the domain, which will be revealed by greater gains in their ability to solve probability problems, particularly on more difficult test problems and transfer problems. If PS diagrams are effective tools for thinking about the domain and easier to use, then compared to CON group using their own representations after instruction the PSD group should be using PS diagrams more and with a higher success rate.

5.1. Experiment

5.1.1. Measures of learning

Twenty probability problems (Q1–Q20) were adapted from UK school mathematics texts for 16 year olds (Greer, 1992; Kent et al., 1996). They had five alternative answers, with four incorrect answers that were plausible alternatives generated through common errors. The same problems were used in the pretest and posttest. The biased die problem, above, is a representative item (Q5).

Three transfer problems followed the posttest: (a) the card problem involved a complex conditional situation (Cheng, 2003); (b) the cab problem, a typical base-rate problem; and (c) the infamous Monty Hall dilemma. It was not expected that participants would obtain correct solutions to them; rather the aim was to examine the extent to which the participants would use the methods they had learned.

5.1.2. Materials

Mini-curricula were devised for each of the representations. For the conventional representation, a popular modern school mathematics text was adapted (Greer, 1992). The subtopics covered included the notion of probability; the probability scale; relative frequency; (in)dependent events; (not) mutually exclusive events, including Venn diagrams; tree diagrams, and repeated trials. Although the content was largely unaltered, the presentation was modified to suit individual study, with sections introducing a particular topic interspersed with worked examples, practice exercises, and their solutions. At an abstract level, the PS diagram curriculum covered the same general content, but the specific topics and their sequence were designed to suit the novel representation. The project team developed the mini-curriculum without specialist advice from experts in the pedagogy of this topic. The same overall style of instruction was used. Presumably, the pedigree of the conventional text used to develop the mini-curriculum biases the experiment against the PS diagrams approach.

5.1.3. Participants

Thirty-three undergraduates, 25 female and 7 male, were recruited from arts and humanities degree courses at a UK university and were paid to participate. All the participants had a GCSE mathematics qualification (UK high school examination at age 16 years) but none had a higher mathematics qualification. The mean age of the participants was 19 years 4 months (range 18–23 years). They were randomly assigned to the PSD group or the CON group. Three participants left the study for reasons unconnected to the experiment, leaving 15 in each group.

5.1.4. Procedure

The experiment was conducted over four sessions of approximately 50 min at weekly intervals, with the pretest and posttest in the first and last. The middle two were instructional sessions. All the test and instructional materials were presented in booklets, and plain paper was used for writing solutions. In the posttest, participants were requested to

talk aloud while working as audio and video recordings were made, although these are not analyzed here. Participants were encouraged to make two attempts at the transfer problems.

5.2. Results

5.2.1. Learning gains

On the basis of mixed design 2×2 ANOVA there was a significant main effect of time [$F(1,28) = 9.01$, $p < .01$, MSE = 33.8], but there was no main effect of group and no significant interaction. The mean learning gains (and *SD*) of the PSD group given by the number of correct posttest minus pretest answers was 2.0 (2.7) and was 0.8 (2.9) for the CON group, but this difference is not significant (by a *t* test). However, from the proportion of all participants correctly answering each problem in the pretest, a binary split identified the 10 hardest and easiest problems. Fig. 6 gives the mean scores for the two levels of problem before and after instruction for both groups. The hard problems reveal an interesting effect, with a mixed design 2×2 ANOVA, on group by time of test, showing a significant main effect of time [F(1,28) = 17.9, $p < .001$, MSE = 43.4] and a significant interaction [F(1,28) = 4.3, $p < .05$, MSE = 10.4]. The increase PSD group score from 3.87 (*SD* = 2.13) to 6.40 (2.38) is significant by a *t* test, $p < .001$; but the increase of the CON group from 2.60 (1.81) to 4.47 (2.03) is not. The difference between the two groups at pretest was not significantly different, but it was at posttest, $p < .05$. After repeating the analysis with the hard category including 1/3 or 2/3 of the hardest problems, the same overall pattern of better PSD group performance was evident.

5.2.2. Representation use

The PSD group drew more PS diagrams than whatever expressions the CON group wrote, with mean proportions of use (and *SD*s) of 80.7% (29.3%) versus 55.3% (17.0%), which is significant at $p < .01$ by a *t* test. When representations were used on a problem, the mean proportion of correct answers was 72.8% (13.5%) for PSD group and 53.0% (25.2%) for the CON group, which is significant at $p < .01$. When correct answers were given, then the mean proportion of times that PS diagrams or conventional representa-


Fig. 6. Learning gains on the easy and hard problems.

tions had been used was 81.0% (20.6%) and 52.8% (29.1%), respectively, which is again significant at $p < .01$.

The participants work scratchings provide further evidence that the diagrams drawn by the PSD group were instrumental to their success on the problems. Their solutions to the biased die problem (Q5) in the posttest is a representative example. In the CON group: 14 wrote something for this problem; three identified possible outcomes; five noted that the chances of an even number was twice that of an odd number; four gave the common divisor as 1/9; four wrote mathematic expressions; eight got the correct answer, but two admitted it was a guess. In contrast, of the 15 PSD participants: 13 drew something; 13 included a trial line; 13 showed segments for possible outcomes; 13 drew segments for odd numbers longer than even numbers; 12 highlighted the target; 13 gave the correct answer; none reported guessing. Figs. 7 and 8 each show two sample solutions from each group. Fig. 7A is the solution closest to the ideal solution given in Fig. 1. Fig. 7B is a typical CON participant's solution. Although Fig. 8A and B have been chosen to show the full range of PS diagram solutions, their similarity to the ideal solution, Fig. 5, and to each other, is obvious. The PSD group are modeling the problem situation and then interpreting the constructed diagram to find the answer—a pattern that is common to the other problems.

5.2.3. Transfer problems

Consider first the card problem that involved a complex conditional situation. The CON group were able to identify and record the information given in the problem, but they were unable to do anything meaningful with it. However, one third of the PDS group solved the card problem correctly, which constitutes a significant difference compared to the CON group (Fisher exact test, $p = .021$). Nearly all the PSD group participants were able to model the given situation correctly and over half considered the conditional target relation.

Fig. 7. CON group solutions to the die problem: (A) most complete attempt (CON 9); (B) typical attempt (CON 12).

Fig. 8. PSD solutions to the die problem: (A) best solution (PSD 4); (B) typical solution (PSD 6).

No participant in either group solved the cab base-rate problem or the Monty Hall problem, but for both problems 13 participants in the PSD group drew diagrams that were clearly PS diagrams, whereas none of the CON group used a tree diagram or a contingency table, which would have been appropriate. The CON group solution attempts were idiosyncratic notes and calculations, with little coordination of the problem information in the external representation.

5.3. Discussion of empirical evaluation

The results are consistent with the general prediction of the superiority of PS diagrams. PS diagrams supported learning better than the conventional approach, as made apparent by the greater improvement on the harder test problems and some success on one of the transfer problems. Because the harder problems require the participants to accurately construct models of relatively complex probabilistic situations and to make interpretations involving interconnected relations, this suggests that the PSD group may have developed a higher level of conceptual understanding. The difference between groups is noteworthy for four reasons. First, this was the first attempt to develop a curriculum for probability theory using PS diagrams, whereas the materials for the CON group were based on the third edition of an established mathematics text. Second, the design of the PS diagram materials was not done by experienced mathematics teachers. Third, a conventional ''book learning'' pedagogic approach was taken without any individual scaffolding of the material for the learners. Fourth, there were no instructional interactions with the participants other than on minor points for clarification.

There is some evidence that PS diagrams supported the acquisition and use of effective problem-solving procedures: There was extensive use of the PS diagrams on the posttest problems; PS diagrams were used in many attempts on the transfer problems; the proportion of correct answers given the use of a PS diagram was greater than for the conventional representations; solution methods of the PSD group were largely consistent with each other, whereas the CON group solutions were often idiosyncratic. The minimal use of the

conventional techniques by the CON group in the posttest and transfer problems implies that the participants had either not acquired the conventional methods or that they did not know how to apply them effectively.

6. Discussion

6.1. Scope of PS diagrams and pedagogic implications

The theoretical comparison showed the conventional approach to be poor in plastic generativity terms, which was revealed in the experiment by participants often reaching impasses, abandoning their given representations, and often reverting to informal verbal reasoning. In contrast, PSD group appeared to generate meaningful expressions that met problem-solving goals but in a fashion that was constrained. The solutions were often complete and their similarity across participants suggests that PS diagrams have semantic transparency.

Overall, PS diagrams do appear to support problem solving and learning better than the conventional approach, at least for the level of complexity of the problems considered here. PS diagrams do not extend well to modeling situations in which there are many possible outcomes over multiple trials, because the diagrams become unwieldy. For situations with two trials and multiple possible outcomes, the conventional approach has an advantage that a two-dimensional outcome table may be used. However, for more complex situations a strategy such as focusing on the subset of outcomes must be used, as would be the case with PS diagrams. No claim is made that PS diagrams are in general more effective than the conventional approach; rather for problems of relatively low complexity they have greater semantic transparency and plastic generativity, which means that they may provide learners with a superior conceptual grounding in the domain.

If PS diagrams are superior in some ways, then an obvious pedagogic question is whether they should supplant or supplement the conventional approach. The answer depends on one's instructional goals rather than an assessment of which approach is in general more effective cognitively. For a basic fundamental grounding PS diagrams may alone suffice, but if the learners are expected to eventually model complex situations or to perform sophisticated analyses, then a transition to the conventional approach will be required. Fortunately, a consequence of directly encoding the fundamental conceptual structure of the domain under the REEP approach is that PS diagrams are mathematically compatible with the conventional approach. The spatial and geometrical rules that govern the diagrams capture the laws of set theory and probability theory; all the equations in the top half of Table 1 can be mapped directly to particular configurations in PS diagrams. Hence, it is feasible to create a curriculum that begins with PS diagrams to give a solid conceptual understanding before transitioning to the full mathematical power of the conventional approach. Whether this is an effective overall pedagogic strategy is an open question.

6.2. REEP implications

The design of PS diagrams and the demonstration of their efficacy provide some further support for the validity and utility for REEP design principles, which attempt to give representations semantic transparency and plastic generativity.

In order to recodify the knowledge of a domain, we must break a representational vicious circle: Somehow the fundamental conceptual structure of the target domain must be analyzed, but our understanding of it is grounded in conceptual structures provided by the extant representation that we wish to redesign. The notion of conceptual dimensions in the REEP approach is an attempt to provide a ''language'' for the interrogation of conceptual structures in a relatively domain- and representation-independent manner. Probability theory was particularly challenging compared to the previous domains that have been recodified (mentioned in the Introduction), because of the extent to which the meanings of the fundamental concepts are closely tied to the definitions of the conventional approach. Hence, the successful recodification provides some further support for the utility of this form of analysis.

The learners using PS diagrams appear to have benefited from a better comprehension of the concepts of the domain and had more successful problem-solving procedures. Greater problem-solving success may have enhanced learning by exposing learners to a greater proportion of complete and correct cases: a better signal to noise ratio of learning episodes. This provides some further support for the claim (Cheng, 2002) that the representational system used for learning not only affects the ease of learning but also determines how learning occurs, the structure of the knowledge that develops, and the problem-solving procedures acquired.

Some accounts that posit the challenges of probability theory arise from the intrinsic characteristics of the domain, such as the abstract aleotoric concept of chance (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) or the need to reason through disjunctions (Shafir, 1994). The recodification of the domain in PS diagrams, which enabled better performance on the hard and transfer problems, suggests an alternative view. Probability theory may not intrinsically be difficult to learn. Rather the codification of the conventional approach puts up barriers, which are not inevitable, that hide the fundamental nature of the domain and so demands deliberate effort to overcome. In other words, learners' efforts that could be expending on comprehending the domain are diverted to the acquisition of skills to manage the representations in themselves.

All this provides some support for the central claim of the REEP approach that an effective representational system should encode the fundamental conceptual structure of its knowledge domain. At a fundamental level probability theory is relatively simple; there are a small number of axioms that underpin set theory and probability relations. By capturing these laws and invariants in the structure of the PS diagrams, this inherent simplicity seems to have been preserved. Hence, the intricacies of modeling particular situations with PS diagrams appears to be a reflection of the interactions and contingencies of the modeled situation itself rather than an artefact of the structure and function of the representational system. The drawing of a PS diagram is, in effect, reproducing the steps that occur in the

situation itself and the elegance that some PS diagrams appear to possess may be interpreted as a manifestation of the way the underlying symmetries and laws of the domain are directly encoded in this diagrammatic representation.

The focus on recodifying the fundamental conceptual structure of knowledge domains is the main way in which the REEP approach differs from other methods to the design of visual displays that are based on task-oriented perspectives (e.g., Endsley et al., 2003; Vincente, 1996) or that address the overt informational dimensions of a domain (e.g., Card et al., 1999; Engelhardt, 2002; Zhang, 1996). However, the REEP approach is compatible with such approaches in that it is appropriate to apply them at the level of the third epistemic principle proposed above, because this principle deals with how individual representational schemes should coherently encode a set of concepts for a single conceptual dimension. Nevertheless, the REEP approach suggests that principles at the cognitive level should take a secondary role in the overall design of representational systems for complex domains, because effectively encoding the conceptual structure may produce representations that naturally have semantic transparency and plastic generativity over a greater range of the domain.

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